aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/contrib/restricted/aws/s2n/tls/s2n_client_key_exchange.c
blob: 37f4964f911c75dc46158a14ae57b31be832f887 (plain) (blame)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
/*
 * Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License").
 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * A copy of the License is located at
 *
 *  http://aws.amazon.com/apache2.0
 *
 * or in the "license" file accompanying this file. This file is distributed
 * on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either
 * express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing
 * permissions and limitations under the License.
 */

#include <sys/param.h>
#include "api/s2n.h"

#include "error/s2n_errno.h"

#include "tls/s2n_async_pkey.h"
#include "tls/s2n_handshake.h"
#include "tls/s2n_kem.h"
#include "tls/s2n_cipher_suites.h"
#include "tls/s2n_connection.h"
#include "tls/s2n_kex.h"
#include "tls/s2n_key_log.h"
#include "tls/s2n_resume.h"

#include "stuffer/s2n_stuffer.h"

#include "crypto/s2n_dhe.h"
#include "crypto/s2n_rsa.h"
#include "crypto/s2n_pkey.h"

#include "utils/s2n_safety.h"
#include "utils/s2n_random.h"

#define get_client_hello_protocol_version(conn) (conn->client_hello_version == S2N_SSLv2 ? conn->client_protocol_version : conn->client_hello_version)

typedef S2N_RESULT s2n_kex_client_key_method(const struct s2n_kex *kex, struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key);
typedef void *s2n_stuffer_action(struct s2n_stuffer *stuffer, uint32_t data_len);

static int s2n_rsa_client_key_recv_complete(struct s2n_connection *conn, bool rsa_failed, struct s2n_blob *shared_key);

static int s2n_hybrid_client_action(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *combined_shared_key,
        s2n_kex_client_key_method kex_method, uint32_t *cursor, s2n_stuffer_action stuffer_action)
{
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(kex_method);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(stuffer_action);

    struct s2n_stuffer *io = &conn->handshake.io;
    const struct s2n_kex *hybrid_kex_0 = conn->secure->cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg->hybrid[0];
    const struct s2n_kex *hybrid_kex_1 = conn->secure->cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg->hybrid[1];

    /* Keep a copy to the start of the entire hybrid client key exchange message for the hybrid PRF */
    struct s2n_blob *client_key_exchange_message = &conn->kex_params.client_key_exchange_message;
    client_key_exchange_message->data = stuffer_action(io, 0);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(client_key_exchange_message->data);
    const uint32_t start_cursor = *cursor;

    DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob shared_key_0 = {0}, s2n_free);
    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(kex_method(hybrid_kex_0, conn, &shared_key_0));

    struct s2n_blob *shared_key_1 = &(conn->kex_params.kem_params.shared_secret);
    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(kex_method(hybrid_kex_1, conn, shared_key_1));

    const uint32_t end_cursor = *cursor;
    POSIX_ENSURE_GTE(end_cursor, start_cursor);
    client_key_exchange_message->size = end_cursor - start_cursor;

    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_alloc(combined_shared_key, shared_key_0.size + shared_key_1->size));
    struct s2n_stuffer stuffer_combiner = {0};
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&stuffer_combiner, combined_shared_key));
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&stuffer_combiner, &shared_key_0));
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&stuffer_combiner, shared_key_1));

    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_kem_free(&conn->kex_params.kem_params));

    return 0;
}

static int s2n_calculate_keys(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure->cipher_suite);

    /* Turn the pre-master secret into a master secret */
    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_kex_tls_prf(conn->secure->cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg, conn, shared_key));

    /* Expand the keys */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_prf_key_expansion(conn));
    /* Save the master secret in the cache.
     * Failing to cache the session should not affect the current handshake.
     */
    if (s2n_allowed_to_cache_connection(conn)) {
        s2n_result_ignore(s2n_store_to_cache(conn));
    }
    /* log the secret, if needed */
    s2n_result_ignore(s2n_key_log_tls12_secret(conn));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_rsa_client_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    /* Set shared_key before async guard to pass the proper shared_key to the caller upon async completion */
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(shared_key);
    shared_key->data = conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret;
    shared_key->size = S2N_TLS_SECRET_LEN;

    S2N_ASYNC_PKEY_GUARD(conn);

    struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;
    uint8_t client_hello_protocol_version[S2N_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEN];
    uint16_t length;

    if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
        length = s2n_stuffer_data_available(in);
    } else {
        POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint16(in, &length));
    }

    S2N_ERROR_IF(length > s2n_stuffer_data_available(in), S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);

    /* Keep a copy of the client hello version in wire format, which should be
     * either the protocol version supported by client if the supported version is <= TLS1.2,
     * or TLS1.2 (the legacy version) if client supported version is TLS1.3
     */
    uint8_t legacy_client_hello_protocol_version = get_client_hello_protocol_version(conn);
    client_hello_protocol_version[0] = legacy_client_hello_protocol_version / 10;
    client_hello_protocol_version[1] = legacy_client_hello_protocol_version % 10;

    /* Decrypt the pre-master secret */
    struct s2n_blob encrypted = {.size = length, .data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(in, length)};
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(encrypted.data);
    POSIX_ENSURE_GT(encrypted.size, 0);

    /* First: use a random pre-master secret */
    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_get_private_random_data(shared_key));
    conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret[0] = client_hello_protocol_version[0];
    conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret[1] = client_hello_protocol_version[1];

    S2N_ASYNC_PKEY_DECRYPT(conn, &encrypted, shared_key, s2n_rsa_client_key_recv_complete);
}

int s2n_rsa_client_key_recv_complete(struct s2n_connection *conn, bool rsa_failed, struct s2n_blob *decrypted)
{
    S2N_ERROR_IF(decrypted->size != S2N_TLS_SECRET_LEN, S2N_ERR_SIZE_MISMATCH);

    /* Avoid copying the same buffer for the case where async pkey is not used */
    if (conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret != decrypted->data) {
        /* Copy (maybe) decrypted data into shared key */
        POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret, decrypted->data, S2N_TLS_SECRET_LEN);
    }

    /* Get client hello protocol version for comparison with decrypted data */
    uint8_t legacy_client_hello_protocol_version = get_client_hello_protocol_version(conn);
    uint8_t client_hello_protocol_version[S2N_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEN];
    client_hello_protocol_version[0] = legacy_client_hello_protocol_version / 10;
    client_hello_protocol_version[1] = legacy_client_hello_protocol_version % 10;

    conn->handshake.rsa_failed = rsa_failed;

    /* Set rsa_failed to true, if it isn't already, if the protocol version isn't what we expect */
    conn->handshake.rsa_failed |= !s2n_constant_time_equals(client_hello_protocol_version,
            conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret, S2N_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEN);

    return 0;
}

int s2n_dhe_client_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;

    /* Get the shared key */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_dh_compute_shared_secret_as_server(&conn->kex_params.server_dh_params, in, shared_key));
    /* We don't need the server params any more */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_dh_params_free(&conn->kex_params.server_dh_params));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_ecdhe_client_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    struct s2n_stuffer *in = &conn->handshake.io;

    /* Get the shared key */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_ecc_evp_compute_shared_secret_as_server(&conn->kex_params.server_ecc_evp_params, in, shared_key));
    /* We don't need the server params any more */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_ecc_evp_params_free(&conn->kex_params.server_ecc_evp_params));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_kem_client_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    /* s2n_kem_recv_ciphertext() writes the KEM shared secret directly to
     * conn->kex_params.kem_params. However, the calling function
     * likely expects *shared_key to point to the shared secret. We 
     * can't reassign *shared_key to point to kem_params.shared_secret,
     * because that would require us to take struct s2n_blob **shared_key
     * as the argument, but we can't (easily) change the function signature
     * because it has to be consistent with what is defined in s2n_kex.
     *
     * So, we assert that the caller already has *shared_key pointing
     * to kem_params.shared_secret. */
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(shared_key);
    S2N_ERROR_IF(shared_key != &(conn->kex_params.kem_params.shared_secret), S2N_ERR_SAFETY);

    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_kem_recv_ciphertext(&(conn->handshake.io), &(conn->kex_params.kem_params)));

    return 0;
}

int s2n_hybrid_client_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *combined_shared_key)
{
    return s2n_hybrid_client_action(conn, combined_shared_key, &s2n_kex_client_key_recv, &conn->handshake.io.read_cursor,
            &s2n_stuffer_raw_read);
}

int s2n_client_key_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure->cipher_suite);

    const struct s2n_kex *key_exchange = conn->secure->cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg;
    DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob shared_key = { 0 }, s2n_blob_zeroize_free);
    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_kex_client_key_recv(key_exchange, conn, &shared_key));

    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_calculate_keys(conn, &shared_key));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_dhe_client_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    struct s2n_stuffer *out = &conn->handshake.io;
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_dh_compute_shared_secret_as_client(&conn->kex_params.server_dh_params, out, shared_key));

    /* We don't need the server params any more */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_dh_params_free(&conn->kex_params.server_dh_params));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_ecdhe_client_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    struct s2n_stuffer *out = &conn->handshake.io;
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_ecc_evp_compute_shared_secret_as_client(&conn->kex_params.server_ecc_evp_params, out, shared_key));

    /* We don't need the server params any more */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_ecc_evp_params_free(&conn->kex_params.server_ecc_evp_params));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_rsa_client_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    uint8_t client_hello_protocol_version[S2N_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEN];
    uint8_t legacy_client_hello_protocol_version = get_client_hello_protocol_version(conn);
    client_hello_protocol_version[0] = legacy_client_hello_protocol_version / 10;
    client_hello_protocol_version[1] = legacy_client_hello_protocol_version % 10;

    shared_key->data = conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret;
    shared_key->size = S2N_TLS_SECRET_LEN;

    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_get_private_random_data(shared_key));

    /* Over-write the first two bytes with the client hello version, per RFC2246/RFC4346/RFC5246 7.4.7.1.
     * The latest version supported by client (as seen from the the client hello version) are <= TLS1.2
     * for all clients, because TLS 1.3 clients freezes the TLS1.2 legacy version in client hello.
     */
    POSIX_CHECKED_MEMCPY(conn->secrets.tls12.rsa_premaster_secret, client_hello_protocol_version, S2N_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_LEN);

    uint32_t encrypted_size = 0;
    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_pkey_size(&conn->handshake_params.server_public_key, &encrypted_size));
    S2N_ERROR_IF(encrypted_size > 0xffff, S2N_ERR_SIZE_MISMATCH);

    if (conn->actual_protocol_version > S2N_SSLv3) {
        POSIX_GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(&conn->handshake.io, encrypted_size));
    }

    struct s2n_blob encrypted = {0};
    encrypted.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(&conn->handshake.io, encrypted_size);
    encrypted.size = encrypted_size;
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(encrypted.data);

    /* Encrypt the secret and send it on */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_pkey_encrypt(&conn->handshake_params.server_public_key, shared_key, &encrypted));

    /* We don't need the key any more, so free it */
    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_pkey_free(&conn->handshake_params.server_public_key));
    return 0;
}

int s2n_kem_client_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *shared_key)
{
    /* s2n_kem_send_ciphertext() writes the KEM shared secret directly to
     * conn->kex_params.kem_params. However, the calling function
     * likely expects *shared_key to point to the shared secret. We
     * can't reassign *shared_key to point to kem_params.shared_secret,
     * because that would require us to take struct s2n_blob **shared_key
     * as the argument, but we can't (easily) change the function signature
     * because it has to be consistent with what is defined in s2n_kex.
     *
     * So, we assert that the caller already has *shared_key pointing
     * to kem_params.shared_secret. */
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(shared_key);
    S2N_ERROR_IF(shared_key != &(conn->kex_params.kem_params.shared_secret), S2N_ERR_SAFETY);

    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_kem_send_ciphertext(&(conn->handshake.io), &(conn->kex_params.kem_params)));

    return 0;
}

int s2n_hybrid_client_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *combined_shared_key)
{
    return s2n_hybrid_client_action(conn, combined_shared_key, &s2n_kex_client_key_send, &conn->handshake.io.write_cursor,
                                    s2n_stuffer_raw_write);
}

int s2n_client_key_send(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure);
    POSIX_ENSURE_REF(conn->secure->cipher_suite);

    const struct s2n_kex *key_exchange = conn->secure->cipher_suite->key_exchange_alg;
    DEFER_CLEANUP(struct s2n_blob shared_key = { 0 }, s2n_blob_zeroize_free);

    POSIX_GUARD_RESULT(s2n_kex_client_key_send(key_exchange, conn, &shared_key));

    POSIX_GUARD(s2n_calculate_keys(conn, &shared_key));
    return 0;
}