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/*
* Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* A copy of the License is located at
*
* http://aws.amazon.com/apache2.0
*
* or in the "license" file accompanying this file. This file is distributed
* on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either
* express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing
* permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "error/s2n_errno.h"
#include "utils/s2n_safety.h"
#include "utils/s2n_mem.h"
#include "crypto/s2n_hmac.h"
#include "tls/s2n_connection.h"
#include "tls/s2n_record.h"
/* A TLS CBC record looks like ..
*
* [ Payload data ] [ HMAC ] [ Padding ] [ Padding length byte ]
*
* Each byte in the padding is expected to be set to the same value
* as the padding length byte. So if the padding length byte is '2'
* then the padding will be [ '2', '2' ] (there'll be three bytes
* set to that value if you include the padding length byte).
*
* The goal of s2n_verify_cbc() is to verify that the padding and hmac
* are correct, without leaking (via timing) how much padding there
* actually is: as this is considered secret.
*
* In addition to our efforts here though, s2n also wraps any CBC
* verification error (or record parsing error in general) with
* a randomized delay of between 1ms and 10 seconds. See s2n_connection.c.
* This amount of delay randomization is sufficient to increase the
* complexity of attack for even a 1 microsecond timing leak (which
* is quite large) by a factor of around 83 trillion.
*/
int s2n_verify_cbc(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_hmac_state *hmac, struct s2n_blob *decrypted)
{
uint8_t mac_digest_size;
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_hmac_digest_size(hmac->alg, &mac_digest_size));
/* The record has to be at least big enough to contain the MAC,
* plus the padding length byte */
POSIX_ENSURE_GT(decrypted->size, mac_digest_size);
int payload_and_padding_size = decrypted->size - mac_digest_size;
/* Determine what the padding length is */
uint8_t padding_length = decrypted->data[decrypted->size - 1];
int payload_length = MAX(payload_and_padding_size - padding_length - 1, 0);
/* Update the MAC */
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(hmac, decrypted->data, payload_length));
int currently_in_hash_block = hmac->currently_in_hash_block;
/* Check the MAC */
uint8_t check_digest[S2N_MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
POSIX_ENSURE_LTE(mac_digest_size, sizeof(check_digest));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_hmac_digest_two_compression_rounds(hmac, check_digest, mac_digest_size));
int mismatches = s2n_constant_time_equals(decrypted->data + payload_length, check_digest, mac_digest_size) ^ 1;
/* Compute a MAC on the rest of the data so that we perform the same number of hash operations.
* Include the partial hash block from the first MAC to ensure we use the same number of blocks.
*/
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_hmac_reset(hmac));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(hmac, decrypted->data, currently_in_hash_block));
POSIX_GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(hmac, decrypted->data + payload_length + mac_digest_size, decrypted->size - payload_length - mac_digest_size - 1));
/* SSLv3 doesn't specify what the padding should actually be */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
return 0 - mismatches;
}
/* Check the maximum amount that could theoretically be padding */
int check = MIN(255, (payload_and_padding_size - 1));
int cutoff = check - padding_length;
for (uint32_t i = 0, j = decrypted->size - 1 - check; i < check && j < decrypted->size; i++, j++) {
uint8_t mask = ~(0xff << ((i >= cutoff) * 8));
mismatches |= (decrypted->data[j] ^ padding_length) & mask;
}
S2N_ERROR_IF(mismatches, S2N_ERR_CBC_VERIFY);
return 0;
}
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