diff options
author | vitalyisaev <vitalyisaev@ydb.tech> | 2023-12-12 21:55:07 +0300 |
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committer | vitalyisaev <vitalyisaev@ydb.tech> | 2023-12-12 22:25:10 +0300 |
commit | 4967f99474a4040ba150eb04995de06342252718 (patch) | |
tree | c9c118836513a8fab6e9fcfb25be5d404338bca7 /vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRoleWithSAML.go | |
parent | 2ce9cccb9b0bdd4cd7a3491dc5cbf8687cda51de (diff) | |
download | ydb-4967f99474a4040ba150eb04995de06342252718.tar.gz |
YQ Connector: prepare code base for S3 integration
1. Кодовая база Коннектора переписана с помощью Go дженериков так, чтобы добавление нового источника данных (в частности S3 + csv) максимально переиспользовало имеющийся код (чтобы сохранялась логика нарезания на блоки данных, учёт трафика и пр.)
2. API Connector расширено для работы с S3, но ещё пока не протестировано.
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRoleWithSAML.go')
-rw-r--r-- | vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRoleWithSAML.go | 482 |
1 files changed, 482 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRoleWithSAML.go b/vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRoleWithSAML.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9c33720d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRoleWithSAML.go @@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ +// Code generated by smithy-go-codegen DO NOT EDIT. + +package sts + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws" + awsmiddleware "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/middleware" + internalauth "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/auth" + "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/types" + smithyendpoints "github.com/aws/smithy-go/endpoints" + "github.com/aws/smithy-go/middleware" + smithyhttp "github.com/aws/smithy-go/transport/http" +) + +// Returns a set of temporary security credentials for users who have been +// authenticated via a SAML authentication response. This operation provides a +// mechanism for tying an enterprise identity store or directory to role-based +// Amazon Web Services access without user-specific credentials or configuration. +// For a comparison of AssumeRoleWithSAML with the other API operations that +// produce temporary credentials, see Requesting Temporary Security Credentials (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html) +// and Comparing the Amazon Web Services STS API operations (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html#stsapi_comparison) +// in the IAM User Guide. The temporary security credentials returned by this +// operation consist of an access key ID, a secret access key, and a security +// token. Applications can use these temporary security credentials to sign calls +// to Amazon Web Services services. Session Duration By default, the temporary +// security credentials created by AssumeRoleWithSAML last for one hour. However, +// you can use the optional DurationSeconds parameter to specify the duration of +// your session. Your role session lasts for the duration that you specify, or +// until the time specified in the SAML authentication response's +// SessionNotOnOrAfter value, whichever is shorter. You can provide a +// DurationSeconds value from 900 seconds (15 minutes) up to the maximum session +// duration setting for the role. This setting can have a value from 1 hour to 12 +// hours. To learn how to view the maximum value for your role, see View the +// Maximum Session Duration Setting for a Role (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use.html#id_roles_use_view-role-max-session) +// in the IAM User Guide. The maximum session duration limit applies when you use +// the AssumeRole* API operations or the assume-role* CLI commands. However the +// limit does not apply when you use those operations to create a console URL. For +// more information, see Using IAM Roles (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. Role chaining (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_terms-and-concepts.html#iam-term-role-chaining) +// limits your CLI or Amazon Web Services API role session to a maximum of one +// hour. When you use the AssumeRole API operation to assume a role, you can +// specify the duration of your role session with the DurationSeconds parameter. +// You can specify a parameter value of up to 43200 seconds (12 hours), depending +// on the maximum session duration setting for your role. However, if you assume a +// role using role chaining and provide a DurationSeconds parameter value greater +// than one hour, the operation fails. Permissions The temporary security +// credentials created by AssumeRoleWithSAML can be used to make API calls to any +// Amazon Web Services service with the following exception: you cannot call the +// STS GetFederationToken or GetSessionToken API operations. (Optional) You can +// pass inline or managed session policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session) +// to this operation. You can pass a single JSON policy document to use as an +// inline session policy. You can also specify up to 10 managed policy Amazon +// Resource Names (ARNs) to use as managed session policies. The plaintext that you +// use for both inline and managed session policies can't exceed 2,048 characters. +// Passing policies to this operation returns new temporary credentials. The +// resulting session's permissions are the intersection of the role's +// identity-based policy and the session policies. You can use the role's temporary +// credentials in subsequent Amazon Web Services API calls to access resources in +// the account that owns the role. You cannot use session policies to grant more +// permissions than those allowed by the identity-based policy of the role that is +// being assumed. For more information, see Session Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session) +// in the IAM User Guide. Calling AssumeRoleWithSAML does not require the use of +// Amazon Web Services security credentials. The identity of the caller is +// validated by using keys in the metadata document that is uploaded for the SAML +// provider entity for your identity provider. Calling AssumeRoleWithSAML can +// result in an entry in your CloudTrail logs. The entry includes the value in the +// NameID element of the SAML assertion. We recommend that you use a NameIDType +// that is not associated with any personally identifiable information (PII). For +// example, you could instead use the persistent identifier ( +// urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent ). Tags (Optional) You can +// configure your IdP to pass attributes into your SAML assertion as session tags. +// Each session tag consists of a key name and an associated value. For more +// information about session tags, see Passing Session Tags in STS (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. You can pass up to 50 session tags. The plaintext session +// tag keys can’t exceed 128 characters and the values can’t exceed 256 characters. +// For these and additional limits, see IAM and STS Character Limits (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_iam-limits.html#reference_iam-limits-entity-length) +// in the IAM User Guide. An Amazon Web Services conversion compresses the passed +// inline session policy, managed policy ARNs, and session tags into a packed +// binary format that has a separate limit. Your request can fail for this limit +// even if your plaintext meets the other requirements. The PackedPolicySize +// response element indicates by percentage how close the policies and tags for +// your request are to the upper size limit. You can pass a session tag with the +// same key as a tag that is attached to the role. When you do, session tags +// override the role's tags with the same key. An administrator must grant you the +// permissions necessary to pass session tags. The administrator can also create +// granular permissions to allow you to pass only specific session tags. For more +// information, see Tutorial: Using Tags for Attribute-Based Access Control (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/tutorial_attribute-based-access-control.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. You can set the session tags as transitive. Transitive +// tags persist during role chaining. For more information, see Chaining Roles +// with Session Tags (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html#id_session-tags_role-chaining) +// in the IAM User Guide. SAML Configuration Before your application can call +// AssumeRoleWithSAML , you must configure your SAML identity provider (IdP) to +// issue the claims required by Amazon Web Services. Additionally, you must use +// Identity and Access Management (IAM) to create a SAML provider entity in your +// Amazon Web Services account that represents your identity provider. You must +// also create an IAM role that specifies this SAML provider in its trust policy. +// For more information, see the following resources: +// - About SAML 2.0-based Federation (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_saml.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. +// - Creating SAML Identity Providers (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_create_saml.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. +// - Configuring a Relying Party and Claims (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_create_saml_relying-party.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. +// - Creating a Role for SAML 2.0 Federation (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create_for-idp_saml.html) +// in the IAM User Guide. +func (c *Client) AssumeRoleWithSAML(ctx context.Context, params *AssumeRoleWithSAMLInput, optFns ...func(*Options)) (*AssumeRoleWithSAMLOutput, error) { + if params == nil { + params = &AssumeRoleWithSAMLInput{} + } + + result, metadata, err := c.invokeOperation(ctx, "AssumeRoleWithSAML", params, optFns, c.addOperationAssumeRoleWithSAMLMiddlewares) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + out := result.(*AssumeRoleWithSAMLOutput) + out.ResultMetadata = metadata + return out, nil +} + +type AssumeRoleWithSAMLInput struct { + + // The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the SAML provider in IAM that describes the + // IdP. + // + // This member is required. + PrincipalArn *string + + // The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the role that the caller is assuming. + // + // This member is required. + RoleArn *string + + // The base64 encoded SAML authentication response provided by the IdP. For more + // information, see Configuring a Relying Party and Adding Claims (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/create-role-saml-IdP-tasks.html) + // in the IAM User Guide. + // + // This member is required. + SAMLAssertion *string + + // The duration, in seconds, of the role session. Your role session lasts for the + // duration that you specify for the DurationSeconds parameter, or until the time + // specified in the SAML authentication response's SessionNotOnOrAfter value, + // whichever is shorter. You can provide a DurationSeconds value from 900 seconds + // (15 minutes) up to the maximum session duration setting for the role. This + // setting can have a value from 1 hour to 12 hours. If you specify a value higher + // than this setting, the operation fails. For example, if you specify a session + // duration of 12 hours, but your administrator set the maximum session duration to + // 6 hours, your operation fails. To learn how to view the maximum value for your + // role, see View the Maximum Session Duration Setting for a Role (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use.html#id_roles_use_view-role-max-session) + // in the IAM User Guide. By default, the value is set to 3600 seconds. The + // DurationSeconds parameter is separate from the duration of a console session + // that you might request using the returned credentials. The request to the + // federation endpoint for a console sign-in token takes a SessionDuration + // parameter that specifies the maximum length of the console session. For more + // information, see Creating a URL that Enables Federated Users to Access the + // Amazon Web Services Management Console (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_enable-console-custom-url.html) + // in the IAM User Guide. + DurationSeconds *int32 + + // An IAM policy in JSON format that you want to use as an inline session policy. + // This parameter is optional. Passing policies to this operation returns new + // temporary credentials. The resulting session's permissions are the intersection + // of the role's identity-based policy and the session policies. You can use the + // role's temporary credentials in subsequent Amazon Web Services API calls to + // access resources in the account that owns the role. You cannot use session + // policies to grant more permissions than those allowed by the identity-based + // policy of the role that is being assumed. For more information, see Session + // Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session) + // in the IAM User Guide. The plaintext that you use for both inline and managed + // session policies can't exceed 2,048 characters. The JSON policy characters can + // be any ASCII character from the space character to the end of the valid + // character list (\u0020 through \u00FF). It can also include the tab (\u0009), + // linefeed (\u000A), and carriage return (\u000D) characters. An Amazon Web + // Services conversion compresses the passed inline session policy, managed policy + // ARNs, and session tags into a packed binary format that has a separate limit. + // Your request can fail for this limit even if your plaintext meets the other + // requirements. The PackedPolicySize response element indicates by percentage how + // close the policies and tags for your request are to the upper size limit. + Policy *string + + // The Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) of the IAM managed policies that you want to + // use as managed session policies. The policies must exist in the same account as + // the role. This parameter is optional. You can provide up to 10 managed policy + // ARNs. However, the plaintext that you use for both inline and managed session + // policies can't exceed 2,048 characters. For more information about ARNs, see + // Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) and Amazon Web Services Service Namespaces (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws-arns-and-namespaces.html) + // in the Amazon Web Services General Reference. An Amazon Web Services conversion + // compresses the passed inline session policy, managed policy ARNs, and session + // tags into a packed binary format that has a separate limit. Your request can + // fail for this limit even if your plaintext meets the other requirements. The + // PackedPolicySize response element indicates by percentage how close the policies + // and tags for your request are to the upper size limit. Passing policies to this + // operation returns new temporary credentials. The resulting session's permissions + // are the intersection of the role's identity-based policy and the session + // policies. You can use the role's temporary credentials in subsequent Amazon Web + // Services API calls to access resources in the account that owns the role. You + // cannot use session policies to grant more permissions than those allowed by the + // identity-based policy of the role that is being assumed. For more information, + // see Session Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session) + // in the IAM User Guide. + PolicyArns []types.PolicyDescriptorType + + noSmithyDocumentSerde +} + +// Contains the response to a successful AssumeRoleWithSAML request, including +// temporary Amazon Web Services credentials that can be used to make Amazon Web +// Services requests. +type AssumeRoleWithSAMLOutput struct { + + // The identifiers for the temporary security credentials that the operation + // returns. + AssumedRoleUser *types.AssumedRoleUser + + // The value of the Recipient attribute of the SubjectConfirmationData element of + // the SAML assertion. + Audience *string + + // The temporary security credentials, which include an access key ID, a secret + // access key, and a security (or session) token. The size of the security token + // that STS API operations return is not fixed. We strongly recommend that you make + // no assumptions about the maximum size. + Credentials *types.Credentials + + // The value of the Issuer element of the SAML assertion. + Issuer *string + + // A hash value based on the concatenation of the following: + // - The Issuer response value. + // - The Amazon Web Services account ID. + // - The friendly name (the last part of the ARN) of the SAML provider in IAM. + // The combination of NameQualifier and Subject can be used to uniquely identify a + // user. The following pseudocode shows how the hash value is calculated: BASE64 ( + // SHA1 ( "https://example.com/saml" + "123456789012" + "/MySAMLIdP" ) ) + NameQualifier *string + + // A percentage value that indicates the packed size of the session policies and + // session tags combined passed in the request. The request fails if the packed + // size is greater than 100 percent, which means the policies and tags exceeded the + // allowed space. + PackedPolicySize *int32 + + // The value in the SourceIdentity attribute in the SAML assertion. You can + // require users to set a source identity value when they assume a role. You do + // this by using the sts:SourceIdentity condition key in a role trust policy. That + // way, actions that are taken with the role are associated with that user. After + // the source identity is set, the value cannot be changed. It is present in the + // request for all actions that are taken by the role and persists across chained + // role (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_terms-and-concepts#iam-term-role-chaining) + // sessions. You can configure your SAML identity provider to use an attribute + // associated with your users, like user name or email, as the source identity when + // calling AssumeRoleWithSAML . You do this by adding an attribute to the SAML + // assertion. For more information about using source identity, see Monitor and + // control actions taken with assumed roles (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_control-access_monitor.html) + // in the IAM User Guide. The regex used to validate this parameter is a string of + // characters consisting of upper- and lower-case alphanumeric characters with no + // spaces. You can also include underscores or any of the following characters: + // =,.@- + SourceIdentity *string + + // The value of the NameID element in the Subject element of the SAML assertion. + Subject *string + + // The format of the name ID, as defined by the Format attribute in the NameID + // element of the SAML assertion. Typical examples of the format are transient or + // persistent . If the format includes the prefix + // urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format , that prefix is removed. For example, + // urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient is returned as transient . + // If the format includes any other prefix, the format is returned with no + // modifications. + SubjectType *string + + // Metadata pertaining to the operation's result. + ResultMetadata middleware.Metadata + + noSmithyDocumentSerde +} + +func (c *Client) addOperationAssumeRoleWithSAMLMiddlewares(stack *middleware.Stack, options Options) (err error) { + err = stack.Serialize.Add(&awsAwsquery_serializeOpAssumeRoleWithSAML{}, middleware.After) + if err != nil { + return err + } + err = stack.Deserialize.Add(&awsAwsquery_deserializeOpAssumeRoleWithSAML{}, middleware.After) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addlegacyEndpointContextSetter(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addSetLoggerMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = awsmiddleware.AddClientRequestIDMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = smithyhttp.AddComputeContentLengthMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addRetryMiddlewares(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = awsmiddleware.AddRawResponseToMetadata(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = awsmiddleware.AddRecordResponseTiming(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addClientUserAgent(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = smithyhttp.AddErrorCloseResponseBodyMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = smithyhttp.AddCloseResponseBodyMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addAssumeRoleWithSAMLResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addOpAssumeRoleWithSAMLValidationMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = stack.Initialize.Add(newServiceMetadataMiddleware_opAssumeRoleWithSAML(options.Region), middleware.Before); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = awsmiddleware.AddRecursionDetection(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addRequestIDRetrieverMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addResponseErrorMiddleware(stack); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addRequestResponseLogging(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = addendpointDisableHTTPSMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} + +func newServiceMetadataMiddleware_opAssumeRoleWithSAML(region string) *awsmiddleware.RegisterServiceMetadata { + return &awsmiddleware.RegisterServiceMetadata{ + Region: region, + ServiceID: ServiceID, + SigningName: "sts", + OperationName: "AssumeRoleWithSAML", + } +} + +type opAssumeRoleWithSAMLResolveEndpointMiddleware struct { + EndpointResolver EndpointResolverV2 + BuiltInResolver builtInParameterResolver +} + +func (*opAssumeRoleWithSAMLResolveEndpointMiddleware) ID() string { + return "ResolveEndpointV2" +} + +func (m *opAssumeRoleWithSAMLResolveEndpointMiddleware) HandleSerialize(ctx context.Context, in middleware.SerializeInput, next middleware.SerializeHandler) ( + out middleware.SerializeOutput, metadata middleware.Metadata, err error, +) { + if awsmiddleware.GetRequiresLegacyEndpoints(ctx) { + return next.HandleSerialize(ctx, in) + } + + req, ok := in.Request.(*smithyhttp.Request) + if !ok { + return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf("unknown transport type %T", in.Request) + } + + if m.EndpointResolver == nil { + return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf("expected endpoint resolver to not be nil") + } + + params := EndpointParameters{} + + m.BuiltInResolver.ResolveBuiltIns(¶ms) + + var resolvedEndpoint smithyendpoints.Endpoint + resolvedEndpoint, err = m.EndpointResolver.ResolveEndpoint(ctx, params) + if err != nil { + return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve service endpoint, %w", err) + } + + req.URL = &resolvedEndpoint.URI + + for k := range resolvedEndpoint.Headers { + req.Header.Set( + k, + resolvedEndpoint.Headers.Get(k), + ) + } + + authSchemes, err := internalauth.GetAuthenticationSchemes(&resolvedEndpoint.Properties) + if err != nil { + var nfe *internalauth.NoAuthenticationSchemesFoundError + if errors.As(err, &nfe) { + // if no auth scheme is found, default to sigv4 + signingName := "sts" + signingRegion := m.BuiltInResolver.(*builtInResolver).Region + ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningName(ctx, signingName) + ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningRegion(ctx, signingRegion) + + } + var ue *internalauth.UnSupportedAuthenticationSchemeSpecifiedError + if errors.As(err, &ue) { + return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf( + "This operation requests signer version(s) %v but the client only supports %v", + ue.UnsupportedSchemes, + internalauth.SupportedSchemes, + ) + } + } + + for _, authScheme := range authSchemes { + switch authScheme.(type) { + case *internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4: + v4Scheme, _ := authScheme.(*internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4) + var signingName, signingRegion string + if v4Scheme.SigningName == nil { + signingName = "sts" + } else { + signingName = *v4Scheme.SigningName + } + if v4Scheme.SigningRegion == nil { + signingRegion = m.BuiltInResolver.(*builtInResolver).Region + } else { + signingRegion = *v4Scheme.SigningRegion + } + if v4Scheme.DisableDoubleEncoding != nil { + // The signer sets an equivalent value at client initialization time. + // Setting this context value will cause the signer to extract it + // and override the value set at client initialization time. + ctx = internalauth.SetDisableDoubleEncoding(ctx, *v4Scheme.DisableDoubleEncoding) + } + ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningName(ctx, signingName) + ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningRegion(ctx, signingRegion) + break + case *internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4A: + v4aScheme, _ := authScheme.(*internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4A) + if v4aScheme.SigningName == nil { + v4aScheme.SigningName = aws.String("sts") + } + if v4aScheme.DisableDoubleEncoding != nil { + // The signer sets an equivalent value at client initialization time. + // Setting this context value will cause the signer to extract it + // and override the value set at client initialization time. + ctx = internalauth.SetDisableDoubleEncoding(ctx, *v4aScheme.DisableDoubleEncoding) + } + ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningName(ctx, *v4aScheme.SigningName) + ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningRegion(ctx, v4aScheme.SigningRegionSet[0]) + break + case *internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeNone: + break + } + } + + return next.HandleSerialize(ctx, in) +} + +func addAssumeRoleWithSAMLResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack *middleware.Stack, options Options) error { + return stack.Serialize.Insert(&opAssumeRoleWithSAMLResolveEndpointMiddleware{ + EndpointResolver: options.EndpointResolverV2, + BuiltInResolver: &builtInResolver{ + Region: options.Region, + UseDualStack: options.EndpointOptions.UseDualStackEndpoint, + UseFIPS: options.EndpointOptions.UseFIPSEndpoint, + Endpoint: options.BaseEndpoint, + }, + }, "ResolveEndpoint", middleware.After) +} |