YQ Connector: prepare code base for S3 integration

1. Кодовая база Коннектора переписана с помощью Go дженериков так, чтобы добавление нового источника данных (в частности S3 + csv) максимально переиспользовало имеющийся код (чтобы сохранялась логика нарезания на блоки данных, учёт трафика и пр.)
2. API Connector расширено для работы с S3, но ещё пока не протестировано.

1 files changed, 558 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRole.go b/vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRole.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ef7affc59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/api_op_AssumeRole.go
@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
+// Code generated by smithy-go-codegen DO NOT EDIT.
+
+package sts
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
+	awsmiddleware "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/middleware"
+	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/signer/v4"
+	internalauth "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts/types"
+	smithyendpoints "github.com/aws/smithy-go/endpoints"
+	"github.com/aws/smithy-go/middleware"
+	smithyhttp "github.com/aws/smithy-go/transport/http"
+)
+
+// Returns a set of temporary security credentials that you can use to access
+// Amazon Web Services resources. These temporary credentials consist of an access
+// key ID, a secret access key, and a security token. Typically, you use AssumeRole
+// within your account or for cross-account access. For a comparison of AssumeRole
+// with other API operations that produce temporary credentials, see Requesting
+// Temporary Security Credentials (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html)
+// and Comparing the Amazon Web Services STS API operations (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html#stsapi_comparison)
+// in the IAM User Guide. Permissions The temporary security credentials created by
+// AssumeRole can be used to make API calls to any Amazon Web Services service
+// with the following exception: You cannot call the Amazon Web Services STS
+// GetFederationToken or GetSessionToken API operations. (Optional) You can pass
+// inline or managed session policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session)
+// to this operation. You can pass a single JSON policy document to use as an
+// inline session policy. You can also specify up to 10 managed policy Amazon
+// Resource Names (ARNs) to use as managed session policies. The plaintext that you
+// use for both inline and managed session policies can't exceed 2,048 characters.
+// Passing policies to this operation returns new temporary credentials. The
+// resulting session's permissions are the intersection of the role's
+// identity-based policy and the session policies. You can use the role's temporary
+// credentials in subsequent Amazon Web Services API calls to access resources in
+// the account that owns the role. You cannot use session policies to grant more
+// permissions than those allowed by the identity-based policy of the role that is
+// being assumed. For more information, see Session Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session)
+// in the IAM User Guide. When you create a role, you create two policies: a role
+// trust policy that specifies who can assume the role, and a permissions policy
+// that specifies what can be done with the role. You specify the trusted principal
+// that is allowed to assume the role in the role trust policy. To assume a role
+// from a different account, your Amazon Web Services account must be trusted by
+// the role. The trust relationship is defined in the role's trust policy when the
+// role is created. That trust policy states which accounts are allowed to delegate
+// that access to users in the account. A user who wants to access a role in a
+// different account must also have permissions that are delegated from the account
+// administrator. The administrator must attach a policy that allows the user to
+// call AssumeRole for the ARN of the role in the other account. To allow a user
+// to assume a role in the same account, you can do either of the following:
+//   - Attach a policy to the user that allows the user to call AssumeRole (as long
+//     as the role's trust policy trusts the account).
+//   - Add the user as a principal directly in the role's trust policy.
+//
+// You can do either because the role’s trust policy acts as an IAM resource-based
+// policy. When a resource-based policy grants access to a principal in the same
+// account, no additional identity-based policy is required. For more information
+// about trust policies and resource-based policies, see IAM Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html)
+// in the IAM User Guide. Tags (Optional) You can pass tag key-value pairs to your
+// session. These tags are called session tags. For more information about session
+// tags, see Passing Session Tags in STS (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html)
+// in the IAM User Guide. An administrator must grant you the permissions necessary
+// to pass session tags. The administrator can also create granular permissions to
+// allow you to pass only specific session tags. For more information, see
+// Tutorial: Using Tags for Attribute-Based Access Control (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/tutorial_attribute-based-access-control.html)
+// in the IAM User Guide. You can set the session tags as transitive. Transitive
+// tags persist during role chaining. For more information, see Chaining Roles
+// with Session Tags (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html#id_session-tags_role-chaining)
+// in the IAM User Guide. Using MFA with AssumeRole (Optional) You can include
+// multi-factor authentication (MFA) information when you call AssumeRole . This is
+// useful for cross-account scenarios to ensure that the user that assumes the role
+// has been authenticated with an Amazon Web Services MFA device. In that scenario,
+// the trust policy of the role being assumed includes a condition that tests for
+// MFA authentication. If the caller does not include valid MFA information, the
+// request to assume the role is denied. The condition in a trust policy that tests
+// for MFA authentication might look like the following example. "Condition":
+// {"Bool": {"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": true}} For more information, see
+// Configuring MFA-Protected API Access (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/MFAProtectedAPI.html)
+// in the IAM User Guide guide. To use MFA with AssumeRole , you pass values for
+// the SerialNumber and TokenCode parameters. The SerialNumber value identifies
+// the user's hardware or virtual MFA device. The TokenCode is the time-based
+// one-time password (TOTP) that the MFA device produces.
+func (c *Client) AssumeRole(ctx context.Context, params *AssumeRoleInput, optFns ...func(*Options)) (*AssumeRoleOutput, error) {
+	if params == nil {
+		params = &AssumeRoleInput{}
+	}
+
+	result, metadata, err := c.invokeOperation(ctx, "AssumeRole", params, optFns, c.addOperationAssumeRoleMiddlewares)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	out := result.(*AssumeRoleOutput)
+	out.ResultMetadata = metadata
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+type AssumeRoleInput struct {
+
+	// The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the role to assume.
+	//
+	// This member is required.
+	RoleArn *string
+
+	// An identifier for the assumed role session. Use the role session name to
+	// uniquely identify a session when the same role is assumed by different
+	// principals or for different reasons. In cross-account scenarios, the role
+	// session name is visible to, and can be logged by the account that owns the role.
+	// The role session name is also used in the ARN of the assumed role principal.
+	// This means that subsequent cross-account API requests that use the temporary
+	// security credentials will expose the role session name to the external account
+	// in their CloudTrail logs. The regex used to validate this parameter is a string
+	// of characters consisting of upper- and lower-case alphanumeric characters with
+	// no spaces. You can also include underscores or any of the following characters:
+	// =,.@-
+	//
+	// This member is required.
+	RoleSessionName *string
+
+	// The duration, in seconds, of the role session. The value specified can range
+	// from 900 seconds (15 minutes) up to the maximum session duration set for the
+	// role. The maximum session duration setting can have a value from 1 hour to 12
+	// hours. If you specify a value higher than this setting or the administrator
+	// setting (whichever is lower), the operation fails. For example, if you specify a
+	// session duration of 12 hours, but your administrator set the maximum session
+	// duration to 6 hours, your operation fails. Role chaining limits your Amazon Web
+	// Services CLI or Amazon Web Services API role session to a maximum of one hour.
+	// When you use the AssumeRole API operation to assume a role, you can specify the
+	// duration of your role session with the DurationSeconds parameter. You can
+	// specify a parameter value of up to 43200 seconds (12 hours), depending on the
+	// maximum session duration setting for your role. However, if you assume a role
+	// using role chaining and provide a DurationSeconds parameter value greater than
+	// one hour, the operation fails. To learn how to view the maximum value for your
+	// role, see View the Maximum Session Duration Setting for a Role (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use.html#id_roles_use_view-role-max-session)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. By default, the value is set to 3600 seconds. The
+	// DurationSeconds parameter is separate from the duration of a console session
+	// that you might request using the returned credentials. The request to the
+	// federation endpoint for a console sign-in token takes a SessionDuration
+	// parameter that specifies the maximum length of the console session. For more
+	// information, see Creating a URL that Enables Federated Users to Access the
+	// Amazon Web Services Management Console (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_providers_enable-console-custom-url.html)
+	// in the IAM User Guide.
+	DurationSeconds *int32
+
+	// A unique identifier that might be required when you assume a role in another
+	// account. If the administrator of the account to which the role belongs provided
+	// you with an external ID, then provide that value in the ExternalId parameter.
+	// This value can be any string, such as a passphrase or account number. A
+	// cross-account role is usually set up to trust everyone in an account. Therefore,
+	// the administrator of the trusting account might send an external ID to the
+	// administrator of the trusted account. That way, only someone with the ID can
+	// assume the role, rather than everyone in the account. For more information about
+	// the external ID, see How to Use an External ID When Granting Access to Your
+	// Amazon Web Services Resources to a Third Party (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create_for-user_externalid.html)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. The regex used to validate this parameter is a string of
+	// characters consisting of upper- and lower-case alphanumeric characters with no
+	// spaces. You can also include underscores or any of the following characters:
+	// =,.@:/-
+	ExternalId *string
+
+	// An IAM policy in JSON format that you want to use as an inline session policy.
+	// This parameter is optional. Passing policies to this operation returns new
+	// temporary credentials. The resulting session's permissions are the intersection
+	// of the role's identity-based policy and the session policies. You can use the
+	// role's temporary credentials in subsequent Amazon Web Services API calls to
+	// access resources in the account that owns the role. You cannot use session
+	// policies to grant more permissions than those allowed by the identity-based
+	// policy of the role that is being assumed. For more information, see Session
+	// Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. The plaintext that you use for both inline and managed
+	// session policies can't exceed 2,048 characters. The JSON policy characters can
+	// be any ASCII character from the space character to the end of the valid
+	// character list (\u0020 through \u00FF). It can also include the tab (\u0009),
+	// linefeed (\u000A), and carriage return (\u000D) characters. An Amazon Web
+	// Services conversion compresses the passed inline session policy, managed policy
+	// ARNs, and session tags into a packed binary format that has a separate limit.
+	// Your request can fail for this limit even if your plaintext meets the other
+	// requirements. The PackedPolicySize response element indicates by percentage how
+	// close the policies and tags for your request are to the upper size limit.
+	Policy *string
+
+	// The Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) of the IAM managed policies that you want to
+	// use as managed session policies. The policies must exist in the same account as
+	// the role. This parameter is optional. You can provide up to 10 managed policy
+	// ARNs. However, the plaintext that you use for both inline and managed session
+	// policies can't exceed 2,048 characters. For more information about ARNs, see
+	// Amazon Resource Names (ARNs) and Amazon Web Services Service Namespaces (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws-arns-and-namespaces.html)
+	// in the Amazon Web Services General Reference. An Amazon Web Services conversion
+	// compresses the passed inline session policy, managed policy ARNs, and session
+	// tags into a packed binary format that has a separate limit. Your request can
+	// fail for this limit even if your plaintext meets the other requirements. The
+	// PackedPolicySize response element indicates by percentage how close the policies
+	// and tags for your request are to the upper size limit. Passing policies to this
+	// operation returns new temporary credentials. The resulting session's permissions
+	// are the intersection of the role's identity-based policy and the session
+	// policies. You can use the role's temporary credentials in subsequent Amazon Web
+	// Services API calls to access resources in the account that owns the role. You
+	// cannot use session policies to grant more permissions than those allowed by the
+	// identity-based policy of the role that is being assumed. For more information,
+	// see Session Policies (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html#policies_session)
+	// in the IAM User Guide.
+	PolicyArns []types.PolicyDescriptorType
+
+	// Reserved for future use.
+	ProvidedContexts []types.ProvidedContext
+
+	// The identification number of the MFA device that is associated with the user
+	// who is making the AssumeRole call. Specify this value if the trust policy of
+	// the role being assumed includes a condition that requires MFA authentication.
+	// The value is either the serial number for a hardware device (such as
+	// GAHT12345678 ) or an Amazon Resource Name (ARN) for a virtual device (such as
+	// arn:aws:iam::123456789012:mfa/user ). The regex used to validate this parameter
+	// is a string of characters consisting of upper- and lower-case alphanumeric
+	// characters with no spaces. You can also include underscores or any of the
+	// following characters: =,.@-
+	SerialNumber *string
+
+	// The source identity specified by the principal that is calling the AssumeRole
+	// operation. You can require users to specify a source identity when they assume a
+	// role. You do this by using the sts:SourceIdentity condition key in a role trust
+	// policy. You can use source identity information in CloudTrail logs to determine
+	// who took actions with a role. You can use the aws:SourceIdentity condition key
+	// to further control access to Amazon Web Services resources based on the value of
+	// source identity. For more information about using source identity, see Monitor
+	// and control actions taken with assumed roles (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_control-access_monitor.html)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. The regex used to validate this parameter is a string of
+	// characters consisting of upper- and lower-case alphanumeric characters with no
+	// spaces. You can also include underscores or any of the following characters:
+	// =,.@-. You cannot use a value that begins with the text aws: . This prefix is
+	// reserved for Amazon Web Services internal use.
+	SourceIdentity *string
+
+	// A list of session tags that you want to pass. Each session tag consists of a
+	// key name and an associated value. For more information about session tags, see
+	// Tagging Amazon Web Services STS Sessions (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. This parameter is optional. You can pass up to 50 session
+	// tags. The plaintext session tag keys can’t exceed 128 characters, and the values
+	// can’t exceed 256 characters. For these and additional limits, see IAM and STS
+	// Character Limits (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_iam-limits.html#reference_iam-limits-entity-length)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. An Amazon Web Services conversion compresses the passed
+	// inline session policy, managed policy ARNs, and session tags into a packed
+	// binary format that has a separate limit. Your request can fail for this limit
+	// even if your plaintext meets the other requirements. The PackedPolicySize
+	// response element indicates by percentage how close the policies and tags for
+	// your request are to the upper size limit. You can pass a session tag with the
+	// same key as a tag that is already attached to the role. When you do, session
+	// tags override a role tag with the same key. Tag key–value pairs are not case
+	// sensitive, but case is preserved. This means that you cannot have separate
+	// Department and department tag keys. Assume that the role has the Department =
+	// Marketing tag and you pass the department = engineering session tag. Department
+	// and department are not saved as separate tags, and the session tag passed in
+	// the request takes precedence over the role tag. Additionally, if you used
+	// temporary credentials to perform this operation, the new session inherits any
+	// transitive session tags from the calling session. If you pass a session tag with
+	// the same key as an inherited tag, the operation fails. To view the inherited
+	// tags for a session, see the CloudTrail logs. For more information, see Viewing
+	// Session Tags in CloudTrail (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html#id_session-tags_ctlogs)
+	// in the IAM User Guide.
+	Tags []types.Tag
+
+	// The value provided by the MFA device, if the trust policy of the role being
+	// assumed requires MFA. (In other words, if the policy includes a condition that
+	// tests for MFA). If the role being assumed requires MFA and if the TokenCode
+	// value is missing or expired, the AssumeRole call returns an "access denied"
+	// error. The format for this parameter, as described by its regex pattern, is a
+	// sequence of six numeric digits.
+	TokenCode *string
+
+	// A list of keys for session tags that you want to set as transitive. If you set
+	// a tag key as transitive, the corresponding key and value passes to subsequent
+	// sessions in a role chain. For more information, see Chaining Roles with Session
+	// Tags (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_session-tags.html#id_session-tags_role-chaining)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. This parameter is optional. When you set session tags as
+	// transitive, the session policy and session tags packed binary limit is not
+	// affected. If you choose not to specify a transitive tag key, then no tags are
+	// passed from this session to any subsequent sessions.
+	TransitiveTagKeys []string
+
+	noSmithyDocumentSerde
+}
+
+// Contains the response to a successful AssumeRole request, including temporary
+// Amazon Web Services credentials that can be used to make Amazon Web Services
+// requests.
+type AssumeRoleOutput struct {
+
+	// The Amazon Resource Name (ARN) and the assumed role ID, which are identifiers
+	// that you can use to refer to the resulting temporary security credentials. For
+	// example, you can reference these credentials as a principal in a resource-based
+	// policy by using the ARN or assumed role ID. The ARN and ID include the
+	// RoleSessionName that you specified when you called AssumeRole .
+	AssumedRoleUser *types.AssumedRoleUser
+
+	// The temporary security credentials, which include an access key ID, a secret
+	// access key, and a security (or session) token. The size of the security token
+	// that STS API operations return is not fixed. We strongly recommend that you make
+	// no assumptions about the maximum size.
+	Credentials *types.Credentials
+
+	// A percentage value that indicates the packed size of the session policies and
+	// session tags combined passed in the request. The request fails if the packed
+	// size is greater than 100 percent, which means the policies and tags exceeded the
+	// allowed space.
+	PackedPolicySize *int32
+
+	// The source identity specified by the principal that is calling the AssumeRole
+	// operation. You can require users to specify a source identity when they assume a
+	// role. You do this by using the sts:SourceIdentity condition key in a role trust
+	// policy. You can use source identity information in CloudTrail logs to determine
+	// who took actions with a role. You can use the aws:SourceIdentity condition key
+	// to further control access to Amazon Web Services resources based on the value of
+	// source identity. For more information about using source identity, see Monitor
+	// and control actions taken with assumed roles (https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_control-access_monitor.html)
+	// in the IAM User Guide. The regex used to validate this parameter is a string of
+	// characters consisting of upper- and lower-case alphanumeric characters with no
+	// spaces. You can also include underscores or any of the following characters:
+	// =,.@-
+	SourceIdentity *string
+
+	// Metadata pertaining to the operation's result.
+	ResultMetadata middleware.Metadata
+
+	noSmithyDocumentSerde
+}
+
+func (c *Client) addOperationAssumeRoleMiddlewares(stack *middleware.Stack, options Options) (err error) {
+	err = stack.Serialize.Add(&awsAwsquery_serializeOpAssumeRole{}, middleware.After)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	err = stack.Deserialize.Add(&awsAwsquery_deserializeOpAssumeRole{}, middleware.After)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addlegacyEndpointContextSetter(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addSetLoggerMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = awsmiddleware.AddClientRequestIDMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = smithyhttp.AddComputeContentLengthMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = v4.AddComputePayloadSHA256Middleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addRetryMiddlewares(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addHTTPSignerV4Middleware(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = awsmiddleware.AddRawResponseToMetadata(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = awsmiddleware.AddRecordResponseTiming(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addClientUserAgent(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = smithyhttp.AddErrorCloseResponseBodyMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = smithyhttp.AddCloseResponseBodyMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addAssumeRoleResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addOpAssumeRoleValidationMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = stack.Initialize.Add(newServiceMetadataMiddleware_opAssumeRole(options.Region), middleware.Before); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = awsmiddleware.AddRecursionDetection(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addRequestIDRetrieverMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addResponseErrorMiddleware(stack); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addRequestResponseLogging(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = addendpointDisableHTTPSMiddleware(stack, options); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func newServiceMetadataMiddleware_opAssumeRole(region string) *awsmiddleware.RegisterServiceMetadata {
+	return &awsmiddleware.RegisterServiceMetadata{
+		Region:        region,
+		ServiceID:     ServiceID,
+		SigningName:   "sts",
+		OperationName: "AssumeRole",
+	}
+}
+
+// PresignAssumeRole is used to generate a presigned HTTP Request which contains
+// presigned URL, signed headers and HTTP method used.
+func (c *PresignClient) PresignAssumeRole(ctx context.Context, params *AssumeRoleInput, optFns ...func(*PresignOptions)) (*v4.PresignedHTTPRequest, error) {
+	if params == nil {
+		params = &AssumeRoleInput{}
+	}
+	options := c.options.copy()
+	for _, fn := range optFns {
+		fn(&options)
+	}
+	clientOptFns := append(options.ClientOptions, withNopHTTPClientAPIOption)
+
+	result, _, err := c.client.invokeOperation(ctx, "AssumeRole", params, clientOptFns,
+		c.client.addOperationAssumeRoleMiddlewares,
+		presignConverter(options).convertToPresignMiddleware,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	out := result.(*v4.PresignedHTTPRequest)
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+type opAssumeRoleResolveEndpointMiddleware struct {
+	EndpointResolver EndpointResolverV2
+	BuiltInResolver  builtInParameterResolver
+}
+
+func (*opAssumeRoleResolveEndpointMiddleware) ID() string {
+	return "ResolveEndpointV2"
+}
+
+func (m *opAssumeRoleResolveEndpointMiddleware) HandleSerialize(ctx context.Context, in middleware.SerializeInput, next middleware.SerializeHandler) (
+	out middleware.SerializeOutput, metadata middleware.Metadata, err error,
+) {
+	if awsmiddleware.GetRequiresLegacyEndpoints(ctx) {
+		return next.HandleSerialize(ctx, in)
+	}
+
+	req, ok := in.Request.(*smithyhttp.Request)
+	if !ok {
+		return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf("unknown transport type %T", in.Request)
+	}
+
+	if m.EndpointResolver == nil {
+		return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf("expected endpoint resolver to not be nil")
+	}
+
+	params := EndpointParameters{}
+
+	m.BuiltInResolver.ResolveBuiltIns(&params)
+
+	var resolvedEndpoint smithyendpoints.Endpoint
+	resolvedEndpoint, err = m.EndpointResolver.ResolveEndpoint(ctx, params)
+	if err != nil {
+		return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve service endpoint, %w", err)
+	}
+
+	req.URL = &resolvedEndpoint.URI
+
+	for k := range resolvedEndpoint.Headers {
+		req.Header.Set(
+			k,
+			resolvedEndpoint.Headers.Get(k),
+		)
+	}
+
+	authSchemes, err := internalauth.GetAuthenticationSchemes(&resolvedEndpoint.Properties)
+	if err != nil {
+		var nfe *internalauth.NoAuthenticationSchemesFoundError
+		if errors.As(err, &nfe) {
+			// if no auth scheme is found, default to sigv4
+			signingName := "sts"
+			signingRegion := m.BuiltInResolver.(*builtInResolver).Region
+			ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningName(ctx, signingName)
+			ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningRegion(ctx, signingRegion)
+
+		}
+		var ue *internalauth.UnSupportedAuthenticationSchemeSpecifiedError
+		if errors.As(err, &ue) {
+			return out, metadata, fmt.Errorf(
+				"This operation requests signer version(s) %v but the client only supports %v",
+				ue.UnsupportedSchemes,
+				internalauth.SupportedSchemes,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, authScheme := range authSchemes {
+		switch authScheme.(type) {
+		case *internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4:
+			v4Scheme, _ := authScheme.(*internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4)
+			var signingName, signingRegion string
+			if v4Scheme.SigningName == nil {
+				signingName = "sts"
+			} else {
+				signingName = *v4Scheme.SigningName
+			}
+			if v4Scheme.SigningRegion == nil {
+				signingRegion = m.BuiltInResolver.(*builtInResolver).Region
+			} else {
+				signingRegion = *v4Scheme.SigningRegion
+			}
+			if v4Scheme.DisableDoubleEncoding != nil {
+				// The signer sets an equivalent value at client initialization time.
+				// Setting this context value will cause the signer to extract it
+				// and override the value set at client initialization time.
+				ctx = internalauth.SetDisableDoubleEncoding(ctx, *v4Scheme.DisableDoubleEncoding)
+			}
+			ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningName(ctx, signingName)
+			ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningRegion(ctx, signingRegion)
+			break
+		case *internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4A:
+			v4aScheme, _ := authScheme.(*internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeV4A)
+			if v4aScheme.SigningName == nil {
+				v4aScheme.SigningName = aws.String("sts")
+			}
+			if v4aScheme.DisableDoubleEncoding != nil {
+				// The signer sets an equivalent value at client initialization time.
+				// Setting this context value will cause the signer to extract it
+				// and override the value set at client initialization time.
+				ctx = internalauth.SetDisableDoubleEncoding(ctx, *v4aScheme.DisableDoubleEncoding)
+			}
+			ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningName(ctx, *v4aScheme.SigningName)
+			ctx = awsmiddleware.SetSigningRegion(ctx, v4aScheme.SigningRegionSet[0])
+			break
+		case *internalauth.AuthenticationSchemeNone:
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return next.HandleSerialize(ctx, in)
+}
+
+func addAssumeRoleResolveEndpointMiddleware(stack *middleware.Stack, options Options) error {
+	return stack.Serialize.Insert(&opAssumeRoleResolveEndpointMiddleware{
+		EndpointResolver: options.EndpointResolverV2,
+		BuiltInResolver: &builtInResolver{
+			Region:       options.Region,
+			UseDualStack: options.EndpointOptions.UseDualStackEndpoint,
+			UseFIPS:      options.EndpointOptions.UseFIPSEndpoint,
+			Endpoint:     options.BaseEndpoint,
+		},
+	}, "ResolveEndpoint", middleware.After)
+}