BoringSSL as optional cryptobackend for ngtcp2

PR добавляет возможность использовать BoringSSL в ngtcp2 в качестве криптобиблиотеки. Для проектов в Аркадии, уже зависящих от ngtcp2, добавлена явная зависимость от слоя абстракции quictls (сейчас в транке ngtcp2 собирается с quictls).
commit_hash:3d6607abecfcff2157859acbdd18f9d0345ac485

1 files changed, 319 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/ssl/tls_method.cc b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/ssl/tls_method.cc
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c624990a59c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/ssl/tls_method.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected])
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young ([email protected]).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young ([email protected])"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+static void tls_on_handshake_complete(SSL *ssl) {
+  // The handshake should have released its final message.
+  assert(!ssl->s3->has_message);
+
+  // During the handshake, |hs_buf| is retained. Release if it there is no
+  // excess in it. There should not be any excess because the handshake logic
+  // rejects unprocessed data after each Finished message. Note this means we do
+  // not allow a TLS 1.2 HelloRequest to be packed into the same record as
+  // Finished. (Schannel also rejects this.)
+  assert(!ssl->s3->hs_buf || ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0);
+  if (ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
+    ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
+  }
+}
+
+static bool tls_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                               UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                               Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic) {
+  // Cipher changes are forbidden if the current epoch has leftover data.
+  if (tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
+    if ((ssl->s3->hs == nullptr || !ssl->s3->hs->hints_requested) &&
+        !ssl->quic_method->set_read_secret(ssl, level, aead_ctx->cipher(),
+                                           secret_for_quic.data(),
+                                           secret_for_quic.size())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // QUIC only uses |ssl| for handshake messages, which never use early data
+    // keys, so we return without installing anything. This avoids needing to
+    // have two secrets active at once in 0-RTT.
+    if (level == ssl_encryption_early_data) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->read_sequence = 0;
+  ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx = std::move(aead_ctx);
+  ssl->s3->read_level = level;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool tls_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                                UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                                Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic) {
+  if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
+    if ((ssl->s3->hs == nullptr || !ssl->s3->hs->hints_requested) &&
+        !ssl->quic_method->set_write_secret(ssl, level, aead_ctx->cipher(),
+                                            secret_for_quic.data(),
+                                            secret_for_quic.size())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // QUIC only uses |ssl| for handshake messages, which never use early data
+    // keys, so we return without installing anything. This avoids needing to
+    // have two secrets active at once in 0-RTT.
+    if (level == ssl_encryption_early_data) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->write_sequence = 0;
+  ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx = std::move(aead_ctx);
+  ssl->s3->write_level = level;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kTLSProtocolMethod = {
+    false /* is_dtls */,
+    tls_new,
+    tls_free,
+    tls_get_message,
+    tls_next_message,
+    tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data,
+    tls_open_handshake,
+    tls_open_change_cipher_spec,
+    tls_open_app_data,
+    tls_write_app_data,
+    tls_dispatch_alert,
+    tls_init_message,
+    tls_finish_message,
+    tls_add_message,
+    tls_add_change_cipher_spec,
+    tls_flush_flight,
+    tls_on_handshake_complete,
+    tls_set_read_state,
+    tls_set_write_state,
+};
+
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_check_client_CA_names(
+    STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names) {
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_noop_x509_clear(CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_free(CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_dup(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_leaf(CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_chain(CERT *cert) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_cache_objects(SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+  return true;
+}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *new_session,
+                                      const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return true;
+}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_session_clear(SSL_SESSION *session) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_verify_cert_chain(SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                                    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                    uint8_t *out_alert) {
+  return false;
+}
+
+static void ssl_noop_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_new(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { return true; }
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_config_free(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  return true;
+}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return true; }
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_noop_x509_method = {
+  ssl_noop_x509_check_client_CA_names,
+  ssl_noop_x509_clear,
+  ssl_noop_x509_free,
+  ssl_noop_x509_dup,
+  ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_chain,
+  ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_leaf,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_cache_objects,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_dup,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_clear,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_verify_cert_chain,
+  ssl_noop_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_new,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_config_free,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_new,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_free,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA,
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      0,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_with_buffers_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      0,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_noop_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+// Legacy version-locked methods.
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      TLS1_2_VERSION,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      TLS1_1_VERSION,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      TLS1_VERSION,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+// Legacy side-specific methods.
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void) {
+  return SSLv23_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void) {
+  return SSLv23_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}