diff options
author | zaycevm <[email protected]> | 2025-08-12 18:23:32 +0300 |
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committer | zaycevm <[email protected]> | 2025-08-12 18:58:10 +0300 |
commit | 7ce1229be33024092eb56910264510447d21116f (patch) | |
tree | 6697d934399db06c36ebd516ebe6f0a76245a3ba /contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h | |
parent | 27af3f7dfd34fe3cdd1c1329f3d205ac5ac136a3 (diff) |
BoringSSL as optional cryptobackend for ngtcp2
PR добавляет возможность использовать BoringSSL в ngtcp2 в качестве криптобиблиотеки. Для проектов в Аркадии, уже зависящих от ngtcp2, добавлена явная зависимость от слоя абстракции quictls (сейчас в транке ngtcp2 собирается с quictls).
commit_hash:3d6607abecfcff2157859acbdd18f9d0345ac485
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h | 6101 |
1 files changed, 6101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0b2603535e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,6101 @@ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected]) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young ([email protected]). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young ([email protected])" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * [email protected]. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson ([email protected]). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_H +#define OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_H + +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/base.h> + +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/bio.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/buf.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/pem.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/span.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ssl3.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/thread.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/tls1.h> +#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/x509.h> + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) +#include <sys/time.h> +#endif + +// Forward-declare struct timeval. On Windows, it is defined in winsock2.h and +// Windows headers define too many macros to be included in public headers. +// However, only a forward declaration is needed. +struct timeval; + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +extern "C" { +#endif + + +// SSL implementation. + + +// SSL contexts. +// +// |SSL_CTX| objects manage shared state and configuration between multiple TLS +// or DTLS connections. Whether the connections are TLS or DTLS is selected by +// an |SSL_METHOD| on creation. +// +// |SSL_CTX| are reference-counted and may be shared by connections across +// multiple threads. Once shared, functions which change the |SSL_CTX|'s +// configuration may not be used. + +// TLS_method is the |SSL_METHOD| used for TLS connections. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void); + +// DTLS_method is the |SSL_METHOD| used for DTLS connections. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void); + +// TLS_with_buffers_method is like |TLS_method|, but avoids all use of +// crypto/x509. All client connections created with |TLS_with_buffers_method| +// will fail unless a certificate verifier is installed with +// |SSL_set_custom_verify| or |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLS_with_buffers_method(void); + +// DTLS_with_buffers_method is like |DTLS_method|, but avoids all use of +// crypto/x509. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_with_buffers_method(void); + +// SSL_CTX_new returns a newly-allocated |SSL_CTX| with default settings or NULL +// on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method); + +// SSL_CTX_up_ref increments the reference count of |ctx|. It returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_free releases memory associated with |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx); + + +// SSL connections. +// +// An |SSL| object represents a single TLS or DTLS connection. Although the +// shared |SSL_CTX| is thread-safe, an |SSL| is not thread-safe and may only be +// used on one thread at a time. + +// SSL_new returns a newly-allocated |SSL| using |ctx| or NULL on error. The new +// connection inherits settings from |ctx| at the time of creation. Settings may +// also be individually configured on the connection. +// +// On creation, an |SSL| is not configured to be either a client or server. Call +// |SSL_set_connect_state| or |SSL_set_accept_state| to set this. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_free releases memory associated with |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_SSL_CTX returns the |SSL_CTX| associated with |ssl|. If +// |SSL_set_SSL_CTX| is called, it returns the new |SSL_CTX|, not the initial +// one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_connect_state configures |ssl| to be a client. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_accept_state configures |ssl| to be a server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_is_server returns one if |ssl| is configured as a server and zero +// otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_server(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_is_dtls returns one if |ssl| is a DTLS connection and zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_bio configures |ssl| to read from |rbio| and write to |wbio|. |ssl| +// takes ownership of the two |BIO|s. If |rbio| and |wbio| are the same, |ssl| +// only takes ownership of one reference. +// +// In DTLS, |rbio| must be non-blocking to properly handle timeouts and +// retransmits. +// +// If |rbio| is the same as the currently configured |BIO| for reading, that +// side is left untouched and is not freed. +// +// If |wbio| is the same as the currently configured |BIO| for writing AND |ssl| +// is not currently configured to read from and write to the same |BIO|, that +// side is left untouched and is not freed. This asymmetry is present for +// historical reasons. +// +// Due to the very complex historical behavior of this function, calling this +// function if |ssl| already has |BIO|s configured is deprecated. Prefer +// |SSL_set0_rbio| and |SSL_set0_wbio| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); + +// SSL_set0_rbio configures |ssl| to read from |rbio|. It takes ownership of +// |rbio|. +// +// Note that, although this function and |SSL_set0_wbio| may be called on the +// same |BIO|, each call takes a reference. Use |BIO_up_ref| to balance this. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio); + +// SSL_set0_wbio configures |ssl| to write to |wbio|. It takes ownership of +// |wbio|. +// +// Note that, although this function and |SSL_set0_rbio| may be called on the +// same |BIO|, each call takes a reference. Use |BIO_up_ref| to balance this. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio); + +// SSL_get_rbio returns the |BIO| that |ssl| reads from. +OPENSSL_EXPORT BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_wbio returns the |BIO| that |ssl| writes to. +OPENSSL_EXPORT BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_fd calls |SSL_get_rfd|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_rfd returns the file descriptor that |ssl| is configured to read +// from. If |ssl|'s read |BIO| is not configured or doesn't wrap a file +// descriptor then it returns -1. +// +// Note: On Windows, this may return either a file descriptor or a socket (cast +// to int), depending on whether |ssl| was configured with a file descriptor or +// socket |BIO|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_wfd returns the file descriptor that |ssl| is configured to write +// to. If |ssl|'s write |BIO| is not configured or doesn't wrap a file +// descriptor then it returns -1. +// +// Note: On Windows, this may return either a file descriptor or a socket (cast +// to int), depending on whether |ssl| was configured with a file descriptor or +// socket |BIO|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl); + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) +// SSL_set_fd configures |ssl| to read from and write to |fd|. It returns one +// on success and zero on allocation error. The caller retains ownership of +// |fd|. +// +// On Windows, |fd| is cast to a |SOCKET| and used with Winsock APIs. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd); + +// SSL_set_rfd configures |ssl| to read from |fd|. It returns one on success and +// zero on allocation error. The caller retains ownership of |fd|. +// +// On Windows, |fd| is cast to a |SOCKET| and used with Winsock APIs. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); + +// SSL_set_wfd configures |ssl| to write to |fd|. It returns one on success and +// zero on allocation error. The caller retains ownership of |fd|. +// +// On Windows, |fd| is cast to a |SOCKET| and used with Winsock APIs. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); +#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_SOCK + +// SSL_do_handshake continues the current handshake. If there is none or the +// handshake has completed or False Started, it returns one. Otherwise, it +// returns <= 0. The caller should pass the value into |SSL_get_error| to +// determine how to proceed. +// +// In DTLS, the caller must drive retransmissions. Whenever |SSL_get_error| +// signals |SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ|, use |DTLSv1_get_timeout| to determine the +// current timeout. If it expires before the next retry, call +// |DTLSv1_handle_timeout|. Note that DTLS handshake retransmissions use fresh +// sequence numbers, so it is not sufficient to replay packets at the transport. +// +// TODO(davidben): Ensure 0 is only returned on transport EOF. +// https://crbug.com/466303. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_connect configures |ssl| as a client, if unconfigured, and calls +// |SSL_do_handshake|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_accept configures |ssl| as a server, if unconfigured, and calls +// |SSL_do_handshake|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_read reads up to |num| bytes from |ssl| into |buf|. It implicitly runs +// any pending handshakes, including renegotiations when enabled. On success, it +// returns the number of bytes read. Otherwise, it returns <= 0. The caller +// should pass the value into |SSL_get_error| to determine how to proceed. +// +// TODO(davidben): Ensure 0 is only returned on transport EOF. +// https://crbug.com/466303. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); + +// SSL_peek behaves like |SSL_read| but does not consume any bytes returned. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); + +// SSL_pending returns the number of buffered, decrypted bytes available for +// read in |ssl|. It does not read from the transport. +// +// In DTLS, it is possible for this function to return zero while there is +// buffered, undecrypted data from the transport in |ssl|. For example, +// |SSL_read| may read a datagram with two records, decrypt the first, and leave +// the second buffered for a subsequent call to |SSL_read|. Callers that wish to +// detect this case can use |SSL_has_pending|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_has_pending returns one if |ssl| has buffered, decrypted bytes available +// for read, or if |ssl| has buffered data from the transport that has not yet +// been decrypted. If |ssl| has neither, this function returns zero. +// +// In TLS, BoringSSL does not implement read-ahead, so this function returns one +// if and only if |SSL_pending| would return a non-zero value. In DTLS, it is +// possible for this function to return one while |SSL_pending| returns zero. +// For example, |SSL_read| may read a datagram with two records, decrypt the +// first, and leave the second buffered for a subsequent call to |SSL_read|. +// +// As a result, if this function returns one, the next call to |SSL_read| may +// still fail, read from the transport, or both. The buffered, undecrypted data +// may be invalid or incomplete. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_write writes up to |num| bytes from |buf| into |ssl|. It implicitly runs +// any pending handshakes, including renegotiations when enabled. On success, it +// returns the number of bytes written. Otherwise, it returns <= 0. The caller +// should pass the value into |SSL_get_error| to determine how to proceed. +// +// In TLS, a non-blocking |SSL_write| differs from non-blocking |write| in that +// a failed |SSL_write| still commits to the data passed in. When retrying, the +// caller must supply the original write buffer (or a larger one containing the +// original as a prefix). By default, retries will fail if they also do not +// reuse the same |buf| pointer. This may be relaxed with +// |SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER|, but the buffer contents still must be +// unchanged. +// +// By default, in TLS, |SSL_write| will not return success until all |num| bytes +// are written. This may be relaxed with |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE|. It +// allows |SSL_write| to complete with a partial result when only part of the +// input was written in a single record. +// +// In DTLS, neither |SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER| and +// |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE| do anything. The caller may retry with a +// different buffer freely. A single call to |SSL_write| only ever writes a +// single record in a single packet, so |num| must be at most +// |SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH|. +// +// TODO(davidben): Ensure 0 is only returned on transport EOF. +// https://crbug.com/466303. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); + +// SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED indicates that the peer should reply to a KeyUpdate +// message with its own, thus updating traffic secrets for both directions on +// the connection. +#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED 1 + +// SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED indicates that the peer should not reply with +// it's own KeyUpdate message. +#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED 0 + +// SSL_key_update queues a TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate message to be sent on |ssl| +// if one is not already queued. The |request_type| argument must one of the +// |SSL_KEY_UPDATE_*| values. This function requires that |ssl| have completed a +// TLS >= 1.3 handshake. It returns one on success or zero on error. +// +// Note that this function does not _send_ the message itself. The next call to +// |SSL_write| will cause the message to be sent. |SSL_write| may be called with +// a zero length to flush a KeyUpdate message when no application data is +// pending. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_key_update(SSL *ssl, int request_type); + +// SSL_shutdown shuts down |ssl|. It runs in two stages. First, it sends +// close_notify and returns zero or one on success or -1 on failure. Zero +// indicates that close_notify was sent, but not received, and one additionally +// indicates that the peer's close_notify had already been received. +// +// To then wait for the peer's close_notify, run |SSL_shutdown| to completion a +// second time. This returns 1 on success and -1 on failure. Application data +// is considered a fatal error at this point. To process or discard it, read +// until close_notify with |SSL_read| instead. +// +// In both cases, on failure, pass the return value into |SSL_get_error| to +// determine how to proceed. +// +// Most callers should stop at the first stage. Reading for close_notify is +// primarily used for uncommon protocols where the underlying transport is +// reused after TLS completes. Additionally, DTLS uses an unordered transport +// and is unordered, so the second stage is a no-op in DTLS. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown sets quiet shutdown on |ctx| to |mode|. If +// enabled, |SSL_shutdown| will not send a close_notify alert or wait for one +// from the peer. It will instead synchronously return one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); + +// SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown returns whether quiet shutdown is enabled for +// |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_set_quiet_shutdown sets quiet shutdown on |ssl| to |mode|. If enabled, +// |SSL_shutdown| will not send a close_notify alert or wait for one from the +// peer. It will instead synchronously return one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); + +// SSL_get_quiet_shutdown returns whether quiet shutdown is enabled for +// |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_error returns a |SSL_ERROR_*| value for the most recent operation on +// |ssl|. It should be called after an operation failed to determine whether the +// error was fatal and, if not, when to retry. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code); + +// SSL_ERROR_NONE indicates the operation succeeded. +#define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 + +// SSL_ERROR_SSL indicates the operation failed within the library. The caller +// may inspect the error queue for more information. +#define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ indicates the operation failed attempting to read from +// the transport. The caller may retry the operation when the transport is ready +// for reading. +// +// If signaled by a DTLS handshake, the caller must also call +// |DTLSv1_get_timeout| and |DTLSv1_handle_timeout| as appropriate. See +// |SSL_do_handshake|. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE indicates the operation failed attempting to write to +// the transport. The caller may retry the operation when the transport is ready +// for writing. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP indicates the operation failed in calling the +// |cert_cb| or |client_cert_cb|. The caller may retry the operation when the +// callback is ready to return a certificate or one has been configured +// externally. +// +// See also |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb|. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4 + +// SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL indicates the operation failed externally to the library. +// The caller should consult the system-specific error mechanism. This is +// typically |errno| but may be something custom if using a custom |BIO|. It +// may also be signaled if the transport returned EOF, in which case the +// operation's return value will be zero. +#define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5 + +// SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN indicates the operation failed because the connection +// was cleanly shut down with a close_notify alert. +#define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT indicates the operation failed attempting to connect +// the transport (the |BIO| signaled |BIO_RR_CONNECT|). The caller may retry the +// operation when the transport is ready. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT indicates the operation failed attempting to accept a +// connection from the transport (the |BIO| signaled |BIO_RR_ACCEPT|). The +// caller may retry the operation when the transport is ready. +// +// TODO(davidben): Remove this. It's used by accept BIOs which are bizarre. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP is never used. +// +// TODO(davidben): Remove this. Some callers reference it when stringifying +// errors. They should use |SSL_error_description| instead. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP 9 + +// SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION indicates the operation failed because the session +// lookup callback indicated the session was unavailable. The caller may retry +// the operation when lookup has completed. +// +// See also |SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb| and |SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr|. +#define SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION 11 + +// SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE indicates the operation failed because the +// early callback indicated certificate lookup was incomplete. The caller may +// retry the operation when lookup has completed. +// +// See also |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|. +#define SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE 12 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION indicates the operation failed because +// a private key operation was unfinished. The caller may retry the operation +// when the private key operation is complete. +// +// See also |SSL_set_private_key_method|, |SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method|, and +// |SSL_CREDENTIAL_set_private_key_method|. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION 13 + +// SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET indicates that a ticket decryption is pending. The +// caller may retry the operation when the decryption is ready. +// +// See also |SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method|. +#define SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET 14 + +// SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED indicates that early data was rejected. The +// caller should treat this as a connection failure and retry any operations +// associated with the rejected early data. |SSL_reset_early_data_reject| may be +// used to reuse the underlying connection for the retry. +#define SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED 15 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY indicates the operation failed because +// certificate verification was incomplete. The caller may retry the operation +// when certificate verification is complete. +// +// See also |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 16 + +#define SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF 17 +#define SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK 18 + +// SSL_ERROR_WANT_RENEGOTIATE indicates the operation is pending a response to +// a renegotiation request from the server. The caller may call +// |SSL_renegotiate| to schedule a renegotiation and retry the operation. +// +// See also |ssl_renegotiate_explicit|. +#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_RENEGOTIATE 19 + +// SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY indicates the handshake has progressed enough +// for |SSL_serialize_handshake_hints| to be called. See also +// |SSL_request_handshake_hints|. +#define SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY 20 + +// SSL_error_description returns a string representation of |err|, where |err| +// is one of the |SSL_ERROR_*| constants returned by |SSL_get_error|, or NULL +// if the value is unrecognized. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_error_description(int err); + +// SSL_set_mtu sets the |ssl|'s MTU in DTLS to |mtu|. It returns one on success +// and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu); + +// DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration sets the initial duration for a DTLS +// handshake timeout. +// +// This duration overrides the default of 1 second, which is the strong +// recommendation of RFC 6347 (see section 4.2.4.1). However, there may exist +// situations where a shorter timeout would be beneficial, such as for +// time-sensitive applications. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration(SSL *ssl, + unsigned duration_ms); + +// DTLSv1_get_timeout queries the next DTLS handshake timeout. If there is a +// timeout in progress, it sets |*out| to the time remaining and returns one. +// Otherwise, it returns zero. +// +// When the timeout expires, call |DTLSv1_handle_timeout| to handle the +// retransmit behavior. +// +// NOTE: This function must be queried again whenever the handshake state +// machine changes, including when |DTLSv1_handle_timeout| is called. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int DTLSv1_get_timeout(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out); + +// DTLSv1_handle_timeout is called when a DTLS handshake timeout expires. If no +// timeout had expired, it returns 0. Otherwise, it retransmits the previous +// flight of handshake messages and returns 1. If too many timeouts had expired +// without progress or an error occurs, it returns -1. +// +// The caller's external timer should be compatible with the one |ssl| queries +// within some fudge factor. Otherwise, the call will be a no-op, but +// |DTLSv1_get_timeout| will return an updated timeout. +// +// If the function returns -1, checking if |SSL_get_error| returns +// |SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE| may be used to determine if the retransmit failed due +// to a non-fatal error at the write |BIO|. However, the operation may not be +// retried until the next timeout fires. +// +// WARNING: This function breaks the usual return value convention. +// +// TODO(davidben): This |SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE| behavior is kind of bizarre. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int DTLSv1_handle_timeout(SSL *ssl); + + +// Protocol versions. + +#define DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0xfe +#define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 + +#define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300 +#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301 +#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 +#define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303 +#define TLS1_3_VERSION 0x0304 + +#define DTLS1_VERSION 0xfeff +#define DTLS1_2_VERSION 0xfefd + +// SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version sets the minimum protocol version for |ctx| to +// |version|. If |version| is zero, the default minimum version is used. It +// returns one on success and zero if |version| is invalid. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, + uint16_t version); + +// SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version sets the maximum protocol version for |ctx| to +// |version|. If |version| is zero, the default maximum version is used. It +// returns one on success and zero if |version| is invalid. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, + uint16_t version); + +// SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version returns the minimum protocol version for |ctx| +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version returns the maximum protocol version for |ctx| +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_set_min_proto_version sets the minimum protocol version for |ssl| to +// |version|. If |version| is zero, the default minimum version is used. It +// returns one on success and zero if |version| is invalid. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version); + +// SSL_set_max_proto_version sets the maximum protocol version for |ssl| to +// |version|. If |version| is zero, the default maximum version is used. It +// returns one on success and zero if |version| is invalid. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version); + +// SSL_get_min_proto_version returns the minimum protocol version for |ssl|. If +// the connection's configuration has been shed, 0 is returned. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_get_min_proto_version(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_max_proto_version returns the maximum protocol version for |ssl|. If +// the connection's configuration has been shed, 0 is returned. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_get_max_proto_version(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_version returns the TLS or DTLS protocol version used by |ssl|, which is +// one of the |*_VERSION| values. (E.g. |TLS1_2_VERSION|.) Before the version +// is negotiated, the result is undefined. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Options. +// +// Options configure protocol behavior. + +// SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU, in DTLS, disables querying the MTU from the underlying +// |BIO|. Instead, the MTU is configured with |SSL_set_mtu|. +#define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L + +// SSL_OP_NO_TICKET disables session ticket support (RFC 5077). +#define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L + +// SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE configures servers to select ciphers and +// ECDHE curves according to the server's preferences instead of the +// client's. +#define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L + +// The following flags toggle individual protocol versions. This is deprecated. +// Use |SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version| and |SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version| +// instead. +#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L +#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000L +#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0x10000000L +#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 0x20000000L +#define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 +#define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2 SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 + +// SSL_CTX_set_options enables all options set in |options| (which should be one +// or more of the |SSL_OP_*| values, ORed together) in |ctx|. It returns a +// bitmask representing the resulting enabled options. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options); + +// SSL_CTX_clear_options disables all options set in |options| (which should be +// one or more of the |SSL_OP_*| values, ORed together) in |ctx|. It returns a +// bitmask representing the resulting enabled options. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options); + +// SSL_CTX_get_options returns a bitmask of |SSL_OP_*| values that represent all +// the options enabled for |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_set_options enables all options set in |options| (which should be one or +// more of the |SSL_OP_*| values, ORed together) in |ssl|. It returns a bitmask +// representing the resulting enabled options. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options); + +// SSL_clear_options disables all options set in |options| (which should be one +// or more of the |SSL_OP_*| values, ORed together) in |ssl|. It returns a +// bitmask representing the resulting enabled options. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options); + +// SSL_get_options returns a bitmask of |SSL_OP_*| values that represent all the +// options enabled for |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Modes. +// +// Modes configure API behavior. + +// SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE, in TLS, allows |SSL_write| to complete with a +// partial result when the only part of the input was written in a single +// record. In DTLS, it does nothing. +#define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L + +// SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER, in TLS, allows retrying an incomplete +// |SSL_write| with a different buffer. However, |SSL_write| still assumes the +// buffer contents are unchanged. This is not the default to avoid the +// misconception that non-blocking |SSL_write| behaves like non-blocking +// |write|. In DTLS, it does nothing. +#define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L + +// SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN disables automatically building a certificate chain +// before sending certificates to the peer. This flag is set (and the feature +// disabled) by default. +// TODO(davidben): Remove this behavior. https://crbug.com/boringssl/42. +#define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L + +// SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START allows clients to send application data before +// receipt of ChangeCipherSpec and Finished. This mode enables full handshakes +// to 'complete' in one RTT. See RFC 7918. +// +// When False Start is enabled, |SSL_do_handshake| may succeed before the +// handshake has completely finished. |SSL_write| will function at this point, +// and |SSL_read| will transparently wait for the final handshake leg before +// returning application data. To determine if False Start occurred or when the +// handshake is completely finished, see |SSL_in_false_start|, |SSL_in_init|, +// and |SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE| from |SSL_CTX_set_info_callback|. +#define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START 0x00000080L + +// SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING causes multi-byte CBC records in TLS 1.0 to be +// split in two: the first record will contain a single byte and the second will +// contain the remainder. This effectively randomises the IV and prevents BEAST +// attacks. +#define SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING 0x00000100L + +// SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION will cause any attempts to create a session to +// fail with SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED. This can be used to enforce that +// session resumption is used for a given SSL*. +#define SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION 0x00000200L + +// SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV sends TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. +// To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol +// version; see RFC 7507 for details. +// +// DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake. Only use +// this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance in RFC 7507. +#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000400L + +// SSL_CTX_set_mode enables all modes set in |mode| (which should be one or more +// of the |SSL_MODE_*| values, ORed together) in |ctx|. It returns a bitmask +// representing the resulting enabled modes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode); + +// SSL_CTX_clear_mode disables all modes set in |mode| (which should be one or +// more of the |SSL_MODE_*| values, ORed together) in |ctx|. It returns a +// bitmask representing the resulting enabled modes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode); + +// SSL_CTX_get_mode returns a bitmask of |SSL_MODE_*| values that represent all +// the modes enabled for |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_set_mode enables all modes set in |mode| (which should be one or more of +// the |SSL_MODE_*| values, ORed together) in |ssl|. It returns a bitmask +// representing the resulting enabled modes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode); + +// SSL_clear_mode disables all modes set in |mode| (which should be one or more +// of the |SSL_MODE_*| values, ORed together) in |ssl|. It returns a bitmask +// representing the resulting enabled modes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode); + +// SSL_get_mode returns a bitmask of |SSL_MODE_*| values that represent all the +// modes enabled for |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool sets a |CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL| that will be used to +// store certificates. This can allow multiple connections to share +// certificates and thus save memory. +// +// The SSL_CTX does not take ownership of |pool| and the caller must ensure +// that |pool| outlives |ctx| and all objects linked to it, including |SSL|, +// |X509| and |SSL_SESSION| objects. Basically, don't ever free |pool|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(SSL_CTX *ctx, + CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool); + + +// Credentials. +// +// TLS endpoints may present authentication during the handshake, usually using +// X.509 certificates. This is typically required for servers and optional for +// clients. BoringSSL uses the |SSL_CREDENTIAL| object to abstract between +// different kinds of credentials, as well as configure automatic selection +// between multiple credentials. This may be used to select between ECDSA and +// RSA certificates. +// +// |SSL_CTX| and |SSL| objects maintain lists of credentials in preference +// order. During the handshake, BoringSSL will select the first usable +// credential from the list. Non-credential APIs, such as +// |SSL_CTX_use_certificate|, configure a "default credential", which is +// appended to this list if configured. +// +// When selecting credentials, BoringSSL considers the credential's type, its +// cryptographic capabilities, and capabilities advertised by the peer. This +// varies between TLS versions but includes: +// +// - Whether the peer supports the leaf certificate key +// - Whether there is a common signature algorithm that is compatible with the +// credential +// - Whether there is a common cipher suite that is compatible with the +// credential +// +// WARNING: In TLS 1.2 and below, there is no mechanism for servers to advertise +// supported ECDSA curves to the client. BoringSSL clients will assume the +// server accepts all ECDSA curves in client certificates. +// +// By default, BoringSSL does not check the following, though we may add APIs +// in the future to enable them on a per-credential basis. +// +// - Whether the peer supports the signature algorithms in the certificate chain +// - Whether the a server certificate is compatible with the server_name +// extension (SNI) +// - Whether the peer supports the certificate authority that issued the +// certificate +// +// Credentials may be configured before the handshake or dynamically in the +// early callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|) and certificate +// callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb|). These callbacks allow applications to +// use BoringSSL's built-in selection logic in tandem with custom logic. For +// example, a callback could evaluate application-specific SNI rules to filter +// down to an ECDSA and RSA credential, then configure both for BoringSSL to +// select between the two. + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_x509 returns a new, empty X.509 credential, or NULL on +// error. Callers should release the result with |SSL_CREDENTIAL_free| when +// done. +// +// Callers should configure a certificate chain and private key on the +// credential, along with other properties, then add it with +// |SSL_CTX_add1_credential|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_CREDENTIAL *SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_x509(void); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_up_ref increments the reference count of |cred|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CREDENTIAL_up_ref(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_free decrements the reference count of |cred|. If it reaches +// zero, all data referenced by |cred| and |cred| itself are released. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CREDENTIAL_free(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_private_key sets |cred|'s private key to |cred|. It +// returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_private_key(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, + EVP_PKEY *key); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signing_algorithm_prefs configures |cred| to use |prefs| +// as the preference list when signing with |cred|'s private key. It returns one +// on success and zero on error. |prefs| should not include the internal-only +// value |SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1|. +// +// It is an error to call this function with delegated credentials (see +// |SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_delegated|) because delegated credentials already +// constrain the key to a single algorithm. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signing_algorithm_prefs( + SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, const uint16_t *prefs, size_t num_prefs); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_cert_chain sets |cred|'s certificate chain, starting from +// the leaf, to |num_cert|s certificates from |certs|. It returns one on success +// and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_cert_chain(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, + CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, + size_t num_certs); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_ocsp_response sets |cred|'s stapled OCSP response to +// |ocsp|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_ocsp_response(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, + CRYPTO_BUFFER *ocsp); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signed_cert_timestamp_list sets |cred|'s list of signed +// certificate timestamps |sct_list|. |sct_list| must contain one or more SCT +// structures serialised as a SignedCertificateTimestampList (see +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3) – i.e. each SCT is prefixed +// by a big-endian, uint16 length and the concatenation of one or more such +// prefixed SCTs are themselves also prefixed by a uint16 length. It returns one +// on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signed_cert_timestamp_list( + SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, CRYPTO_BUFFER *sct_list); + +// SSL_CTX_add1_credential appends |cred| to |ctx|'s credential list. It returns +// one on success and zero on error. The credential list is maintained in order +// of decreasing preference, so earlier calls are preferred over later calls. +// +// After calling this function, it is an error to modify |cred|. Doing so may +// result in inconsistent handshake behavior or race conditions. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add1_credential(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred); + +// SSL_add1_credential appends |cred| to |ssl|'s credential list. It returns one +// on success and zero on error. The credential list is maintained in order of +// decreasing preference, so earlier calls are preferred over later calls. +// +// After calling this function, it is an error to modify |cred|. Doing so may +// result in inconsistent handshake behavior or race conditions. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add1_credential(SSL *ssl, SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred); + +// SSL_certs_clear removes all credentials configured on |ssl|. It also removes +// the certificate chain and private key on the default credential. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get0_selected_credential returns the credential in use in the current +// handshake on |ssl|. If there is current handshake on |ssl| or if the +// handshake has not progressed to this point, it returns NULL. +// +// This function is intended for use with |SSL_CREDENTIAL_get_ex_data|. It may +// be called from handshake callbacks, such as those in +// |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD|, to trigger credential-specific behavior. +// +// In applications that use the older APIs, such as |SSL_use_certificate|, this +// function may return an internal |SSL_CREDENTIAL| object. This internal object +// will have no ex_data installed. To avoid this, it is recommended that callers +// moving to |SSL_CREDENTIAL| use the new APIs consistently. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_CREDENTIAL *SSL_get0_selected_credential( + const SSL *ssl); + + +// Configuring certificates and private keys. +// +// These functions configure the connection's leaf certificate, private key, and +// certificate chain. The certificate chain is ordered leaf to root (as sent on +// the wire) but does not include the leaf. Both client and server certificates +// use these functions. +// +// Prefer to configure the certificate before the private key. If configured in +// the other order, inconsistent private keys will be silently dropped, rather +// than return an error. Additionally, overwriting a previously-configured +// certificate and key pair only works if the certificate is configured first. +// +// Each of these functions configures the default credential. To select between +// multiple certificates, see |SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_x509| and related APIs. + +// SSL_CTX_use_certificate sets |ctx|'s leaf certificate to |x509|. It returns +// one on success and zero on failure. If |ctx| has a private key which is +// inconsistent with |x509|, the private key is silently dropped. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_use_certificate sets |ssl|'s leaf certificate to |x509|. It returns one +// on success and zero on failure. If |ssl| has a private key which is +// inconsistent with |x509|, the private key is silently dropped. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey sets |ctx|'s private key to |pkey|. It returns one on +// success and zero on failure. If |ctx| had a private key or +// |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD| previously configured, it is replaced. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +// SSL_use_PrivateKey sets |ssl|'s private key to |pkey|. It returns one on +// success and zero on failure. If |ssl| had a private key or +// |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD| previously configured, it is replaced. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +// SSL_CTX_set0_chain sets |ctx|'s certificate chain, excluding the leaf, to +// |chain|. On success, it returns one and takes ownership of |chain|. +// Otherwise, it returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_chain sets |ctx|'s certificate chain, excluding the leaf, to +// |chain|. It returns one on success and zero on failure. The caller retains +// ownership of |chain| and may release it freely. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); + +// SSL_set0_chain sets |ssl|'s certificate chain, excluding the leaf, to +// |chain|. On success, it returns one and takes ownership of |chain|. +// Otherwise, it returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); + +// SSL_set1_chain sets |ssl|'s certificate chain, excluding the leaf, to +// |chain|. It returns one on success and zero on failure. The caller retains +// ownership of |chain| and may release it freely. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); + +// SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert appends |x509| to |ctx|'s certificate chain. On +// success, it returns one and takes ownership of |x509|. Otherwise, it returns +// zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert appends |x509| to |ctx|'s certificate chain. It +// returns one on success and zero on failure. The caller retains ownership of +// |x509| and may release it freely. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_add0_chain_cert appends |x509| to |ctx|'s certificate chain. On success, +// it returns one and takes ownership of |x509|. Otherwise, it returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert calls |SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_add1_chain_cert appends |x509| to |ctx|'s certificate chain. It returns +// one on success and zero on failure. The caller retains ownership of |x509| +// and may release it freely. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs clears |ctx|'s certificate chain and returns +// one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs calls |SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_clear_chain_certs clears |ssl|'s certificate chain and returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb sets a callback that is called to select a certificate. +// The callback returns one on success, zero on internal error, and a negative +// number on failure or to pause the handshake. If the handshake is paused, +// |SSL_get_error| will return |SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP|. +// +// On the client, the callback may call |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and +// |SSL_get_client_CA_list| for information on the server's certificate +// request. +// +// On the server, the callback will be called after extensions have been +// processed, but before the resumption decision has been made. This differs +// from OpenSSL which handles resumption before selecting the certificate. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), + void *arg); + +// SSL_set_cert_cb sets a callback that is called to select a certificate. The +// callback returns one on success, zero on internal error, and a negative +// number on failure or to pause the handshake. If the handshake is paused, +// |SSL_get_error| will return |SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP|. +// +// On the client, the callback may call |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and +// |SSL_get_client_CA_list| for information on the server's certificate +// request. +// +// On the server, the callback will be called after extensions have been +// processed, but before the resumption decision has been made. This differs +// from OpenSSL which handles resumption before selecting the certificate. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), + void *arg); + +// SSL_get0_certificate_types, for a client, sets |*out_types| to an array +// containing the client certificate types requested by a server. It returns the +// length of the array. Note this list is always empty in TLS 1.3. The server +// will instead send signature algorithms. See +// |SSL_get0_peer_verify_algorithms|. +// +// The behavior of this function is undefined except during the callbacks set by +// by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb| or when the +// handshake is paused because of them. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(const SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t **out_types); + +// SSL_get0_peer_verify_algorithms sets |*out_sigalgs| to an array containing +// the signature algorithms the peer is able to verify. It returns the length of +// the array. Note these values are only sent starting TLS 1.2 and only +// mandatory starting TLS 1.3. If not sent, the empty array is returned. For the +// historical client certificate types list, see |SSL_get0_certificate_types|. +// +// The behavior of this function is undefined except during the callbacks set by +// by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb| or when the +// handshake is paused because of them. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t +SSL_get0_peer_verify_algorithms(const SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **out_sigalgs); + +// SSL_get0_peer_delegation_algorithms sets |*out_sigalgs| to an array +// containing the signature algorithms the peer is willing to use with delegated +// credentials. It returns the length of the array. If not sent, the empty +// array is returned. +// +// The behavior of this function is undefined except during the callbacks set by +// by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb| or when the +// handshake is paused because of them. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t +SSL_get0_peer_delegation_algorithms(const SSL *ssl, + const uint16_t **out_sigalgs); + +// SSL_CTX_get0_certificate returns |ctx|'s leaf certificate. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_get_certificate returns |ssl|'s leaf certificate. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey returns |ctx|'s private key. +OPENSSL_EXPORT EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_get_privatekey returns |ssl|'s private key. +OPENSSL_EXPORT EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs sets |*out_chain| to |ctx|'s certificate chain and +// returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, + STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain); + +// SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs calls |SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, + STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain); + +// SSL_get0_chain_certs sets |*out_chain| to |ssl|'s certificate chain and +// returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, + STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain); + +// SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list sets the list of signed certificate +// timestamps that is sent to clients that request it. The |list| argument must +// contain one or more SCT structures serialised as a SignedCertificateTimestamp +// List (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3) – i.e. each SCT +// is prefixed by a big-endian, uint16 length and the concatenation of one or +// more such prefixed SCTs are themselves also prefixed by a uint16 length. It +// returns one on success and zero on error. The caller retains ownership of +// |list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *list, + size_t list_len); + +// SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list sets the list of signed certificate +// timestamps that is sent to clients that request is. The same format as the +// one used for |SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list| applies. The caller +// retains ownership of |list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL *ctx, + const uint8_t *list, + size_t list_len); + +// SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response sets the OCSP response that is sent to clients +// which request it. It returns one on success and zero on error. The caller +// retains ownership of |response|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *response, + size_t response_len); + +// SSL_set_ocsp_response sets the OCSP response that is sent to clients which +// request it. It returns one on success and zero on error. The caller retains +// ownership of |response|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_ocsp_response(SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *response, + size_t response_len); + +// SSL_SIGN_* are signature algorithm values as defined in TLS 1.3. +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x0201 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x0401 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x0501 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x0601 +#define SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1 0x0203 +#define SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 0x0403 +#define SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 0x0503 +#define SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 0x0603 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 0x0804 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 0x0805 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 0x0806 +#define SSL_SIGN_ED25519 0x0807 + +// SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal signature algorithm used to +// specify raw RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with an MD5/SHA-1 concatenation, as used in TLS +// before TLS 1.2. +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 0xff01 + +// SSL_get_signature_algorithm_name returns a human-readable name for |sigalg|, +// or NULL if unknown. If |include_curve| is one, the curve for ECDSA algorithms +// is included as in TLS 1.3. Otherwise, it is excluded as in TLS 1.2. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_signature_algorithm_name(uint16_t sigalg, + int include_curve); + +// SSL_get_all_signature_algorithm_names outputs a list of possible strings +// |SSL_get_signature_algorithm_name| may return in this version of BoringSSL. +// It writes at most |max_out| entries to |out| and returns the total number it +// would have written, if |max_out| had been large enough. |max_out| may be +// initially set to zero to size the output. +// +// This function is only intended to help initialize tables in callers that want +// possible strings pre-declared. This list would not be suitable to set a list +// of supported features. It is in no particular order, and may contain +// placeholder, experimental, or deprecated values that do not apply to every +// caller. Future versions of BoringSSL may also return strings not in this +// list, so this does not apply if, say, sending strings across services. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_all_signature_algorithm_names(const char **out, + size_t max_out); + +// SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type returns the key type associated with +// |sigalg| as an |EVP_PKEY_*| constant or |EVP_PKEY_NONE| if unknown. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type(uint16_t sigalg); + +// SSL_get_signature_algorithm_digest returns the digest function associated +// with |sigalg| or |NULL| if |sigalg| has no prehash (Ed25519) or is unknown. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_MD *SSL_get_signature_algorithm_digest( + uint16_t sigalg); + +// SSL_is_signature_algorithm_rsa_pss returns one if |sigalg| is an RSA-PSS +// signature algorithm and zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_signature_algorithm_rsa_pss(uint16_t sigalg); + +// SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs configures |ctx| to use |prefs| as the +// preference list when signing with |ctx|'s private key. It returns one on +// success and zero on error. |prefs| should not include the internal-only value +// |SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint16_t *prefs, + size_t num_prefs); + +// SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs configures |ssl| to use |prefs| as the +// preference list when signing with |ssl|'s private key. It returns one on +// success and zero on error. |prefs| should not include the internal-only value +// |SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, + const uint16_t *prefs, + size_t num_prefs); + + +// Certificate and private key convenience functions. + +// SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key sets the certificate chain and private key for a +// TLS client or server. References to the given |CRYPTO_BUFFER| and |EVP_PKEY| +// objects are added as needed. Exactly one of |privkey| or |privkey_method| +// may be non-NULL. Returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key( + SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, size_t num_certs, + EVP_PKEY *privkey, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method); + +// SSL_set_chain_and_key sets the certificate chain and private key for a TLS +// client or server. References to the given |CRYPTO_BUFFER| and |EVP_PKEY| +// objects are added as needed. Exactly one of |privkey| or |privkey_method| +// may be non-NULL. Returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_chain_and_key( + SSL *ssl, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey, + const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method); + +// SSL_CTX_get0_chain returns the list of |CRYPTO_BUFFER|s that were set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key|. Reference counts are not incremented by this +// call. The return value may be |NULL| if no chain has been set. +// +// (Note: if a chain was configured by non-|CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based functions then +// the return value is undefined and, even if not NULL, the stack itself may +// contain nullptrs. Thus you shouldn't mix this function with +// non-|CRYPTO_BUFFER| functions for manipulating the chain.) +OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_CTX_get0_chain( + const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_get0_chain returns the list of |CRYPTO_BUFFER|s that were set by +// |SSL_set_chain_and_key|, unless they have been discarded. Reference counts +// are not incremented by this call. The return value may be |NULL| if no chain +// has been set. +// +// (Note: if a chain was configured by non-|CRYPTO_BUFFER|-based functions then +// the return value is undefined and, even if not NULL, the stack itself may +// contain nullptrs. Thus you shouldn't mix this function with +// non-|CRYPTO_BUFFER| functions for manipulating the chain.) +// +// This function may return nullptr if a handshake has completed even if +// |SSL_set_chain_and_key| was previously called, since the configuration +// containing the certificates is typically cleared after handshake completion. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_chain(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey sets |ctx|'s private key to |rsa|. It returns one +// on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); + +// SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey sets |ctx|'s private key to |rsa|. It returns one on +// success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); + +// The following functions configure certificates or private keys but take as +// input DER-encoded structures. They return one on success and zero on +// failure. + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len, + const uint8_t *der); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, + size_t der_len); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *der, + size_t der_len); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *der, + size_t der_len); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, + size_t der_len); + +// The following functions configure certificates or private keys but take as +// input files to read from. They return one on success and zero on failure. The +// |type| parameter is one of the |SSL_FILETYPE_*| values and determines whether +// the file's contents are read as PEM or DER. + +#define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM 1 +#define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 2 + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *file, + int type); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, + int type); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, + int type); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, + int type); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, + int type); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, + int type); + +// SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file configures certificates for |ctx|. It +// reads the contents of |file| as a PEM-encoded leaf certificate followed +// optionally by the certificate chain to send to the peer. It returns one on +// success and zero on failure. +// +// WARNING: If the input contains "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" PEM blocks, this +// function parses auxiliary properties as in |d2i_X509_AUX|. Passing untrusted +// input to this function allows an attacker to influence those properties. See +// |d2i_X509_AUX| for details. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *file); + +// SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb sets the password callback for PEM-based +// convenience functions called on |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + pem_password_cb *cb); + +// SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb returns the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb( + const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata sets the userdata parameter for +// |ctx|'s password callback. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void *data); + +// SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata returns the userdata parameter set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + + +// Custom private keys. + +enum ssl_private_key_result_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + ssl_private_key_success, + ssl_private_key_retry, + ssl_private_key_failure, +}; + +// ssl_private_key_method_st (aka |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD|) describes private +// key hooks. This is used to off-load signing operations to a custom, +// potentially asynchronous, backend. Metadata about the key such as the type +// and size are parsed out of the certificate. +struct ssl_private_key_method_st { + // sign signs the message |in| in using the specified signature algorithm. On + // success, it returns |ssl_private_key_success| and writes at most |max_out| + // bytes of signature data to |out| and sets |*out_len| to the number of bytes + // written. On failure, it returns |ssl_private_key_failure|. If the operation + // has not completed, it returns |ssl_private_key_retry|. |sign| should + // arrange for the high-level operation on |ssl| to be retried when the + // operation is completed. This will result in a call to |complete|. + // + // |signature_algorithm| is one of the |SSL_SIGN_*| values, as defined in TLS + // 1.3. Note that, in TLS 1.2, ECDSA algorithms do not require that curve + // sizes match hash sizes, so the curve portion of |SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_*| values + // must be ignored. BoringSSL will internally handle the curve matching logic + // where appropriate. + // + // It is an error to call |sign| while another private key operation is in + // progress on |ssl|. + enum ssl_private_key_result_t (*sign)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, + size_t max_out, + uint16_t signature_algorithm, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len); + + // decrypt decrypts |in_len| bytes of encrypted data from |in|. On success it + // returns |ssl_private_key_success|, writes at most |max_out| bytes of + // decrypted data to |out| and sets |*out_len| to the actual number of bytes + // written. On failure it returns |ssl_private_key_failure|. If the operation + // has not completed, it returns |ssl_private_key_retry|. The caller should + // arrange for the high-level operation on |ssl| to be retried when the + // operation is completed, which will result in a call to |complete|. This + // function only works with RSA keys and should perform a raw RSA decryption + // operation with no padding. + // + // It is an error to call |decrypt| while another private key operation is in + // progress on |ssl|. + enum ssl_private_key_result_t (*decrypt)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len); + + // complete completes a pending operation. If the operation has completed, it + // returns |ssl_private_key_success| and writes the result to |out| as in + // |sign|. Otherwise, it returns |ssl_private_key_failure| on failure and + // |ssl_private_key_retry| if the operation is still in progress. + // + // |complete| may be called arbitrarily many times before completion, but it + // is an error to call |complete| if there is no pending operation in progress + // on |ssl|. + enum ssl_private_key_result_t (*complete)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out); +}; + +// SSL_set_private_key_method configures a custom private key on |ssl|. +// |key_method| must remain valid for the lifetime of |ssl|. +// +// If using an RSA or ECDSA key, callers should configure signing capabilities +// with |SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs|. Otherwise, BoringSSL may select a +// signature algorithm that |key_method| does not support. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_private_key_method( + SSL *ssl, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method); + +// SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method configures a custom private key on |ctx|. +// |key_method| must remain valid for the lifetime of |ctx|. +// +// If using an RSA or ECDSA key, callers should configure signing capabilities +// with |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs|. Otherwise, BoringSSL may select a +// signature algorithm that |key_method| does not support. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method( + SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set_private_key_method configures a custom private key on +// |cred|. |key_method| must remain valid for the lifetime of |cred|. It returns +// one on success and zero if |cred| does not use private keys. +// +// If using an RSA or ECDSA key, callers should configure signing capabilities +// with |SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_signing_algorithm_prefs|. Otherwise, BoringSSL may +// select a signature algorithm that |key_method| does not support. This is not +// necessary for delegated credentials (see |SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_delegated|) +// because delegated credentials only support a single signature algorithm. +// +// Functions in |key_method| will be passed an |SSL| object, but not |cred| +// directly. Use |SSL_get0_selected_credential| to determine the selected +// credential. From there, |SSL_CREDENTIAL_get_ex_data| can be used to look up +// credential-specific state, such as a handle to the private key. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set_private_key_method( + SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method); + +// SSL_can_release_private_key returns one if |ssl| will no longer call into the +// private key and zero otherwise. If the function returns one, the caller can +// release state associated with the private key. +// +// NOTE: This function assumes the caller does not use |SSL_clear| to reuse +// |ssl| for a second connection. If |SSL_clear| is used, BoringSSL may still +// use the private key on the second connection. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_can_release_private_key(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Cipher suites. +// +// |SSL_CIPHER| objects represent cipher suites. + +DEFINE_CONST_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + +// SSL_get_cipher_by_value returns the structure representing a TLS cipher +// suite based on its assigned number, or NULL if unknown. See +// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_id returns |cipher|'s non-IANA id. This is not its +// IANA-assigned number, which is called the "value" here, although it may be +// cast to a |uint16_t| to get it. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id returns |cipher|'s IANA-assigned number. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_is_aead returns one if |cipher| uses an AEAD cipher. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher returns one if |cipher| is a block cipher. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid returns the NID for |cipher|'s bulk +// cipher. Possible values are |NID_aes_128_gcm|, |NID_aes_256_gcm|, +// |NID_chacha20_poly1305|, |NID_aes_128_cbc|, |NID_aes_256_cbc|, and +// |NID_des_ede3_cbc|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid returns the NID for |cipher|'s HMAC if it is a +// legacy cipher suite. For modern AEAD-based ciphers (see +// |SSL_CIPHER_is_aead|), it returns |NID_undef|. +// +// Note this function only returns the legacy HMAC digest, not the PRF hash. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid returns the NID for |cipher|'s key exchange. This may +// be |NID_kx_rsa|, |NID_kx_ecdhe|, or |NID_kx_psk| for TLS 1.2. In TLS 1.3, +// cipher suites do not specify the key exchange, so this function returns +// |NID_kx_any|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid returns the NID for |cipher|'s authentication +// type. This may be |NID_auth_rsa|, |NID_auth_ecdsa|, or |NID_auth_psk| for TLS +// 1.2. In TLS 1.3, cipher suites do not specify authentication, so this +// function returns |NID_auth_any|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest returns |cipher|'s PRF hash. If |cipher| +// is a pre-TLS-1.2 cipher, it returns |EVP_md5_sha1| but note these ciphers use +// SHA-256 in TLS 1.2. Other return values may be treated uniformly in all +// applicable versions. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest( + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid behaves like |SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest| but +// returns the NID constant. Use |SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version returns the minimum protocol version required +// for |cipher|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version returns the maximum protocol version that +// supports |cipher|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_standard_name returns the standard IETF name for |cipher|. For +// example, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256". +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_name returns the OpenSSL name of |cipher|. For example, +// "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256". Callers are recommended to use +// |SSL_CIPHER_standard_name| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name returns a string that describes the key-exchange +// method used by |cipher|. For example, "ECDHE_ECDSA". TLS 1.3 AEAD-only +// ciphers return the string "GENERIC". +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_bits returns the strength, in bits, of |cipher|. If +// |out_alg_bits| is not NULL, it writes the number of bits consumed by the +// symmetric algorithm to |*out_alg_bits|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, + int *out_alg_bits); + +// SSL_get_all_cipher_names outputs a list of possible strings +// |SSL_CIPHER_get_name| may return in this version of BoringSSL. It writes at +// most |max_out| entries to |out| and returns the total number it would have +// written, if |max_out| had been large enough. |max_out| may be initially set +// to zero to size the output. +// +// This function is only intended to help initialize tables in callers that want +// possible strings pre-declared. This list would not be suitable to set a list +// of supported features. It is in no particular order, and may contain +// placeholder, experimental, or deprecated values that do not apply to every +// caller. Future versions of BoringSSL may also return strings not in this +// list, so this does not apply if, say, sending strings across services. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_all_cipher_names(const char **out, + size_t max_out); + + +// SSL_get_all_standard_cipher_names outputs a list of possible strings +// |SSL_CIPHER_standard_name| may return in this version of BoringSSL. It writes +// at most |max_out| entries to |out| and returns the total number it would have +// written, if |max_out| had been large enough. |max_out| may be initially set +// to zero to size the output. +// +// This function is only intended to help initialize tables in callers that want +// possible strings pre-declared. This list would not be suitable to set a list +// of supported features. It is in no particular order, and may contain +// placeholder, experimental, or deprecated values that do not apply to every +// caller. Future versions of BoringSSL may also return strings not in this +// list, so this does not apply if, say, sending strings across services. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_all_standard_cipher_names(const char **out, + size_t max_out); + + +// Cipher suite configuration. +// +// OpenSSL uses a mini-language to configure cipher suites. The language +// maintains an ordered list of enabled ciphers, along with an ordered list of +// disabled but available ciphers. Initially, all ciphers are disabled with a +// default ordering. The cipher string is then interpreted as a sequence of +// directives, separated by colons, each of which modifies this state. +// +// Most directives consist of a one character or empty opcode followed by a +// selector which matches a subset of available ciphers. +// +// Available opcodes are: +// +// - The empty opcode enables and appends all matching disabled ciphers to the +// end of the enabled list. The newly appended ciphers are ordered relative to +// each other matching their order in the disabled list. +// +// - |-| disables all matching enabled ciphers and prepends them to the disabled +// list, with relative order from the enabled list preserved. This means the +// most recently disabled ciphers get highest preference relative to other +// disabled ciphers if re-enabled. +// +// - |+| moves all matching enabled ciphers to the end of the enabled list, with +// relative order preserved. +// +// - |!| deletes all matching ciphers, enabled or not, from either list. Deleted +// ciphers will not matched by future operations. +// +// A selector may be a specific cipher (using either the standard or OpenSSL +// name for the cipher) or one or more rules separated by |+|. The final +// selector matches the intersection of each rule. For instance, |AESGCM+aECDSA| +// matches ECDSA-authenticated AES-GCM ciphers. +// +// Available cipher rules are: +// +// - |ALL| matches all ciphers, except for deprecated ciphers which must be +// named explicitly. +// +// - |kRSA|, |kDHE|, |kECDHE|, and |kPSK| match ciphers using plain RSA, DHE, +// ECDHE, and plain PSK key exchanges, respectively. Note that ECDHE_PSK is +// matched by |kECDHE| and not |kPSK|. +// +// - |aRSA|, |aECDSA|, and |aPSK| match ciphers authenticated by RSA, ECDSA, and +// a pre-shared key, respectively. +// +// - |RSA|, |DHE|, |ECDHE|, |PSK|, |ECDSA|, and |PSK| are aliases for the +// corresponding |k*| or |a*| cipher rule. |RSA| is an alias for |kRSA|, not +// |aRSA|. +// +// - |3DES|, |AES128|, |AES256|, |AES|, |AESGCM|, |CHACHA20| match ciphers +// whose bulk cipher use the corresponding encryption scheme. Note that +// |AES|, |AES128|, and |AES256| match both CBC and GCM ciphers. +// +// - |SHA1|, and its alias |SHA|, match legacy cipher suites using HMAC-SHA1. +// +// Deprecated cipher rules: +// +// - |kEDH|, |EDH|, |kEECDH|, and |EECDH| are legacy aliases for |kDHE|, |DHE|, +// |kECDHE|, and |ECDHE|, respectively. +// +// - |HIGH| is an alias for |ALL|. +// +// - |FIPS| is an alias for |HIGH|. +// +// - |SSLv3| and |TLSv1| match ciphers available in TLS 1.1 or earlier. +// |TLSv1_2| matches ciphers new in TLS 1.2. This is confusing and should not +// be used. +// +// Unknown rules are silently ignored by legacy APIs, and rejected by APIs with +// "strict" in the name, which should be preferred. Cipher lists can be long +// and it's easy to commit typos. Strict functions will also reject the use of +// spaces, semi-colons and commas as alternative separators. +// +// The special |@STRENGTH| directive will sort all enabled ciphers by strength. +// +// The |DEFAULT| directive, when appearing at the front of the string, expands +// to the default ordering of available ciphers. +// +// If configuring a server, one may also configure equal-preference groups to +// partially respect the client's preferences when +// |SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE| is enabled. Ciphers in an equal-preference +// group have equal priority and use the client order. This may be used to +// enforce that AEADs are preferred but select AES-GCM vs. ChaCha20-Poly1305 +// based on client preferences. An equal-preference is specified with square +// brackets, combining multiple selectors separated by |. For example: +// +// [TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256|TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] +// +// Once an equal-preference group is used, future directives must be +// opcode-less. Inside an equal-preference group, spaces are not allowed. +// +// TLS 1.3 ciphers do not participate in this mechanism and instead have a +// built-in preference order. Functions to set cipher lists do not affect TLS +// 1.3, and functions to query the cipher list do not include TLS 1.3 ciphers. + +// SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST is the default cipher suite configuration. It is +// substituted when a cipher string starts with 'DEFAULT'. +#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL" + +// SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list configures the cipher list for |ctx|, +// evaluating |str| as a cipher string and returning error if |str| contains +// anything meaningless. It returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *str); + +// SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list configures the cipher list for |ctx|, evaluating +// |str| as a cipher string. It returns one on success and zero on failure. +// +// Prefer to use |SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list|. This function tolerates +// garbage inputs, unless an empty cipher list results. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str); + +// SSL_set_strict_cipher_list configures the cipher list for |ssl|, evaluating +// |str| as a cipher string and returning error if |str| contains anything +// meaningless. It returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str); + +// SSL_set_cipher_list configures the cipher list for |ssl|, evaluating |str| as +// a cipher string. It returns one on success and zero on failure. +// +// Prefer to use |SSL_set_strict_cipher_list|. This function tolerates garbage +// inputs, unless an empty cipher list results. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str); + +// SSL_CTX_get_ciphers returns the cipher list for |ctx|, in order of +// preference. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_cipher_in_group returns one if the |i|th cipher (see +// |SSL_CTX_get_ciphers|) is in the same equipreference group as the one +// following it and zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_cipher_in_group(const SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t i); + +// SSL_get_ciphers returns the cipher list for |ssl|, in order of preference. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Connection information. + +// SSL_is_init_finished returns one if |ssl| has completed its initial handshake +// and has no pending handshake. It returns zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_in_init returns one if |ssl| has a pending handshake and zero +// otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_in_false_start returns one if |ssl| has a pending handshake that is in +// False Start. |SSL_write| may be called at this point without waiting for the +// peer, but |SSL_read| will complete the handshake before accepting application +// data. +// +// See also |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_peer_certificate returns the peer's leaf certificate or NULL if the +// peer did not use certificates. The caller must call |X509_free| on the +// result to release it. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_peer_cert_chain returns the peer's certificate chain or NULL if +// unavailable or the peer did not use certificates. This is the unverified list +// of certificates as sent by the peer, not the final chain built during +// verification. The caller does not take ownership of the result. +// +// WARNING: This function behaves differently between client and server. If +// |ssl| is a server, the returned chain does not include the leaf certificate. +// If a client, it does. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_peer_full_cert_chain returns the peer's certificate chain, or NULL if +// unavailable or the peer did not use certificates. This is the unverified list +// of certificates as sent by the peer, not the final chain built during +// verification. The caller does not take ownership of the result. +// +// This is the same as |SSL_get_peer_cert_chain| except that this function +// always returns the full chain, i.e. the first element of the return value +// (if any) will be the leaf certificate. In constrast, +// |SSL_get_peer_cert_chain| returns only the intermediate certificates if the +// |ssl| is a server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_full_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get0_peer_certificates returns the peer's certificate chain, or NULL if +// unavailable or the peer did not use certificates. This is the unverified list +// of certificates as sent by the peer, not the final chain built during +// verification. The caller does not take ownership of the result. +// +// This is the |CRYPTO_BUFFER| variant of |SSL_get_peer_full_cert_chain|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) * + SSL_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list sets |*out| and |*out_len| to point to +// |*out_len| bytes of SCT information from the server. This is only valid if +// |ssl| is a client. The SCT information is a SignedCertificateTimestampList +// (including the two leading length bytes). +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3 +// If no SCT was received then |*out_len| will be zero on return. +// +// WARNING: the returned data is not guaranteed to be well formed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t **out, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_get0_ocsp_response sets |*out| and |*out_len| to point to |*out_len| +// bytes of an OCSP response from the server. This is the DER encoding of an +// OCSPResponse type as defined in RFC 2560. +// +// WARNING: the returned data is not guaranteed to be well formed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_get_tls_unique writes at most |max_out| bytes of the tls-unique value +// for |ssl| to |out| and sets |*out_len| to the number of bytes written. It +// returns one on success or zero on error. In general |max_out| should be at +// least 12. +// +// This function will always fail if the initial handshake has not completed. +// The tls-unique value will change after a renegotiation but, since +// renegotiations can be initiated by the server at any point, the higher-level +// protocol must either leave them disabled or define states in which the +// tls-unique value can be read. +// +// The tls-unique value is defined by +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. Due to a weakness in the +// TLS protocol, tls-unique is broken for resumed connections unless the +// Extended Master Secret extension is negotiated. Thus this function will +// return zero if |ssl| performed session resumption unless EMS was used when +// negotiating the original session. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t *out_len, size_t max_out); + +// SSL_get_extms_support returns one if the Extended Master Secret extension or +// TLS 1.3 was negotiated. Otherwise, it returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_current_cipher returns cipher suite used by |ssl|, or NULL if it has +// not been negotiated yet. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_session_reused returns one if |ssl| performed an abbreviated handshake +// and zero otherwise. +// +// TODO(davidben): Hammer down the semantics of this API while a handshake, +// initial or renego, is in progress. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support returns one if the peer supports secure +// renegotiation (RFC 5746) or TLS 1.3. Otherwise, it returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret, as +// specified in RFC 5705. It writes |out_len| bytes to |out| given a label and +// optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context| +// flag controls whether a context is included.) +// +// It returns one on success and zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_export_keying_material( + SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const char *label, size_t label_len, + const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len, int use_context); + + +// Sessions. +// +// An |SSL_SESSION| represents an SSL session that may be resumed in an +// abbreviated handshake. It is reference-counted and immutable. Once +// established, an |SSL_SESSION| may be shared by multiple |SSL| objects on +// different threads and must not be modified. +// +// Note the TLS notion of "session" is not suitable for application-level +// session state. It is an optional caching mechanism for the handshake. Not all +// connections within an application-level session will reuse TLS sessions. TLS +// sessions may be dropped by the client or ignored by the server at any time. + +DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) + +// SSL_SESSION_new returns a newly-allocated blank |SSL_SESSION| or NULL on +// error. This may be useful when writing tests but should otherwise not be +// used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_SESSION_up_ref increments the reference count of |session| and returns +// one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_free decrements the reference count of |session|. If it reaches +// zero, all data referenced by |session| and |session| itself are released. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_to_bytes serializes |in| into a newly allocated buffer and sets +// |*out_data| to that buffer and |*out_len| to its length. The caller takes +// ownership of the buffer and must call |OPENSSL_free| when done. It returns +// one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(const SSL_SESSION *in, + uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket serializes |in|, but excludes the session +// identification information, namely the session ID and ticket. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *in, + uint8_t **out_data, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_from_bytes parses |in_len| bytes from |in| as an SSL_SESSION. It +// returns a newly-allocated |SSL_SESSION| on success or NULL on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes( + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_SESSION_get_version returns a string describing the TLS or DTLS version +// |session| was established at. For example, "TLSv1.2" or "DTLSv1". +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version returns the TLS or DTLS version |session| +// was established at. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t +SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version sets |session|'s TLS or DTLS version to +// |version|. This may be useful when writing tests but should otherwise not be +// used. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *session, + uint16_t version); + +// SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH is the maximum length of an SSL session ID. +#define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 + +// SSL_SESSION_get_id returns a pointer to a buffer containing |session|'s +// session ID and sets |*out_len| to its length. +// +// This function should only be used for implementing a TLS session cache. TLS +// sessions are not suitable for application-level session state, and a session +// ID is an implementation detail of the TLS resumption handshake mechanism. Not +// all resumption flows use session IDs, and not all connections within an +// application-level session will reuse TLS sessions. +// +// To determine if resumption occurred, use |SSL_session_reused| instead. +// Comparing session IDs will not give the right result in all cases. +// +// As a workaround for some broken applications, BoringSSL sometimes synthesizes +// arbitrary session IDs for non-ID-based sessions. This behavior may be +// removed in the future. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session, + unsigned *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_set1_id sets |session|'s session ID to |sid|, It returns one on +// success and zero on error. This function may be useful in writing tests but +// otherwise should not be used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid, + size_t sid_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_get_time returns the time at which |session| was established in +// seconds since the UNIX epoch. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get_timeout returns the lifetime of |session| in seconds. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_peer returns the peer leaf certificate stored in +// |session|. +// +// TODO(davidben): This should return a const X509 *. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates returns the peer certificate chain stored +// in |session|, or NULL if the peer did not use certificates. This is the +// unverified list of certificates as sent by the peer, not the final chain +// built during verification. The caller does not take ownership of the result. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) * + SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list sets |*out| and |*out_len| to +// point to |*out_len| bytes of SCT information stored in |session|. This is +// only valid for client sessions. The SCT information is a +// SignedCertificateTimestampList (including the two leading length bytes). See +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3 If no SCT was received then +// |*out_len| will be zero on return. +// +// WARNING: the returned data is not guaranteed to be well formed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list( + const SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response sets |*out| and |*out_len| to point to +// |*out_len| bytes of an OCSP response from the server. This is the DER +// encoding of an OCSPResponse type as defined in RFC 2560. +// +// WARNING: the returned data is not guaranteed to be well formed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL_SESSION *session, + const uint8_t **out, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH is the maximum length of a master secret. +#define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48 + +// SSL_SESSION_get_master_key writes up to |max_out| bytes of |session|'s secret +// to |out| and returns the number of bytes written. If |max_out| is zero, it +// returns the size of the secret. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, + uint8_t *out, size_t max_out); + +// SSL_SESSION_set_time sets |session|'s creation time to |time| and returns +// |time|. This function may be useful in writing tests but otherwise should not +// be used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, + uint64_t time); + +// SSL_SESSION_set_timeout sets |session|'s timeout to |timeout| and returns +// one. This function may be useful in writing tests but otherwise should not +// be used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, + uint32_t timeout); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context returns a pointer to a buffer containing +// |session|'s session ID context (see |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|) and +// sets |*out_len| to its length. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context( + const SSL_SESSION *session, unsigned *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context sets |session|'s session ID context (see +// |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|) to |sid_ctx|. It returns one on success and +// zero on error. This function may be useful in writing tests but otherwise +// should not be used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, + const uint8_t *sid_ctx, + size_t sid_ctx_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use returns one if |session| should be +// single-use (TLS 1.3 and later) and zero otherwise. +// +// If this function returns one, clients retain multiple sessions and use each +// only once. This prevents passive observers from correlating connections with +// tickets. See RFC 8446, appendix C.4. If it returns zero, |session| cannot be +// used without leaking a correlator. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_is_resumable returns one if |session| is complete and contains a +// session ID or ticket. It returns zero otherwise. Note this function does not +// ensure |session| will be resumed. It may be expired, dropped by the server, +// or associated with incompatible parameters. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_has_ticket returns one if |session| has a ticket and zero +// otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket sets |*out_ticket| and |*out_len| to |session|'s +// ticket, or NULL and zero if it does not have one. |out_ticket| may be NULL +// if only the ticket length is needed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session, + const uint8_t **out_ticket, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_set_ticket sets |session|'s ticket to |ticket|. It returns one on +// success and zero on error. This function may be useful in writing tests but +// otherwise should not be used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set_ticket(SSL_SESSION *session, + const uint8_t *ticket, + size_t ticket_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint returns ticket lifetime hint of +// |session| in seconds or zero if none was set. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t +SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher returns the cipher negotiated by the connection which +// established |session|. +// +// Note that, in TLS 1.3, there is no guarantee that resumptions with |session| +// will use that cipher. Prefer calling |SSL_get_current_cipher| on the |SSL| +// instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher( + const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256 returns one if |session| has a SHA-256 hash of +// the peer's certificate retained and zero if the peer did not present a +// certificate or if this was not enabled when |session| was created. See also +// |SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256 sets |*out_ptr| and |*out_len| to the SHA-256 +// hash of the peer certificate retained in |session|, or NULL and zero if it +// does not have one. See also |SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session, + const uint8_t **out_ptr, + size_t *out_len); + + +// Session caching. +// +// Session caching allows connections to be established more efficiently based +// on saved parameters from a previous connection, called a session (see +// |SSL_SESSION|). The client offers a saved session, using an opaque identifier +// from a previous connection. The server may accept the session, if it has the +// parameters available. Otherwise, it will decline and continue with a full +// handshake. +// +// This requires both the client and the server to retain session state. A +// client does so with a stateful session cache. A server may do the same or, if +// supported by both sides, statelessly using session tickets. For more +// information on the latter, see the next section. +// +// For a server, the library implements a built-in internal session cache as an +// in-memory hash table. Servers may also use |SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb| and +// |SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb| to implement a custom external session cache. In +// particular, this may be used to share a session cache between multiple +// servers in a large deployment. An external cache may be used in addition to +// or instead of the internal one. Use |SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode| to +// toggle the internal cache. +// +// For a client, the only option is an external session cache. Clients may use +// |SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb| to register a callback for when new sessions are +// available. These may be cached and, in subsequent compatible connections, +// configured with |SSL_set_session|. +// +// Note that offering or accepting a session short-circuits certificate +// verification and most parameter negotiation. Resuming sessions across +// different contexts may result in security failures and surprising +// behavior. For a typical client, this means sessions for different hosts must +// be cached under different keys. A client that connects to the same host with, +// e.g., different cipher suite settings or client certificates should also use +// separate session caches between those contexts. Servers should also partition +// session caches between SNI hosts with |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|. +// +// Note also, in TLS 1.2 and earlier, offering sessions allows passive observers +// to correlate different client connections. TLS 1.3 and later fix this, +// provided clients use sessions at most once. Session caches are managed by the +// caller in BoringSSL, so this must be implemented externally. See +// |SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use| for details. + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF disables all session caching. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT enables session caching for a client. The internal +// cache is never used on a client, so this only enables the callbacks. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001 + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER enables session caching for a server. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002 + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH enables session caching for both client and server. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR disables automatically calling +// |SSL_CTX_flush_sessions| every 255 connections. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080 + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP, on a server, disables looking up a session +// from the internal session cache. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100 + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE, on a server, disables storing sessions in +// the internal session cache. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200 + +// SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL, on a server, disables the internal session +// cache. +#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \ + (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) + +// SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode sets the session cache mode bits for |ctx| to +// |mode|. It returns the previous value. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); + +// SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode returns the session cache mode bits for +// |ctx| +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_set_session, for a client, configures |ssl| to offer to resume |session| +// in the initial handshake and returns one. The caller retains ownership of +// |session|. Note that configuring a session assumes the authentication in the +// session is valid. For callers that wish to revalidate the session before +// offering, see |SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates|, +// |SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list|, and +// |SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response|. +// +// It is an error to call this function after the handshake has begun. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT is the default lifetime, in seconds, of a +// session in TLS 1.2 or earlier. This is how long we are willing to use the +// secret to encrypt traffic without fresh key material. +#define SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT (2 * 60 * 60) + +// SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT is the default lifetime, in seconds, of a +// session for TLS 1.3 psk_dhe_ke. This is how long we are willing to use the +// secret as an authenticator. +#define SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT (2 * 24 * 60 * 60) + +// SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT is the default non-renewable lifetime, in +// seconds, of a TLS 1.3 session. This is how long we are willing to trust the +// signature in the initial handshake. +#define SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT (7 * 24 * 60 * 60) + +// SSL_CTX_set_timeout sets the lifetime, in seconds, of TLS 1.2 (or earlier) +// sessions created in |ctx| to |timeout|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout); + +// SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout sets the lifetime, in seconds, of TLS 1.3 +// sessions created in |ctx| to |timeout|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, + uint32_t timeout); + +// SSL_CTX_get_timeout returns the lifetime, in seconds, of TLS 1.2 (or earlier) +// sessions created in |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH is the maximum length of a session ID context. +#define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32 + +// SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context sets |ctx|'s session ID context to |sid_ctx|. +// It returns one on success and zero on error. The session ID context is an +// application-defined opaque byte string. A session will not be used in a +// connection without a matching session ID context. +// +// For a server, if |SSL_VERIFY_PEER| is enabled, it is an error to not set a +// session ID context. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint8_t *sid_ctx, + size_t sid_ctx_len); + +// SSL_set_session_id_context sets |ssl|'s session ID context to |sid_ctx|. It +// returns one on success and zero on error. See also +// |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, + size_t sid_ctx_len); + +// SSL_get0_session_id_context returns a pointer to |ssl|'s session ID context +// and sets |*out_len| to its length. It returns NULL on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const uint8_t *SSL_get0_session_id_context(const SSL *ssl, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT is the default maximum size of a session +// cache. +#define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024 * 20) + +// SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size sets the maximum size of |ctx|'s internal session +// cache to |size|. It returns the previous value. +OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, + unsigned long size); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size returns the maximum size of |ctx|'s internal +// session cache. +OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_number returns the number of sessions in |ctx|'s internal +// session cache. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_add_session inserts |session| into |ctx|'s internal session cache. It +// returns one on success and zero on error or if |session| is already in the +// cache. The caller retains its reference to |session|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_CTX_remove_session removes |session| from |ctx|'s internal session cache. +// It returns one on success and zero if |session| was not in the cache. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_CTX_flush_sessions removes all sessions from |ctx| which have expired as +// of time |time|. If |time| is zero, all sessions are removed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb sets the callback to be called when a new session is +// established and ready to be cached. If the session cache is disabled (the +// appropriate one of |SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT| or |SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER| is +// unset), the callback is not called. +// +// The callback is passed a reference to |session|. It returns one if it takes +// ownership (and then calls |SSL_SESSION_free| when done) and zero otherwise. A +// consumer which places |session| into an in-memory cache will likely return +// one, with the cache calling |SSL_SESSION_free|. A consumer which serializes +// |session| with |SSL_SESSION_to_bytes| may not need to retain |session| and +// will likely return zero. Returning one is equivalent to calling +// |SSL_SESSION_up_ref| and then returning zero. +// +// Note: For a client, the callback may be called on abbreviated handshakes if a +// ticket is renewed. Further, it may not be called until some time after +// |SSL_do_handshake| or |SSL_connect| completes if False Start is enabled. Thus +// it's recommended to use this callback over calling |SSL_get_session| on +// handshake completion. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb returns the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))( + SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb sets a callback which is called when a session is +// removed from the internal session cache. +// +// TODO(davidben): What is the point of this callback? It seems useless since it +// only fires on sessions in the internal cache. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb returns the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))( + SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb sets a callback to look up a session by ID for a +// server. The callback is passed the session ID and should return a matching +// |SSL_SESSION| or NULL if not found. It should set |*out_copy| to zero and +// return a new reference to the session. This callback is not used for a +// client. +// +// For historical reasons, if |*out_copy| is set to one (default), the SSL +// library will take a new reference to the returned |SSL_SESSION|, expecting +// the callback to return a non-owning pointer. This is not recommended. If +// |ctx| and thus the callback is used on multiple threads, the session may be +// removed and invalidated before the SSL library calls |SSL_SESSION_up_ref|, +// whereas the callback may synchronize internally. +// +// To look up a session asynchronously, the callback may return +// |SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr|. See the documentation for that function and +// |SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION|. +// +// If the internal session cache is enabled, the callback is only consulted if +// the internal cache does not return a match. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id, + int id_len, int *out_copy)); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb returns the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))( + SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id, int id_len, int *out_copy); + +// SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr returns a magic |SSL_SESSION|* which indicates +// that the session isn't currently unavailable. |SSL_get_error| will then +// return |SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION| and the handshake can be retried later +// when the lookup has completed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void); + + +// Session tickets. +// +// Session tickets, from RFC 5077, allow session resumption without server-side +// state. The server maintains a secret ticket key and sends the client opaque +// encrypted session parameters, called a ticket. When offering the session, the +// client sends the ticket which the server decrypts to recover session state. +// Session tickets are enabled by default but may be disabled with +// |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET|. +// +// On the client, ticket-based sessions use the same APIs as ID-based tickets. +// Callers do not need to handle them differently. +// +// On the server, tickets are encrypted and authenticated with a secret key. +// By default, an |SSL_CTX| will manage session ticket encryption keys by +// generating them internally and rotating every 48 hours. Tickets are minted +// and processed transparently. The following functions may be used to configure +// a persistent key or implement more custom behavior, including key rotation +// and sharing keys between multiple servers in a large deployment. There are +// three levels of customisation possible: +// +// 1) One can simply set the keys with |SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys|. +// 2) One can configure an |EVP_CIPHER_CTX| and |HMAC_CTX| directly for +// encryption and authentication. +// 3) One can configure an |SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD| to have more control +// and the option of asynchronous decryption. +// +// An attacker that compromises a server's session ticket key can impersonate +// the server and, prior to TLS 1.3, retroactively decrypt all application +// traffic from sessions using that ticket key. Thus ticket keys must be +// regularly rotated for forward secrecy. Note the default key is rotated +// automatically once every 48 hours but manually configured keys are not. + +// SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL is the interval with which the +// default session ticket encryption key is rotated, if in use. If any +// non-default ticket encryption mechanism is configured, automatic rotation is +// disabled. +#define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL (2 * 24 * 60 * 60) + +// SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys writes |ctx|'s session ticket key material to +// |len| bytes of |out|. It returns one on success and zero if |len| is not +// 48. If |out| is NULL, it returns 48 instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, + size_t len); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys sets |ctx|'s session ticket key material to +// |len| bytes of |in|. It returns one on success and zero if |len| is not +// 48. If |in| is NULL, it returns 48 instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, + size_t len); + +// SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN is the length of the key name prefix of a session +// ticket. +#define SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN 16 + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb sets the ticket callback to |callback| and +// returns one. |callback| will be called when encrypting a new ticket and when +// decrypting a ticket from the client. +// +// In both modes, |ctx| and |hmac_ctx| will already have been initialized with +// |EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init| and |HMAC_CTX_init|, respectively. |callback| +// configures |hmac_ctx| with an HMAC digest and key, and configures |ctx| +// for encryption or decryption, based on the mode. +// +// When encrypting a new ticket, |encrypt| will be one. It writes a public +// 16-byte key name to |key_name| and a fresh IV to |iv|. The output IV length +// must match |EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length| of the cipher selected. In this mode, +// |callback| returns 1 on success and -1 on error. +// +// When decrypting a ticket, |encrypt| will be zero. |key_name| will point to a +// 16-byte key name and |iv| points to an IV. The length of the IV consumed must +// match |EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length| of the cipher selected. In this mode, +// |callback| returns -1 to abort the handshake, 0 if decrypting the ticket +// failed, and 1 or 2 on success. If it returns 2, the ticket will be renewed. +// This may be used to re-key the ticket. +// +// WARNING: |callback| wildly breaks the usual return value convention and is +// called in two different modes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv, + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx, + int encrypt)); + +// ssl_ticket_aead_result_t enumerates the possible results from decrypting a +// ticket with an |SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD|. +enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + // ssl_ticket_aead_success indicates that the ticket was successfully + // decrypted. + ssl_ticket_aead_success, + // ssl_ticket_aead_retry indicates that the operation could not be + // immediately completed and must be reattempted, via |open|, at a later + // point. + ssl_ticket_aead_retry, + // ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket indicates that the ticket should be ignored + // (i.e. is corrupt or otherwise undecryptable). + ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket, + // ssl_ticket_aead_error indicates that a fatal error occured and the + // handshake should be terminated. + ssl_ticket_aead_error, +}; + +// ssl_ticket_aead_method_st (aka |SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD|) contains methods +// for encrypting and decrypting session tickets. +struct ssl_ticket_aead_method_st { + // max_overhead returns the maximum number of bytes of overhead that |seal| + // may add. + size_t (*max_overhead)(SSL *ssl); + + // seal encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in|, writes, at most, + // |max_out_len| bytes to |out|, and puts the number of bytes written in + // |*out_len|. The |in| and |out| buffers may be equal but will not otherwise + // alias. It returns one on success or zero on error. + int (*seal)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len); + + // open authenticates and decrypts |in_len| bytes from |in|, writes, at most, + // |max_out_len| bytes of plaintext to |out|, and puts the number of bytes + // written in |*out_len|. The |in| and |out| buffers may be equal but will + // not otherwise alias. See |ssl_ticket_aead_result_t| for details of the + // return values. In the case that a retry is indicated, the caller should + // arrange for the high-level operation on |ssl| to be retried when the + // operation is completed, which will result in another call to |open|. + enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t (*open)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, + size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *in, + size_t in_len); +}; + +// SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method configures a custom ticket AEAD method table +// on |ctx|. |aead_method| must remain valid for the lifetime of |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method( + SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *aead_method); + +// SSL_process_tls13_new_session_ticket processes an unencrypted TLS 1.3 +// NewSessionTicket message from |buf| and returns a resumable |SSL_SESSION|, +// or NULL on error. The caller takes ownership of the returned session and +// must call |SSL_SESSION_free| to free it. +// +// |buf| contains |buf_len| bytes that represents a complete NewSessionTicket +// message including its header, i.e., one byte for the type (0x04) and three +// bytes for the length. |buf| must contain only one such message. +// +// This function may be used to process NewSessionTicket messages in TLS 1.3 +// clients that are handling the record layer externally. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_process_tls13_new_session_ticket( + SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len); + +// SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets configures |ctx| to send |num_tickets| immediately +// after a successful TLS 1.3 handshake as a server. It returns one. Large +// values of |num_tickets| will be capped within the library. +// +// By default, BoringSSL sends two tickets. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t num_tickets); + +// SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets returns the number of tickets |ctx| will send +// immediately after a successful TLS 1.3 handshake as a server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + + +// Diffie-Hellman groups and ephemeral key exchanges. +// +// Most TLS handshakes (ECDHE cipher suites in TLS 1.2, and all supported TLS +// 1.3 modes) incorporate an ephemeral key exchange, most commonly using +// Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), as described in RFC 8422. The key +// exchange algorithm is negotiated separately from the cipher suite, using +// NamedGroup values, which define Diffie-Hellman groups. +// +// Historically, these values were known as "curves", in reference to ECDH, and +// some APIs refer to the original name. RFC 7919 renamed them to "groups" in +// reference to Diffie-Hellman in general. These values are also used to select +// experimental post-quantum KEMs. Though not Diffie-Hellman groups, KEMs can +// fill a similar role in TLS, so they use the same codepoints. +// +// In TLS 1.2, the ECDH values also negotiate elliptic curves used in ECDSA. In +// TLS 1.3 and later, ECDSA curves are part of the signature algorithm. See +// |SSL_SIGN_*|. + +// SSL_GROUP_* define TLS group IDs. +#define SSL_GROUP_SECP224R1 21 +#define SSL_GROUP_SECP256R1 23 +#define SSL_GROUP_SECP384R1 24 +#define SSL_GROUP_SECP521R1 25 +#define SSL_GROUP_X25519 29 +#define SSL_GROUP_X25519_KYBER768_DRAFT00 0x6399 + +// SSL_CTX_set1_group_ids sets the preferred groups for |ctx| to |group_ids|. +// Each element of |group_ids| should be one of the |SSL_GROUP_*| constants. It +// returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_group_ids(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint16_t *group_ids, + size_t num_group_ids); + +// SSL_set1_group_ids sets the preferred groups for |ssl| to |group_ids|. Each +// element of |group_ids| should be one of the |SSL_GROUP_*| constants. It +// returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_group_ids(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *group_ids, + size_t num_group_ids); + +// SSL_get_group_id returns the ID of the group used by |ssl|'s most recently +// completed handshake, or 0 if not applicable. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_get_group_id(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_group_name returns a human-readable name for the group specified by +// the given TLS group ID, or NULL if the group is unknown. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_group_name(uint16_t group_id); + +// SSL_get_all_group_names outputs a list of possible strings +// |SSL_get_group_name| may return in this version of BoringSSL. It writes at +// most |max_out| entries to |out| and returns the total number it would have +// written, if |max_out| had been large enough. |max_out| may be initially set +// to zero to size the output. +// +// This function is only intended to help initialize tables in callers that want +// possible strings pre-declared. This list would not be suitable to set a list +// of supported features. It is in no particular order, and may contain +// placeholder, experimental, or deprecated values that do not apply to every +// caller. Future versions of BoringSSL may also return strings not in this +// list, so this does not apply if, say, sending strings across services. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_all_group_names(const char **out, size_t max_out); + +// The following APIs also configure Diffie-Hellman groups, but use |NID_*| +// constants instead of |SSL_GROUP_*| constants. These are provided for OpenSSL +// compatibility. Where NIDs are unstable constants specific to OpenSSL and +// BoringSSL, group IDs are defined by the TLS protocol. Prefer the group ID +// representation if storing persistently, or exporting to another process or +// library. + +// SSL_CTX_set1_groups sets the preferred groups for |ctx| to be |groups|. Each +// element of |groups| should be a |NID_*| constant from nid.h. It returns one +// on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *groups, + size_t num_groups); + +// SSL_set1_groups sets the preferred groups for |ssl| to be |groups|. Each +// element of |groups| should be a |NID_*| constant from nid.h. It returns one +// on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_groups(SSL *ssl, const int *groups, + size_t num_groups); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list decodes |groups| as a colon-separated list of group +// names (e.g. "X25519" or "P-256") and sets |ctx|'s preferred groups to the +// result. It returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *groups); + +// SSL_set1_groups_list decodes |groups| as a colon-separated list of group +// names (e.g. "X25519" or "P-256") and sets |ssl|'s preferred groups to the +// result. It returns one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_groups_list(SSL *ssl, const char *groups); + +// SSL_get_negotiated_group returns the NID of the group used by |ssl|'s most +// recently completed handshake, or |NID_undef| if not applicable. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_negotiated_group(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Certificate verification. +// +// SSL may authenticate either endpoint with an X.509 certificate. Typically +// this is used to authenticate the server to the client. These functions +// configure certificate verification. +// +// WARNING: By default, certificate verification errors on a client are not +// fatal. See |SSL_VERIFY_NONE| This may be configured with +// |SSL_CTX_set_verify|. +// +// By default clients are anonymous but a server may request a certificate from +// the client by setting |SSL_VERIFY_PEER|. +// +// Many of these functions use OpenSSL's legacy X.509 stack which is +// underdocumented and deprecated, but the replacement isn't ready yet. For +// now, consumers may use the existing stack or bypass it by performing +// certificate verification externally. This may be done with +// |SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback| or by extracting the chain with +// |SSL_get_peer_cert_chain| after the handshake. In the future, functions will +// be added to use the SSL stack without dependency on any part of the legacy +// X.509 and ASN.1 stack. +// +// To augment certificate verification, a client may also enable OCSP stapling +// (RFC 6066) and Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962) extensions. + +// SSL_VERIFY_NONE, on a client, verifies the server certificate but does not +// make errors fatal. The result may be checked with |SSL_get_verify_result|. On +// a server it does not request a client certificate. This is the default. +#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00 + +// SSL_VERIFY_PEER, on a client, makes server certificate errors fatal. On a +// server it requests a client certificate and makes errors fatal. However, +// anonymous clients are still allowed. See +// |SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT|. +#define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01 + +// SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT configures a server to reject connections if +// the client declines to send a certificate. This flag must be used together +// with |SSL_VERIFY_PEER|, otherwise it won't work. +#define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02 + +// SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC configures a server to request a client certificate +// if and only if Channel ID is not negotiated. +#define SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC 0x04 + +// SSL_CTX_set_verify configures certificate verification behavior. |mode| is +// one of the |SSL_VERIFY_*| values defined above. |callback| should be NULL. +// +// If |callback| is non-NULL, it is called as in |X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb|, +// which is a deprecated and fragile mechanism to run the default certificate +// verification process, but suppress individual errors in it. See +// |X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb| for details, If set, the callback may use +// |SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx| with |X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data| to +// look up the |SSL| from |store_ctx|. +// +// WARNING: |callback| is not suitable for implementing custom certificate +// check, accepting all certificates, or extracting the certificate after +// verification. It does not replace the default process and is called multiple +// times throughout that process. It is also very difficult to implement this +// callback safely, without inadvertently relying on implementation details or +// making incorrect assumptions about when the callback is called. +// +// Instead, use |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify| or +// |SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback| to customize certificate verification. +// Those callbacks can inspect the peer-sent chain, call |X509_verify_cert| and +// inspect the result, or perform other operations more straightforwardly. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_verify( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)); + +// SSL_set_verify configures certificate verification behavior. |mode| is one of +// the |SSL_VERIFY_*| values defined above. |callback| should be NULL. +// +// If |callback| is non-NULL, it is called as in |X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb|, +// which is a deprecated and fragile mechanism to run the default certificate +// verification process, but suppress individual errors in it. See +// |X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb| for details, If set, the callback may use +// |SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx| with |X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data| to +// look up the |SSL| from |store_ctx|. +// +// WARNING: |callback| is not suitable for implementing custom certificate +// check, accepting all certificates, or extracting the certificate after +// verification. It does not replace the default process and is called multiple +// times throughout that process. It is also very difficult to implement this +// callback safely, without inadvertently relying on implementation details or +// making incorrect assumptions about when the callback is called. +// +// Instead, use |SSL_set_custom_verify| or |SSL_set_cert_verify_callback| to +// customize certificate verification. Those callbacks can inspect the peer-sent +// chain, call |X509_verify_cert| and inspect the result, or perform other +// operations more straightforwardly. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, + int (*callback)(int ok, + X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)); + +enum ssl_verify_result_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + ssl_verify_ok, + ssl_verify_invalid, + ssl_verify_retry, +}; + +// SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify configures certificate verification. |mode| is one +// of the |SSL_VERIFY_*| values defined above. |callback| performs the +// certificate verification. +// +// The callback may call |SSL_get0_peer_certificates| for the certificate chain +// to validate. The callback should return |ssl_verify_ok| if the certificate is +// valid. If the certificate is invalid, the callback should return +// |ssl_verify_invalid| and optionally set |*out_alert| to an alert to send to +// the peer. Some useful alerts include |SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED|, +// |SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED|, |SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA|, |SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE|, +// |SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN|, and |SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR|. See RFC 5246 +// section 7.2.2 for their precise meanings. If unspecified, +// |SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN| will be sent by default. +// +// To verify a certificate asynchronously, the callback may return +// |ssl_verify_retry|. The handshake will then pause with |SSL_get_error| +// returning |SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, + enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)); + +// SSL_set_custom_verify behaves like |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify| but configures +// an individual |SSL|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_custom_verify( + SSL *ssl, int mode, + enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)); + +// SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode returns |ctx|'s verify mode, set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_verify|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_get_verify_mode returns |ssl|'s verify mode, set by |SSL_CTX_set_verify| +// or |SSL_set_verify|. It returns -1 on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback returns the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_verify|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))( + int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx); + +// SSL_get_verify_callback returns the callback set by |SSL_CTX_set_verify| or +// |SSL_set_verify|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))( + int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx); + +// SSL_set1_host sets a DNS name that will be required to be present in the +// verified leaf certificate. It returns one on success and zero on error. +// +// Note: unless _some_ name checking is performed, certificate validation is +// ineffective. Simply checking that a host has some certificate from a CA is +// rarely meaningful—you have to check that the CA believed that the host was +// who you expect to be talking to. +// +// By default, both subject alternative names and the subject's common name +// attribute are checked. The latter has long been deprecated, so callers should +// call |SSL_set_hostflags| with |X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT| to use +// the standard behavior. https://crbug.com/boringssl/464 tracks fixing the +// default. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_host(SSL *ssl, const char *hostname); + +// SSL_set_hostflags calls |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags| on the +// |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| associated with this |SSL*|. |flags| should be some +// combination of the |X509_CHECK_*| constants. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *ssl, unsigned flags); + +// SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth sets the maximum depth of a certificate chain +// accepted in verification. This count excludes both the target certificate and +// the trust anchor (root certificate). +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth); + +// SSL_set_verify_depth sets the maximum depth of a certificate chain accepted +// in verification. This count excludes both the target certificate and the +// trust anchor (root certificate). +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth); + +// SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth returns the maximum depth of a certificate accepted +// in verification. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_get_verify_depth returns the maximum depth of a certificate accepted in +// verification. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_param sets verification parameters from |param|. It returns one +// on success and zero on failure. The caller retains ownership of |param|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); + +// SSL_set1_param sets verification parameters from |param|. It returns one on +// success and zero on failure. The caller retains ownership of |param|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, + const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); + +// SSL_CTX_get0_param returns |ctx|'s |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| for certificate +// verification. The caller must not release the returned pointer but may call +// functions on it to configure it. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_get0_param returns |ssl|'s |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| for certificate +// verification. The caller must not release the returned pointer but may call +// functions on it to configure it. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_purpose sets |ctx|'s |X509_VERIFY_PARAM|'s 'purpose' parameter to +// |purpose|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *ctx, int purpose); + +// SSL_set_purpose sets |ssl|'s |X509_VERIFY_PARAM|'s 'purpose' parameter to +// |purpose|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *ssl, int purpose); + +// SSL_CTX_set_trust sets |ctx|'s |X509_VERIFY_PARAM|'s 'trust' parameter to +// |trust|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *ctx, int trust); + +// SSL_set_trust sets |ssl|'s |X509_VERIFY_PARAM|'s 'trust' parameter to +// |trust|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_trust(SSL *ssl, int trust); + +// SSL_CTX_set_cert_store sets |ctx|'s certificate store to |store|. It takes +// ownership of |store|. The store is used for certificate verification. +// +// The store is also used for the auto-chaining feature, but this is deprecated. +// See also |SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store); + +// SSL_CTX_get_cert_store returns |ctx|'s certificate store. +OPENSSL_EXPORT X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths calls |X509_STORE_set_default_paths| on +// |ctx|'s store. See that function for details. +// +// Using this function is not recommended. In OpenSSL, these defaults are +// determined by OpenSSL's install prefix. There is no corresponding concept for +// BoringSSL. Future versions of BoringSSL may change or remove this +// functionality. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations calls |X509_STORE_load_locations| on |ctx|'s +// store. See that function for details. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *ca_file, + const char *ca_dir); + +// SSL_get_verify_result returns the result of certificate verification. It is +// either |X509_V_OK| or a |X509_V_ERR_*| value. +OPENSSL_EXPORT long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_alert_from_verify_result returns the SSL alert code, such as +// |SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED|, that corresponds to an |X509_V_ERR_*| value. +// The return value is always an alert, even when |result| is |X509_V_OK|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_alert_from_verify_result(long result); + +// SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx returns the ex_data index used to look up +// the |SSL| associated with an |X509_STORE_CTX| in the verify callback. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); + +// SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback sets a custom callback to be called on +// certificate verification rather than |X509_verify_cert|. |store_ctx| contains +// the verification parameters. The callback should return one on success and +// zero on fatal error. It may use |X509_STORE_CTX_set_error| to set a +// verification result. +// +// The callback may use |SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx| to recover the +// |SSL| object from |store_ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, void *arg), + void *arg); + +// SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps causes |ssl| (which must be the client end +// of a connection) to request SCTs from the server. See +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962. +// +// Call |SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list| to recover the SCT after the +// handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps enables SCT requests on all client SSL +// objects created from |ctx|. +// +// Call |SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list| to recover the SCT after the +// handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling causes |ssl| (which must be the client end of a +// connection) to request a stapled OCSP response from the server. +// +// Call |SSL_get0_ocsp_response| to recover the OCSP response after the +// handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling enables OCSP stapling on all client SSL objects +// created from |ctx|. +// +// Call |SSL_get0_ocsp_response| to recover the OCSP response after the +// handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store sets an |X509_STORE| that will be used +// exclusively for certificate verification and returns one. Ownership of +// |store| is transferred to the |SSL_CTX|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, + X509_STORE *store); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store sets an |X509_STORE| that will be used +// exclusively for certificate verification and returns one. An additional +// reference to |store| will be taken. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, + X509_STORE *store); + +// SSL_set0_verify_cert_store sets an |X509_STORE| that will be used +// exclusively for certificate verification and returns one. Ownership of +// |store| is transferred to the |SSL|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store); + +// SSL_set1_verify_cert_store sets an |X509_STORE| that will be used +// exclusively for certificate verification and returns one. An additional +// reference to |store| will be taken. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store); + +// SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs configures |ctx| to use |prefs| as the +// preference list when verifying signatures from the peer's long-term key. It +// returns one on zero on error. |prefs| should not include the internal-only +// value |SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const uint16_t *prefs, + size_t num_prefs); + +// SSL_set_verify_algorithm_prefs configures |ssl| to use |prefs| as the +// preference list when verifying signatures from the peer's long-term key. It +// returns one on zero on error. |prefs| should not include the internal-only +// value |SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, + const uint16_t *prefs, + size_t num_prefs); + + +// Client certificate CA list. +// +// When requesting a client certificate, a server may advertise a list of +// certificate authorities which are accepted. These functions may be used to +// configure this list. + +// SSL_set_client_CA_list sets |ssl|'s client certificate CA list to +// |name_list|. It takes ownership of |name_list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); + +// SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list sets |ctx|'s client certificate CA list to +// |name_list|. It takes ownership of |name_list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); + +// SSL_set0_client_CAs sets |ssl|'s client certificate CA list to |name_list|, +// which should contain DER-encoded distinguished names (RFC 5280). It takes +// ownership of |name_list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set0_client_CAs(SSL *ssl, + STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *name_list); + +// SSL_CTX_set0_client_CAs sets |ctx|'s client certificate CA list to +// |name_list|, which should contain DER-encoded distinguished names (RFC 5280). +// It takes ownership of |name_list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set0_client_CAs(SSL_CTX *ctx, + STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *name_list); + +// SSL_get_client_CA_list returns |ssl|'s client certificate CA list. If |ssl| +// has not been configured as a client, this is the list configured by +// |SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list|. +// +// If configured as a client, it returns the client certificate CA list sent by +// the server. In this mode, the behavior is undefined except during the +// callbacks set by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb| or +// when the handshake is paused because of them. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get0_server_requested_CAs returns the CAs sent by a server to guide a +// client in certificate selection. They are a series of DER-encoded X.509 +// names. This function may only be called during a callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| or when the handshake is paused because of it. +// +// The returned stack is owned by |ssl|, as are its contents. It should not be +// used past the point where the handshake is restarted after the callback. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) * + SSL_get0_server_requested_CAs(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list returns |ctx|'s client certificate CA list. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * + SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_add_client_CA appends |x509|'s subject to the client certificate CA list. +// It returns one on success or zero on error. The caller retains ownership of +// |x509|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_CTX_add_client_CA appends |x509|'s subject to the client certificate CA +// list. It returns one on success or zero on error. The caller retains +// ownership of |x509|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + +// SSL_load_client_CA_file opens |file| and reads PEM-encoded certificates from +// it. It returns a newly-allocated stack of the certificate subjects or NULL +// on error. Duplicates in |file| are ignored. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); + +// SSL_dup_CA_list makes a deep copy of |list|. It returns the new list on +// success or NULL on allocation error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list); + +// SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack behaves like |SSL_load_client_CA_file| +// but appends the result to |out|. It returns one on success or zero on +// error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out, + const char *file); + +// SSL_add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack behaves like +// |SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack| but reads from |bio|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_bio_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out, + BIO *bio); + + +// Server name indication. +// +// The server_name extension (RFC 3546) allows the client to advertise the name +// of the server it is connecting to. This is used in virtual hosting +// deployments to select one of a several certificates on a single IP. Only the +// host_name name type is supported. + +#define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 + +// SSL_set_tlsext_host_name, for a client, configures |ssl| to advertise |name| +// in the server_name extension. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name); + +// SSL_get_servername, for a server, returns the hostname supplied by the +// client or NULL if there was none. The |type| argument must be +// |TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type); + +// SSL_get_servername_type, for a server, returns |TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name| +// if the client sent a hostname and -1 otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback configures |callback| to be called on +// the server after ClientHello extensions have been parsed and returns one. +// The callback may use |SSL_get_servername| to examine the server_name +// extension and returns a |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*| value. The value of |arg| may be +// set by calling |SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg|. +// +// If the callback returns |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK|, the server_name extension is +// not acknowledged in the ServerHello. If the return value is +// |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL|, then |*out_alert| is the alert to send, +// defaulting to |SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME|. |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING| is +// ignored and treated as |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg sets the argument to the servername +// callback and returns one. See |SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + +// SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_* are values returned by some extension-related callbacks. +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0 +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1 +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2 +#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3 + +// SSL_set_SSL_CTX changes |ssl|'s |SSL_CTX|. |ssl| will use the +// certificate-related settings from |ctx|, and |SSL_get_SSL_CTX| will report +// |ctx|. This function may be used during the callbacks registered by +// |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|, +// |SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback|, and |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| or when +// the handshake is paused from them. It is typically used to switch +// certificates based on SNI. +// +// Note the session cache and related settings will continue to use the initial +// |SSL_CTX|. Callers should use |SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context| to partition +// the session cache between different domains. +// +// TODO(davidben): Should other settings change after this call? +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx); + + +// Application-layer protocol negotiation. +// +// The ALPN extension (RFC 7301) allows negotiating different application-layer +// protocols over a single port. This is used, for example, to negotiate +// HTTP/2. + +// SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the client ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to +// |protos|. |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit +// length-prefixed strings), or the empty string to disable ALPN. It returns +// zero on success and one on failure. Configuring a non-empty string enables +// ALPN on a client. +// +// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value +// convention. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos, + size_t protos_len); + +// SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the client ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. +// |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit +// length-prefixed strings), or the empty string to disable ALPN. It returns +// zero on success and one on failure. Configuring a non-empty string enables +// ALPN on a client. +// +// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value +// convention. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, + size_t protos_len); + +// SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called +// during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the +// client's list of offered protocols. +// +// The callback is passed a wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit +// length-prefixed strings) ALPN protocol list in |in|. To select a protocol, +// the callback should set |*out| and |*out_len| to the selected protocol and +// return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK| on success. It does not pass ownership of the +// buffer, so |*out| should point to a static string, a buffer that outlives the +// callback call, or the corresponding entry in |in|. +// +// If the server supports ALPN, but there are no protocols in common, the +// callback should return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL| to abort the connection +// with a no_application_protocol alert. +// +// If the server does not support ALPN, it can return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK| to +// continue the handshake without negotiating a protocol. This may be useful if +// multiple server configurations share an |SSL_CTX|, only some of which have +// ALPN protocols configured. +// +// |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING| is ignored and will be treated as +// |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK|. +// +// The callback will only be called if the client supports ALPN. Callers that +// wish to require ALPN for all clients must check |SSL_get0_alpn_selected| +// after the handshake. In QUIC connections, this is done automatically. +// +// The cipher suite is selected before negotiating ALPN. The callback may use +// |SSL_get_pending_cipher| to query the cipher suite. This may be used to +// implement HTTP/2's cipher suite constraints. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, + const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg), + void *arg); + +// SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. +// On return it sets |*out_data| to point to |*out_len| bytes of protocol name +// (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond +// with a negotiated protocol then |*out_len| will be zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t **out_data, + unsigned *out_len); + +// SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos configures client connections on |ctx| +// to allow unknown ALPN protocols from the server. Otherwise, by default, the +// client will require that the protocol be advertised in +// |SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int enabled); + + +// Application-layer protocol settings +// +// The ALPS extension (draft-vvv-tls-alps) allows exchanging application-layer +// settings in the TLS handshake for applications negotiated with ALPN. Note +// that, when ALPS is negotiated, the client and server each advertise their own +// settings, so there are functions to both configure setting to send and query +// received settings. + +// SSL_add_application_settings configures |ssl| to enable ALPS with ALPN +// protocol |proto|, sending an ALPS value of |settings|. It returns one on +// success and zero on error. If |proto| is negotiated via ALPN and the peer +// supports ALPS, |settings| will be sent to the peer. The peer's ALPS value can +// be retrieved with |SSL_get0_peer_application_settings|. +// +// On the client, this function should be called before the handshake, once for +// each supported ALPN protocol which uses ALPS. |proto| must be included in the +// client's ALPN configuration (see |SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos| and +// |SSL_set_alpn_protos|). On the server, ALPS can be preconfigured for each +// protocol as in the client, or configuration can be deferred to the ALPN +// callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb|), in which case only the selected +// protocol needs to be configured. +// +// ALPS can be independently configured from 0-RTT, however changes in protocol +// settings will fallback to 1-RTT to negotiate the new value, so it is +// recommended for |settings| to be relatively stable. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_application_settings(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *proto, + size_t proto_len, + const uint8_t *settings, + size_t settings_len); + +// SSL_get0_peer_application_settings sets |*out_data| and |*out_len| to a +// buffer containing the peer's ALPS value, or the empty string if ALPS was not +// negotiated. Note an empty string could also indicate the peer sent an empty +// settings value. Use |SSL_has_application_settings| to check if ALPS was +// negotiated. The output buffer is owned by |ssl| and is valid until the next +// time |ssl| is modified. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_peer_application_settings(const SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t **out_data, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_has_application_settings returns one if ALPS was negotiated on this +// connection and zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_has_application_settings(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_alps_use_new_codepoint configures whether to use the new ALPS +// codepoint. By default, the old codepoint is used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_alps_use_new_codepoint(SSL *ssl, int use_new); + + +// Certificate compression. +// +// Certificates in TLS 1.3 can be compressed (RFC 8879). BoringSSL supports this +// as both a client and a server, but does not link against any specific +// compression libraries in order to keep dependencies to a minimum. Instead, +// hooks for compression and decompression can be installed in an |SSL_CTX| to +// enable support. + +// ssl_cert_compression_func_t is a pointer to a function that performs +// compression. It must write the compressed representation of |in| to |out|, +// returning one on success and zero on error. The results of compressing +// certificates are not cached internally. Implementations may wish to implement +// their own cache if they expect it to be useful given the certificates that +// they serve. +typedef int (*ssl_cert_compression_func_t)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len); + +// ssl_cert_decompression_func_t is a pointer to a function that performs +// decompression. The compressed data from the peer is passed as |in| and the +// decompressed result must be exactly |uncompressed_len| bytes long. It returns +// one on success, in which case |*out| must be set to the result of +// decompressing |in|, or zero on error. Setting |*out| transfers ownership, +// i.e. |CRYPTO_BUFFER_free| will be called on |*out| at some point in the +// future. The results of decompressions are not cached internally. +// Implementations may wish to implement their own cache if they expect it to be +// useful. +typedef int (*ssl_cert_decompression_func_t)(SSL *ssl, CRYPTO_BUFFER **out, + size_t uncompressed_len, + const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len); + +// SSL_CTX_add_cert_compression_alg registers a certificate compression +// algorithm on |ctx| with ID |alg_id|. (The value of |alg_id| should be an IANA +// assigned value and each can only be registered once.) +// +// One of the function pointers may be NULL to avoid having to implement both +// sides of a compression algorithm if you're only going to use it in one +// direction. In this case, the unimplemented direction acts like it was never +// configured. +// +// For a server, algorithms are registered in preference order with the most +// preferable first. It returns one on success or zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_add_cert_compression_alg( + SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t alg_id, ssl_cert_compression_func_t compress, + ssl_cert_decompression_func_t decompress); + + +// Next protocol negotiation. +// +// The NPN extension (draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-03) is the predecessor to ALPN +// and deprecated in favor of it. + +// SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a +// TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol +// Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned +// by setting |*out| to point to it and |*out_len| to its length. This memory +// will not be modified, but one should assume that |ssl| keeps a reference to +// it. +// +// The callback should return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK| if it wishes to advertise. +// Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the ServerHello. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg), + void *arg); + +// SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a client +// needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |*out| must be +// set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). The length +// of the protocol name must be written into |*out_len|. The server's advertised +// protocols are provided in |in| and |in_len|. The callback can assume that +// |in| is syntactically valid. +// +// The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this +// callback returns a value other than |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK|. +// +// Configuring this callback enables NPN on a client. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, + const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg), + void *arg); + +// SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets |*out_data| and |*out_len| to point to +// the client's requested protocol for this connection. If the client didn't +// request any protocol, then |*out_data| is set to NULL. +// +// Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned +// from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols +// provided by the server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t **out_data, + unsigned *out_len); + +// SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is +// expected that this function is called from the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb|. +// +// |peer| and |supported| must be vectors of 8-bit, length-prefixed byte strings +// containing the peer and locally-configured protocols, respectively. The +// length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 +// is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. |supported| is assumed to be +// non-empty. +// +// This function finds the first protocol in |peer| which is also in +// |supported|. If one was found, it sets |*out| and |*out_len| to point to it +// and returns |OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED|. Otherwise, it returns +// |OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP| and sets |*out| and |*out_len| to the first +// supported protocol. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, + const uint8_t *peer, unsigned peer_len, + const uint8_t *supported, + unsigned supported_len); + +#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 +#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 +#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 + + +// Channel ID. +// +// See draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01. This is an old, experimental mechanism +// and should not be used in new code. + +// SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled configures whether connections associated +// with |ctx| should enable Channel ID as a server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int enabled); + +// SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled configures whether |ssl| should enable Channel +// ID as a server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id configures a TLS client to send a TLS Channel ID +// to compatible servers. |private_key| must be a P-256 EC key. It returns one +// on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *private_key); + +// SSL_set1_tls_channel_id configures a TLS client to send a TLS Channel ID to +// compatible servers. |private_key| must be a P-256 EC key. It returns one on +// success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key); + +// SSL_get_tls_channel_id gets the client's TLS Channel ID from a server |SSL| +// and copies up to the first |max_out| bytes into |out|. The Channel ID +// consists of the client's P-256 public key as an (x,y) pair where each is a +// 32-byte, big-endian field element. It returns 0 if the client didn't offer a +// Channel ID and the length of the complete Channel ID otherwise. This function +// always returns zero if |ssl| is a client. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t max_out); + + +// DTLS-SRTP. +// +// See RFC 5764. + +// srtp_protection_profile_st (aka |SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE|) is an SRTP +// profile for use with the use_srtp extension. +struct srtp_protection_profile_st { + const char *name; + unsigned long id; +} /* SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE */; + +DEFINE_CONST_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) + +// SRTP_* define constants for SRTP profiles. +#define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 0x0001 +#define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 0x0002 +#define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_80 0x0003 +#define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_32 0x0004 +#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80 0x0005 +#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 0x0006 +#define SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM 0x0007 +#define SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM 0x0008 + +// SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles enables SRTP for all SSL objects created from +// |ctx|. |profile| contains a colon-separated list of profile names. It returns +// one on success and zero on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *profiles); + +// SSL_set_srtp_profiles enables SRTP for |ssl|. |profile| contains a +// colon-separated list of profile names. It returns one on success and zero on +// failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles); + +// SSL_get_srtp_profiles returns the SRTP profiles supported by |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles( + const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile returns the selected SRTP profile, or NULL if +// SRTP was not negotiated. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile( + SSL *ssl); + + +// Pre-shared keys. +// +// Connections may be configured with PSK (Pre-Shared Key) cipher suites. These +// authenticate using out-of-band pre-shared keys rather than certificates. See +// RFC 4279. +// +// This implementation uses NUL-terminated C strings for identities and identity +// hints, so values with a NUL character are not supported. (RFC 4279 does not +// specify the format of an identity.) + +// PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN is the maximum supported length of a PSK identity, +// excluding the NUL terminator. +#define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128 + +// PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN is the maximum supported length of a pre-shared key. +#define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256 + +// SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback sets the callback to be called when PSK is +// negotiated on the client. This callback must be set to enable PSK cipher +// suites on the client. +// +// The callback is passed the identity hint in |hint| or NULL if none was +// provided. It should select a PSK identity and write the identity and the +// corresponding PSK to |identity| and |psk|, respectively. The identity is +// written as a NUL-terminated C string of length (excluding the NUL terminator) +// at most |max_identity_len|. The PSK's length must be at most |max_psk_len|. +// The callback returns the length of the PSK or 0 if no suitable identity was +// found. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, + unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, + unsigned max_psk_len)); + +// SSL_set_psk_client_callback sets the callback to be called when PSK is +// negotiated on the client. This callback must be set to enable PSK cipher +// suites on the client. See also |SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_psk_client_callback( + SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, + unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, + unsigned max_psk_len)); + +// SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback sets the callback to be called when PSK is +// negotiated on the server. This callback must be set to enable PSK cipher +// suites on the server. +// +// The callback is passed the identity in |identity|. It should write a PSK of +// length at most |max_psk_len| to |psk| and return the number of bytes written +// or zero if the PSK identity is unknown. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, + unsigned max_psk_len)); + +// SSL_set_psk_server_callback sets the callback to be called when PSK is +// negotiated on the server. This callback must be set to enable PSK cipher +// suites on the server. See also |SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_psk_server_callback( + SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, + unsigned max_psk_len)); + +// SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint configures server connections to advertise an +// identity hint of |identity_hint|. It returns one on success and zero on +// error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *identity_hint); + +// SSL_use_psk_identity_hint configures server connections to advertise an +// identity hint of |identity_hint|. It returns one on success and zero on +// error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, + const char *identity_hint); + +// SSL_get_psk_identity_hint returns the PSK identity hint advertised for |ssl| +// or NULL if there is none. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_psk_identity, after the handshake completes, returns the PSK identity +// that was negotiated by |ssl| or NULL if PSK was not used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Delegated credentials. +// +// Delegated credentials (RFC 9345) allow a TLS 1.3 endpoint to use its +// certificate to issue new credentials for authentication. Once issued, +// credentials can't be revoked. In order to mitigate the damage in case the +// credential secret key is compromised, the credential is only valid for a +// short time (days, hours, or even minutes). +// +// Currently only the authenticating side, as a server, is implemented. To +// authenticate with delegated credentials, construct an |SSL_CREDENTIAL| with +// |SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_delegated| and add it to the credential list. See also +// |SSL_CTX_add1_credential|. Callers may configure a mix of delegated +// credentials and X.509 credentials on the same |SSL| or |SSL_CTX| to support a +// range of clients. + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_delegated returns a new, empty delegated credential, or +// NULL on error. Callers should release the result with |SSL_CREDENTIAL_free| +// when done. +// +// Callers should configure a delegated credential, certificate chain and +// private key on the credential, along with other properties, then add it with +// |SSL_CTX_add1_credential|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_CREDENTIAL *SSL_CREDENTIAL_new_delegated(void); + +// SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_delegated_credential sets |cred|'s delegated credentials +// structure to |dc|. It returns one on success and zero on error, including if +// |dc| is malformed. This should be a DelegatedCredential structure, signed by +// the end-entity certificate, as described in RFC 9345. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set1_delegated_credential( + SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, CRYPTO_BUFFER *dc); + + +// QUIC integration. +// +// QUIC acts as an underlying transport for the TLS 1.3 handshake. The following +// functions allow a QUIC implementation to serve as the underlying transport as +// described in RFC 9001. +// +// When configured for QUIC, |SSL_do_handshake| will drive the handshake as +// before, but it will not use the configured |BIO|. It will call functions on +// |SSL_QUIC_METHOD| to configure secrets and send data. If data is needed from +// the peer, it will return |SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ|. As the caller receives data +// it can decrypt, it calls |SSL_provide_quic_data|. Subsequent +// |SSL_do_handshake| calls will then consume that data and progress the +// handshake. After the handshake is complete, the caller should continue to +// call |SSL_provide_quic_data| for any post-handshake data, followed by +// |SSL_process_quic_post_handshake| to process it. It is an error to call +// |SSL_read| and |SSL_write| in QUIC. +// +// 0-RTT behaves similarly to |TLS_method|'s usual behavior. |SSL_do_handshake| +// returns early as soon as the client (respectively, server) is allowed to send +// 0-RTT (respectively, half-RTT) data. The caller should then call +// |SSL_do_handshake| again to consume the remaining handshake messages and +// confirm the handshake. As a client, |SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED| and +// |SSL_reset_early_data_reject| behave as usual. +// +// See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001.html#section-4.1 for more details. +// +// To avoid DoS attacks, the QUIC implementation must limit the amount of data +// being queued up. The implementation can call +// |SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len| to get the maximum buffer length at each +// encryption level. +// +// QUIC implementations must additionally configure transport parameters with +// |SSL_set_quic_transport_params|. |SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params| may be +// used to query the value received from the peer. BoringSSL handles this +// extension as an opaque byte string. The caller is responsible for serializing +// and parsing them. See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-7.4 for +// details. +// +// QUIC additionally imposes restrictions on 0-RTT. In particular, the QUIC +// transport layer requires that if a server accepts 0-RTT data, then the +// transport parameters sent on the resumed connection must not lower any limits +// compared to the transport parameters that the server sent on the connection +// where the ticket for 0-RTT was issued. In effect, the server must remember +// the transport parameters with the ticket. Application protocols running on +// QUIC may impose similar restrictions, for example HTTP/3's restrictions on +// SETTINGS frames. +// +// BoringSSL implements this check by doing a byte-for-byte comparison of an +// opaque context passed in by the server. This context must be the same on the +// connection where the ticket was issued and the connection where that ticket +// is used for 0-RTT. If there is a mismatch, or the context was not set, +// BoringSSL will reject early data (but not reject the resumption attempt). +// This context is set via |SSL_set_quic_early_data_context| and should cover +// both transport parameters and any application state. +// |SSL_set_quic_early_data_context| must be called on the server with a +// non-empty context if the server is to support 0-RTT in QUIC. +// +// BoringSSL does not perform any client-side checks on the transport +// parameters received from a server that also accepted early data. It is up to +// the caller to verify that the received transport parameters do not lower any +// limits, and to close the QUIC connection if that is not the case. The same +// holds for any application protocol state remembered for 0-RTT, e.g. HTTP/3 +// SETTINGS. + +// ssl_encryption_level_t represents a specific QUIC encryption level used to +// transmit handshake messages. +enum ssl_encryption_level_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + ssl_encryption_initial = 0, + ssl_encryption_early_data, + ssl_encryption_handshake, + ssl_encryption_application, +}; + +// ssl_quic_method_st (aka |SSL_QUIC_METHOD|) describes custom QUIC hooks. +struct ssl_quic_method_st { + // set_read_secret configures the read secret and cipher suite for the given + // encryption level. It returns one on success and zero to terminate the + // handshake with an error. It will be called at most once per encryption + // level. + // + // BoringSSL will not release read keys before QUIC may use them. Once a level + // has been initialized, QUIC may begin processing data from it. Handshake + // data should be passed to |SSL_provide_quic_data| and application data (if + // |level| is |ssl_encryption_early_data| or |ssl_encryption_application|) may + // be processed according to the rules of the QUIC protocol. + // + // QUIC ACKs packets at the same encryption level they were received at, + // except that client |ssl_encryption_early_data| (0-RTT) packets trigger + // server |ssl_encryption_application| (1-RTT) ACKs. BoringSSL will always + // install ACK-writing keys with |set_write_secret| before the packet-reading + // keys with |set_read_secret|. This ensures the caller can always ACK any + // packet it decrypts. Note this means the server installs 1-RTT write keys + // before 0-RTT read keys. + // + // The converse is not true. An encryption level may be configured with write + // secrets a roundtrip before the corresponding secrets for reading ACKs is + // available. + int (*set_read_secret)(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, + size_t secret_len); + // set_write_secret behaves like |set_read_secret| but configures the write + // secret and cipher suite for the given encryption level. It will be called + // at most once per encryption level. + // + // BoringSSL will not release write keys before QUIC may use them. If |level| + // is |ssl_encryption_early_data| or |ssl_encryption_application|, QUIC may + // begin sending application data at |level|. However, note that BoringSSL + // configures server |ssl_encryption_application| write keys before the client + // Finished. This allows QUIC to send half-RTT data, but the handshake is not + // confirmed at this point and, if requesting client certificates, the client + // is not yet authenticated. + // + // See |set_read_secret| for additional invariants between packets and their + // ACKs. + // + // Note that, on 0-RTT reject, the |ssl_encryption_early_data| write secret + // may use a different cipher suite from the other keys. + int (*set_write_secret)(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, + size_t secret_len); + // add_handshake_data adds handshake data to the current flight at the given + // encryption level. It returns one on success and zero on error. + // + // BoringSSL will pack data from a single encryption level together, but a + // single handshake flight may include multiple encryption levels. Callers + // should defer writing data to the network until |flush_flight| to better + // pack QUIC packets into transport datagrams. + // + // If |level| is not |ssl_encryption_initial|, this function will not be + // called before |level| is initialized with |set_write_secret|. + int (*add_handshake_data)(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, + const uint8_t *data, size_t len); + // flush_flight is called when the current flight is complete and should be + // written to the transport. Note a flight may contain data at several + // encryption levels. It returns one on success and zero on error. + int (*flush_flight)(SSL *ssl); + // send_alert sends a fatal alert at the specified encryption level. It + // returns one on success and zero on error. + // + // If |level| is not |ssl_encryption_initial|, this function will not be + // called before |level| is initialized with |set_write_secret|. + int (*send_alert)(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, uint8_t alert); +}; + +// SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len returns returns the maximum number of bytes +// that may be received at the given encryption level. This function should be +// used to limit buffering in the QUIC implementation. +// +// See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-7.5 +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len( + const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level); + +// SSL_quic_read_level returns the current read encryption level. +// +// TODO(davidben): Is it still necessary to expose this function to callers? +// QUICHE does not use it. +OPENSSL_EXPORT enum ssl_encryption_level_t SSL_quic_read_level(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_quic_write_level returns the current write encryption level. +// +// TODO(davidben): Is it still necessary to expose this function to callers? +// QUICHE does not use it. +OPENSSL_EXPORT enum ssl_encryption_level_t SSL_quic_write_level(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_provide_quic_data provides data from QUIC at a particular encryption +// level |level|. It returns one on success and zero on error. Note this +// function will return zero if the handshake is not expecting data from |level| +// at this time. The QUIC implementation should then close the connection with +// an error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_provide_quic_data(SSL *ssl, + enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, + const uint8_t *data, size_t len); + + +// SSL_process_quic_post_handshake processes any data that QUIC has provided +// after the handshake has completed. This includes NewSessionTicket messages +// sent by the server. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_process_quic_post_handshake(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_quic_method configures the QUIC hooks. This should only be +// configured with a minimum version of TLS 1.3. |quic_method| must remain valid +// for the lifetime of |ctx|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_quic_method(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const SSL_QUIC_METHOD *quic_method); + +// SSL_set_quic_method configures the QUIC hooks. This should only be +// configured with a minimum version of TLS 1.3. |quic_method| must remain valid +// for the lifetime of |ssl|. It returns one on success and zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_quic_method(SSL *ssl, + const SSL_QUIC_METHOD *quic_method); + +// SSL_set_quic_transport_params configures |ssl| to send |params| (of length +// |params_len|) in the quic_transport_parameters extension in either the +// ClientHello or EncryptedExtensions handshake message. It is an error to set +// transport parameters if |ssl| is not configured for QUIC. The buffer pointed +// to by |params| only need be valid for the duration of the call to this +// function. This function returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_quic_transport_params(SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *params, + size_t params_len); + +// SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params provides the caller with the value of the +// quic_transport_parameters extension sent by the peer. A pointer to the buffer +// containing the TransportParameters will be put in |*out_params|, and its +// length in |*params_len|. This buffer will be valid for the lifetime of the +// |SSL|. If no params were received from the peer, |*out_params_len| will be 0. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params( + const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len); + +// SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint configures whether to use the legacy QUIC +// extension codepoint 0xffa5 as opposed to the official value 57. Call with +// |use_legacy| set to 1 to use 0xffa5 and call with 0 to use 57. By default, +// the standard code point is used. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint(SSL *ssl, int use_legacy); + +// SSL_set_quic_early_data_context configures a context string in QUIC servers +// for accepting early data. If a resumption connection offers early data, the +// server will check if the value matches that of the connection which minted +// the ticket. If not, resumption still succeeds but early data is rejected. +// This should include all QUIC Transport Parameters except ones specified that +// the client MUST NOT remember. This should also include any application +// protocol-specific state. For HTTP/3, this should be the serialized server +// SETTINGS frame and the QUIC Transport Parameters (except the stateless reset +// token). +// +// This function may be called before |SSL_do_handshake| or during server +// certificate selection. It returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_quic_early_data_context(SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *context, + size_t context_len); + + +// Early data. +// +// WARNING: 0-RTT support in BoringSSL is currently experimental and not fully +// implemented. It may cause interoperability or security failures when used. +// +// Early data, or 0-RTT, is a feature in TLS 1.3 which allows clients to send +// data on the first flight during a resumption handshake. This can save a +// round-trip in some application protocols. +// +// WARNING: A 0-RTT handshake has different security properties from normal +// handshake, so it is off by default unless opted in. In particular, early data +// is replayable by a network attacker. Callers must account for this when +// sending or processing data before the handshake is confirmed. See RFC 8446 +// for more information. +// +// As a server, if early data is accepted, |SSL_do_handshake| will complete as +// soon as the ClientHello is processed and server flight sent. |SSL_write| may +// be used to send half-RTT data. |SSL_read| will consume early data and +// transition to 1-RTT data as appropriate. Prior to the transition, +// |SSL_in_init| will report the handshake is still in progress. Callers may use +// it or |SSL_in_early_data| to defer or reject requests as needed. +// +// Early data as a client is more complex. If the offered session (see +// |SSL_set_session|) is 0-RTT-capable, the handshake will return after sending +// the ClientHello. The predicted peer certificates and ALPN protocol will be +// available via the usual APIs. |SSL_write| will write early data, up to the +// session's limit. Writes past this limit and |SSL_read| will complete the +// handshake before continuing. Callers may also call |SSL_do_handshake| again +// to complete the handshake sooner. +// +// If the server accepts early data, the handshake will succeed. |SSL_read| and +// |SSL_write| will then act as in a 1-RTT handshake. The peer certificates and +// ALPN protocol will be as predicted and need not be re-queried. +// +// If the server rejects early data, |SSL_do_handshake| (and thus |SSL_read| and +// |SSL_write|) will then fail with |SSL_get_error| returning +// |SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED|. The caller should treat this as a connection +// error and most likely perform a high-level retry. Note the server may still +// have processed the early data due to attacker replays. +// +// To then continue the handshake on the original connection, use +// |SSL_reset_early_data_reject|. The connection will then behave as one which +// had not yet completed the handshake. This allows a faster retry than making a +// fresh connection. |SSL_do_handshake| will complete the full handshake, +// possibly resulting in different peer certificates, ALPN protocol, and other +// properties. The caller must disregard any values from before the reset and +// query again. +// +// Finally, to implement the fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3, retry +// on a fresh connection without 0-RTT if the handshake fails with +// |SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA|. + +// SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled sets whether early data is allowed to be used +// with resumptions using |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled); + +// SSL_set_early_data_enabled sets whether early data is allowed to be used +// with resumptions using |ssl|. See |SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled| for more +// information. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_early_data_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled); + +// SSL_in_early_data returns one if |ssl| has a pending handshake that has +// progressed enough to send or receive early data. Clients may call |SSL_write| +// to send early data, but |SSL_read| will complete the handshake before +// accepting application data. Servers may call |SSL_read| to read early data +// and |SSL_write| to send half-RTT data. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_in_early_data(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable returns whether early data would have been +// attempted with |session| if enabled. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_SESSION_copy_without_early_data returns a copy of |session| with early +// data disabled. If |session| already does not support early data, it returns +// |session| with the reference count increased. The caller takes ownership of +// the result and must release it with |SSL_SESSION_free|. +// +// This function may be used on the client to clear early data support from +// existing sessions when the server rejects early data. In particular, +// |SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA| requires a fresh connection to retry, and +// the client would not want 0-RTT enabled for the next connection attempt. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_copy_without_early_data( + SSL_SESSION *session); + +// SSL_early_data_accepted returns whether early data was accepted on the +// handshake performed by |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_early_data_accepted(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_reset_early_data_reject resets |ssl| after an early data reject. All +// 0-RTT state is discarded, including any pending |SSL_write| calls. The caller +// should treat |ssl| as a logically fresh connection, usually by driving the +// handshake to completion using |SSL_do_handshake|. +// +// It is an error to call this function on an |SSL| object that is not signaling +// |SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_reset_early_data_reject(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_ticket_age_skew returns the difference, in seconds, between the +// client-sent ticket age and the server-computed value in TLS 1.3 server +// connections which resumed a session. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int32_t SSL_get_ticket_age_skew(const SSL *ssl); + +// An ssl_early_data_reason_t describes why 0-RTT was accepted or rejected. +// These values are persisted to logs. Entries should not be renumbered and +// numeric values should never be reused. +enum ssl_early_data_reason_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + // The handshake has not progressed far enough for the 0-RTT status to be + // known. + ssl_early_data_unknown = 0, + // 0-RTT is disabled for this connection. + ssl_early_data_disabled = 1, + // 0-RTT was accepted. + ssl_early_data_accepted = 2, + // The negotiated protocol version does not support 0-RTT. + ssl_early_data_protocol_version = 3, + // The peer declined to offer or accept 0-RTT for an unknown reason. + ssl_early_data_peer_declined = 4, + // The client did not offer a session. + ssl_early_data_no_session_offered = 5, + // The server declined to resume the session. + ssl_early_data_session_not_resumed = 6, + // The session does not support 0-RTT. + ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session = 7, + // The server sent a HelloRetryRequest. + ssl_early_data_hello_retry_request = 8, + // The negotiated ALPN protocol did not match the session. + ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch = 9, + // The connection negotiated Channel ID, which is incompatible with 0-RTT. + ssl_early_data_channel_id = 10, + // Value 11 is reserved. (It has historically |ssl_early_data_token_binding|.) + // The client and server ticket age were too far apart. + ssl_early_data_ticket_age_skew = 12, + // QUIC parameters differ between this connection and the original. + ssl_early_data_quic_parameter_mismatch = 13, + // The application settings did not match the session. + ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch = 14, + // The value of the largest entry. + ssl_early_data_reason_max_value = ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch, +}; + +// SSL_get_early_data_reason returns details why 0-RTT was accepted or rejected +// on |ssl|. This is primarily useful on the server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT enum ssl_early_data_reason_t SSL_get_early_data_reason( + const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_early_data_reason_string returns a string representation for |reason|, or +// NULL if |reason| is unknown. This function may be used for logging. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_early_data_reason_string( + enum ssl_early_data_reason_t reason); + + +// Encrypted ClientHello. +// +// ECH is a mechanism for encrypting the entire ClientHello message in TLS 1.3. +// This can prevent observers from seeing cleartext information about the +// connection, such as the server_name extension. +// +// By default, BoringSSL will treat the server name, session ticket, and client +// certificate as secret, but most other parameters, such as the ALPN protocol +// list will be treated as public and sent in the cleartext ClientHello. Other +// APIs may be added for applications with different secrecy requirements. +// +// ECH support in BoringSSL is still experimental and under development. +// +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-13. + +// SSL_set_enable_ech_grease configures whether the client will send a GREASE +// ECH extension when no supported ECHConfig is available. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_enable_ech_grease(SSL *ssl, int enable); + +// SSL_set1_ech_config_list configures |ssl| to, as a client, offer ECH with the +// specified configuration. |ech_config_list| should contain a serialized +// ECHConfigList structure. It returns one on success and zero on error. +// +// This function returns an error if the input is malformed. If the input is +// valid but none of the ECHConfigs implement supported parameters, it will +// return success and proceed without ECH. +// +// If a supported ECHConfig is found, |ssl| will encrypt the true ClientHello +// parameters. If the server cannot decrypt it, e.g. due to a key mismatch, ECH +// has a recovery flow. |ssl| will handshake using the cleartext parameters, +// including a public name in the ECHConfig. If using +// |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|, callers should use |SSL_get0_ech_name_override| +// to verify the certificate with the public name. If using the built-in +// verifier, the |X509_STORE_CTX| will be configured automatically. +// +// If no other errors are found in this handshake, it will fail with +// |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|. Since it didn't use the true parameters, the connection +// cannot be used for application data. Instead, callers should handle this +// error by calling |SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs| and retrying the connection +// with updated ECH parameters. If the retry also fails with +// |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|, the caller should report a connection failure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_ech_config_list(SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *ech_config_list, + size_t ech_config_list_len); + +// SSL_get0_ech_name_override, if |ssl| is a client and the server rejected ECH, +// sets |*out_name| and |*out_name_len| to point to a buffer containing the ECH +// public name. Otherwise, the buffer will be empty. +// +// When offering ECH as a client, this function should be called during the +// certificate verification callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|). If +// |*out_name_len| is non-zero, the caller should verify the certificate against +// the result, interpreted as a DNS name, rather than the true server name. In +// this case, the handshake will never succeed and is only used to authenticate +// retry configs. See also |SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ech_name_override(const SSL *ssl, + const char **out_name, + size_t *out_name_len); + +// SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs sets |*out_retry_configs| and +// |*out_retry_configs_len| to a buffer containing a serialized ECHConfigList. +// If the server did not provide an ECHConfigList, |*out_retry_configs_len| will +// be zero. +// +// When handling an |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED| error code as a client, callers should +// use this function to recover from potential key mismatches. If the result is +// non-empty, the caller should retry the connection, passing this buffer to +// |SSL_set1_ech_config_list|. If the result is empty, the server has rolled +// back ECH support, and the caller should retry without ECH. +// +// This function must only be called in response to an |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED| +// error code. Calling this function on |ssl|s that have not authenticated the +// rejection handshake will assert in debug builds and otherwise return an +// unparsable list. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs( + const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_retry_configs, + size_t *out_retry_configs_len); + +// SSL_marshal_ech_config constructs a new serialized ECHConfig. On success, it +// sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer containing the result and |*out_len| +// to the size of the buffer. The caller must call |OPENSSL_free| on |*out| to +// release the memory. On failure, it returns zero. +// +// The |config_id| field is a single byte identifier for the ECHConfig. Reusing +// config IDs is allowed, but if multiple ECHConfigs with the same config ID are +// active at a time, server load may increase. See +// |SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id|. +// +// The public key and KEM algorithm are taken from |key|. |public_name| is the +// DNS name used to authenticate the recovery flow. |max_name_len| should be the +// length of the longest name in the ECHConfig's anonymity set and influences +// client padding decisions. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_marshal_ech_config(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, + uint8_t config_id, + const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key, + const char *public_name, + size_t max_name_len); + +// SSL_ECH_KEYS_new returns a newly-allocated |SSL_ECH_KEYS| or NULL on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_ECH_KEYS *SSL_ECH_KEYS_new(void); + +// SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref increments the reference count of |keys|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys); + +// SSL_ECH_KEYS_free releases memory associated with |keys|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_ECH_KEYS_free(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys); + +// SSL_ECH_KEYS_add decodes |ech_config| as an ECHConfig and appends it with +// |key| to |keys|. If |is_retry_config| is non-zero, this config will be +// returned to the client on configuration mismatch. It returns one on success +// and zero on error. +// +// This function should be called successively to register each ECHConfig in +// decreasing order of preference. This configuration must be completed before +// setting |keys| on an |SSL_CTX| with |SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys|. After that +// point, |keys| is immutable; no more ECHConfig values may be added. +// +// See also |SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ECH_KEYS_add(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys, int is_retry_config, + const uint8_t *ech_config, + size_t ech_config_len, + const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key); + +// SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id returns one if |keys| has duplicate +// config IDs or zero otherwise. Duplicate config IDs still work, but may +// increase server load due to trial decryption. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id( + const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys); + +// SSL_ECH_KEYS_marshal_retry_configs serializes the retry configs in |keys| as +// an ECHConfigList. On success, it sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer +// containing the result and |*out_len| to the size of the buffer. The caller +// must call |OPENSSL_free| on |*out| to release the memory. On failure, it +// returns zero. +// +// This output may be advertised to clients in DNS. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ECH_KEYS_marshal_retry_configs(const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys, + uint8_t **out, + size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys configures |ctx| to use |keys| to decrypt encrypted +// ClientHellos. It returns one on success, and zero on failure. If |keys| does +// not contain any retry configs, this function will fail. Retry configs are +// marked as such when they are added to |keys| with |SSL_ECH_KEYS_add|. +// +// Once |keys| has been passed to this function, it is immutable. Unlike most +// |SSL_CTX| configuration functions, this function may be called even if |ctx| +// already has associated connections on multiple threads. This may be used to +// rotate keys in a long-lived server process. +// +// The configured ECHConfig values should also be advertised out-of-band via DNS +// (see draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https). Before advertising an ECHConfig in DNS, +// deployments should ensure all instances of the service are configured with +// the ECHConfig and corresponding private key. +// +// Only the most recent fully-deployed ECHConfigs should be advertised in DNS. +// |keys| may contain a newer set if those ECHConfigs are mid-deployment. It +// should also contain older sets, until the DNS change has rolled out and the +// old records have expired from caches. +// +// If there is a mismatch, |SSL| objects associated with |ctx| will complete the +// handshake using the cleartext ClientHello and send updated ECHConfig values +// to the client. The client will then retry to recover, but with a latency +// penalty. This recovery flow depends on the public name in the ECHConfig. +// Before advertising an ECHConfig in DNS, deployments must ensure all instances +// of the service can present a valid certificate for the public name. +// +// BoringSSL negotiates ECH before certificate selection callbacks are called, +// including |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|. If ECH is negotiated, the +// reported |SSL_CLIENT_HELLO| structure and |SSL_get_servername| function will +// transparently reflect the inner ClientHello. Callers should select parameters +// based on these values to correctly handle ECH as well as the recovery flow. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys); + +// SSL_ech_accepted returns one if |ssl| negotiated ECH and zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ech_accepted(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Alerts. +// +// TLS uses alerts to signal error conditions. Alerts have a type (warning or +// fatal) and description. OpenSSL internally handles fatal alerts with +// dedicated error codes (see |SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET|). Except for close_notify, +// warning alerts are silently ignored and may only be surfaced with +// |SSL_CTX_set_info_callback|. + +// SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET is the offset between error reasons and |SSL_AD_*| +// values. Any error code under |ERR_LIB_SSL| with an error reason above this +// value corresponds to an alert description. Consumers may add or subtract +// |SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET| to convert between them. +// +// make_errors.go reserves error codes above 1000 for manually-assigned errors. +// This value must be kept in sync with reservedReasonCode in make_errors.h +#define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000 + +// SSL_AD_* are alert descriptions. +#define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY +#define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE +#define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC +#define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED +#define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW +#define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE +#define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE +#define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE // Legacy SSL 3.0 value +#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED +#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED +#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN +#define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER +#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA +#define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED +#define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR +#define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR +#define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION +#define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION +#define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY +#define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR +#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK +#define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED +#define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION +#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION +#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE +#define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME +#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE \ + TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE +#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE +#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY +#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED +#define SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL +#define SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED TLS1_AD_ECH_REQUIRED + +// SSL_alert_type_string_long returns a string description of |value| as an +// alert type (warning or fatal). +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); + +// SSL_alert_desc_string_long returns a string description of |value| as an +// alert description or "unknown" if unknown. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); + +// SSL_send_fatal_alert sends a fatal alert over |ssl| of the specified type, +// which should be one of the |SSL_AD_*| constants. It returns one on success +// and <= 0 on error. The caller should pass the return value into +// |SSL_get_error| to determine how to proceed. Once this function has been +// called, future calls to |SSL_write| will fail. +// +// If retrying a failed operation due to |SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE|, subsequent +// calls must use the same |alert| parameter. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_send_fatal_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t alert); + + +// ex_data functions. +// +// See |ex_data.h| for details. + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data); +OPENSSL_EXPORT void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, + void *data); +OPENSSL_EXPORT void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, + int idx); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data); +OPENSSL_EXPORT void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_set_ex_data(SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, int idx, + void *data); +OPENSSL_EXPORT void *SSL_CREDENTIAL_get_ex_data(const SSL_CREDENTIAL *cred, + int idx); +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CREDENTIAL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + +// Low-level record-layer state. + +// SSL_get_ivs sets |*out_iv_len| to the length of the IVs for the ciphers +// underlying |ssl| and sets |*out_read_iv| and |*out_write_iv| to point to the +// current IVs for the read and write directions. This is only meaningful for +// connections with implicit IVs (i.e. CBC mode with TLS 1.0). +// +// It returns one on success or zero on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv, + const uint8_t **out_write_iv, + size_t *out_iv_len); + +// SSL_get_key_block_len returns the length of |ssl|'s key block, for TLS 1.2 +// and below. It is an error to call this function during a handshake, or if +// |ssl| negotiated TLS 1.3. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_generate_key_block generates |out_len| bytes of key material for |ssl|'s +// current connection state, for TLS 1.2 and below. It is an error to call this +// function during a handshake, or if |ssl| negotiated TLS 1.3. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t out_len); + +// SSL_get_read_sequence returns, in TLS, the expected sequence number of the +// next incoming record in the current epoch. In DTLS, it returns the maximum +// sequence number received in the current epoch and includes the epoch number +// in the two most significant bytes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_write_sequence returns the sequence number of the next outgoing +// record in the current epoch. In DTLS, it includes the epoch number in the +// two most significant bytes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_record_protocol_version returns whether |version| is zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int version); + + +// Handshake hints. +// +// WARNING: Contact the BoringSSL team before using this API. While this +// mechanism was designed to gracefully recover from version skew and +// configuration mismatch, splitting a single TLS server into multiple services +// is complex. +// +// Some server deployments make asynchronous RPC calls in both ClientHello +// dispatch and private key operations. In TLS handshakes where the private key +// operation occurs in the first round-trip, this results in two consecutive RPC +// round-trips. Handshake hints allow the RPC service to predict a signature. +// If correctly predicted, this can skip the second RPC call. +// +// First, the server installs a certificate selection callback (see +// |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|). When that is called, it performs the +// RPC as before, but includes the ClientHello and a capabilities string from +// |SSL_serialize_capabilities|. +// +// Next, the RPC service creates its own |SSL| object, applies the results of +// certificate selection, calls |SSL_request_handshake_hints|, and runs the +// handshake. If this successfully computes handshake hints (see +// |SSL_serialize_handshake_hints|), the RPC server should send the hints +// alongside any certificate selection results. +// +// Finally, the server calls |SSL_set_handshake_hints| and applies any +// configuration from the RPC server. It then completes the handshake as before. +// If the hints apply, BoringSSL will use the predicted signature and skip the +// private key callbacks. Otherwise, BoringSSL will call private key callbacks +// to generate a signature as before. +// +// Callers should synchronize configuration across the two services. +// Configuration mismatches and some cases of version skew are not fatal, but +// may result in the hints not applying. Additionally, some handshake flows use +// the private key in later round-trips, such as TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest. In +// those cases, BoringSSL will not predict a signature as there is no benefit. +// Callers must allow for handshakes to complete without a predicted signature. + +// SSL_serialize_capabilities writes an opaque byte string to |out| describing +// some of |ssl|'s capabilities. It returns one on success and zero on error. +// +// This string is used by BoringSSL internally to reduce the impact of version +// skew. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_serialize_capabilities(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out); + +// SSL_request_handshake_hints configures |ssl| to generate a handshake hint for +// |client_hello|. It returns one on success and zero on error. |client_hello| +// should contain a serialized ClientHello structure, from the |client_hello| +// and |client_hello_len| fields of the |SSL_CLIENT_HELLO| structure. +// |capabilities| should contain the output of |SSL_serialize_capabilities|. +// +// When configured, |ssl| will perform no I/O (so there is no need to configure +// |BIO|s). For QUIC, the caller should still configure an |SSL_QUIC_METHOD|, +// but the callbacks themselves will never be called and may be left NULL or +// report failure. |SSL_provide_quic_data| also should not be called. +// +// If hint generation is successful, |SSL_do_handshake| will stop the handshake +// early with |SSL_get_error| returning |SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY|. At +// this point, the caller should run |SSL_serialize_handshake_hints| to extract +// the resulting hints. +// +// Hint generation may fail if, e.g., |ssl| was unable to process the +// ClientHello. Callers should then complete the certificate selection RPC and +// continue the original handshake with no hint. It will likely fail, but this +// reports the correct alert to the client and is more robust in case of +// mismatch. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_request_handshake_hints(SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *client_hello, + size_t client_hello_len, + const uint8_t *capabilities, + size_t capabilities_len); + +// SSL_serialize_handshake_hints writes an opaque byte string to |out| +// containing the handshake hints computed by |out|. It returns one on success +// and zero on error. This function should only be called if +// |SSL_request_handshake_hints| was configured and the handshake terminated +// with |SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY|. +// +// This string may be passed to |SSL_set_handshake_hints| on another |SSL| to +// avoid an extra signature call. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_serialize_handshake_hints(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out); + +// SSL_set_handshake_hints configures |ssl| to use |hints| as handshake hints. +// It returns one on success and zero on error. The handshake will then continue +// as before, but apply predicted values from |hints| where applicable. +// +// Hints may contain connection and session secrets, so they must not leak and +// must come from a source trusted to terminate the connection. However, they +// will not change |ssl|'s configuration. The caller is responsible for +// serializing and applying options from the RPC server as needed. This ensures +// |ssl|'s behavior is self-consistent and consistent with the caller's local +// decisions. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_handshake_hints(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *hints, + size_t hints_len); + + +// Obscure functions. + +// SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback installs |cb| as the message callback for |ctx|. +// This callback will be called when sending or receiving low-level record +// headers, complete handshake messages, ChangeCipherSpec, and alerts. +// |write_p| is one for outgoing messages and zero for incoming messages. +// +// For each record header, |cb| is called with |version| = 0 and |content_type| +// = |SSL3_RT_HEADER|. The |len| bytes from |buf| contain the header. Note that +// this does not include the record body. If the record is sealed, the length +// in the header is the length of the ciphertext. +// +// For each handshake message, ChangeCipherSpec, and alert, |version| is the +// protocol version and |content_type| is the corresponding record type. The +// |len| bytes from |buf| contain the handshake message, one-byte +// ChangeCipherSpec body, and two-byte alert, respectively. +// +// In connections that enable ECH, |cb| is additionally called with +// |content_type| = |SSL3_RT_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER| for each ClientHelloInner that +// is encrypted or decrypted. The |len| bytes from |buf| contain the +// ClientHelloInner, including the reconstructed outer extensions and handshake +// header. +// +// For a V2ClientHello, |version| is |SSL2_VERSION|, |content_type| is zero, and +// the |len| bytes from |buf| contain the V2ClientHello structure. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int is_write, int version, int content_type, + const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + +// SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg sets the |arg| parameter of the message +// callback. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + +// SSL_set_msg_callback installs |cb| as the message callback of |ssl|. See +// |SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback| for when this callback is called. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_msg_callback( + SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, + const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + +// SSL_set_msg_callback_arg sets the |arg| parameter of the message callback. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg); + +// SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback configures a callback to log key material. This +// is intended for debugging use with tools like Wireshark. The |cb| function +// should log |line| followed by a newline, synchronizing with any concurrent +// access to the log. +// +// The format is described in +// https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile-01.html +// +// WARNING: The data in |line| allows an attacker to break security properties +// of the TLS protocol, including confidentiality, integrity, and forward +// secrecy. This impacts both the current connection, and, in TLS 1.2, future +// connections that resume a session from it. Both direct access to the data and +// side channel leaks from application code are possible attack vectors. This +// callback is intended for debugging and should not be used in production +// connections. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, + const char *line)); + +// SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback returns the callback configured by +// |SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void (*SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))( + const SSL *ssl, const char *line); + +// SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb configures a callback to retrieve the current +// time, which should be set in |*out_clock|. This can be used for testing +// purposes; for example, a callback can be configured that returns a time +// set explicitly by the test. The |ssl| pointer passed to |cb| is always null. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out_clock)); + +// SSL_set_shed_handshake_config allows some of the configuration of |ssl| to be +// freed after its handshake completes. Once configuration has been shed, APIs +// that query it may fail. "Configuration" in this context means anything that +// was set by the caller, as distinct from information derived from the +// handshake. For example, |SSL_get_ciphers| queries how the |SSL| was +// configured by the caller, and fails after configuration has been shed, +// whereas |SSL_get_cipher| queries the result of the handshake, and is +// unaffected by configuration shedding. +// +// If configuration shedding is enabled, it is an error to call |SSL_clear|. +// +// Note that configuration shedding as a client additionally depends on +// renegotiation being disabled (see |SSL_set_renegotiate_mode|). If +// renegotiation is possible, the configuration will be retained. If +// configuration shedding is enabled and renegotiation later disabled after the +// handshake, |SSL_set_renegotiate_mode| will shed configuration then. This may +// be useful for clients which support renegotiation with some ALPN protocols, +// such as HTTP/1.1, and not others, such as HTTP/2. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(SSL *ssl, int enable); + +enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + ssl_renegotiate_never = 0, + ssl_renegotiate_once, + ssl_renegotiate_freely, + ssl_renegotiate_ignore, + ssl_renegotiate_explicit, +}; + +// SSL_set_renegotiate_mode configures how |ssl|, a client, reacts to +// renegotiation attempts by a server. If |ssl| is a server, peer-initiated +// renegotiations are *always* rejected and this function does nothing. +// +// WARNING: Renegotiation is error-prone, complicates TLS's security properties, +// and increases its attack surface. When enabled, many common assumptions about +// BoringSSL's behavior no longer hold, and the calling application must handle +// more cases. Renegotiation is also incompatible with many application +// protocols, e.g. section 9.2.1 of RFC 7540. Many functions behave in ambiguous +// or undefined ways during a renegotiation. +// +// The renegotiation mode defaults to |ssl_renegotiate_never|, but may be set +// at any point in a connection's lifetime. Set it to |ssl_renegotiate_once| to +// allow one renegotiation, |ssl_renegotiate_freely| to allow all +// renegotiations or |ssl_renegotiate_ignore| to ignore HelloRequest messages. +// Note that ignoring HelloRequest messages may cause the connection to stall +// if the server waits for the renegotiation to complete. +// +// If set to |ssl_renegotiate_explicit|, |SSL_read| and |SSL_peek| calls which +// encounter a HelloRequest will pause with |SSL_ERROR_WANT_RENEGOTIATE|. +// |SSL_write| will continue to work while paused. The caller may call +// |SSL_renegotiate| to begin the renegotiation at a later point. This mode may +// be used if callers wish to eagerly call |SSL_peek| without triggering a +// renegotiation. +// +// If configuration shedding is enabled (see |SSL_set_shed_handshake_config|), +// configuration is released if, at any point after the handshake, renegotiation +// is disabled. It is not possible to switch from disabling renegotiation to +// enabling it on a given connection. Callers that condition renegotiation on, +// e.g., ALPN must enable renegotiation before the handshake and conditionally +// disable it afterwards. +// +// When enabled, renegotiation can cause properties of |ssl|, such as the cipher +// suite, to change during the lifetime of the connection. More over, during a +// renegotiation, not all properties of the new handshake are available or fully +// established. In BoringSSL, most functions, such as |SSL_get_current_cipher|, +// report information from the most recently completed handshake, not the +// pending one. However, renegotiation may rerun handshake callbacks, such as +// |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb|. Such callbacks must ensure they are acting on the +// desired versions of each property. +// +// BoringSSL does not reverify peer certificates on renegotiation and instead +// requires they match between handshakes, so certificate verification callbacks +// (see |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|) may assume |ssl| is in the initial +// handshake and use |SSL_get0_peer_certificates|, etc. +// +// There is no support in BoringSSL for initiating renegotiations as a client +// or server. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, + enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode); + +// SSL_renegotiate starts a deferred renegotiation on |ssl| if it was configured +// with |ssl_renegotiate_explicit| and has a pending HelloRequest. It returns +// one on success and zero on error. +// +// This function does not do perform any I/O. On success, a subsequent +// |SSL_do_handshake| call will run the handshake. |SSL_write| and +// |SSL_read| will also complete the handshake before sending or receiving +// application data. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_renegotiate_pending returns one if |ssl| is in the middle of a +// renegotiation. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_total_renegotiations returns the total number of renegotiation handshakes +// performed by |ssl|. This includes the pending renegotiation, if any. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT is the default maximum length, in bytes, of a peer +// certificate chain. +#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT (1024 * 100) + +// SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list returns the maximum length, in bytes, of a peer +// certificate chain accepted by |ctx|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list sets the maximum length, in bytes, of a peer +// certificate chain to |max_cert_list|. This affects how much memory may be +// consumed during the handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, + size_t max_cert_list); + +// SSL_get_max_cert_list returns the maximum length, in bytes, of a peer +// certificate chain accepted by |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_max_cert_list sets the maximum length, in bytes, of a peer +// certificate chain to |max_cert_list|. This affects how much memory may be +// consumed during the handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list); + +// SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment sets the maximum length, in bytes, of records +// sent by |ctx|. Beyond this length, handshake messages and application data +// will be split into multiple records. It returns one on success or zero on +// error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, + size_t max_send_fragment); + +// SSL_set_max_send_fragment sets the maximum length, in bytes, of records sent +// by |ssl|. Beyond this length, handshake messages and application data will +// be split into multiple records. It returns one on success or zero on +// error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, + size_t max_send_fragment); + +// ssl_early_callback_ctx (aka |SSL_CLIENT_HELLO|) is passed to certain +// callbacks that are called very early on during the server handshake. At this +// point, much of the SSL* hasn't been filled out and only the ClientHello can +// be depended on. +struct ssl_early_callback_ctx { + SSL *ssl; + const uint8_t *client_hello; + size_t client_hello_len; + uint16_t version; + const uint8_t *random; + size_t random_len; + const uint8_t *session_id; + size_t session_id_len; + const uint8_t *cipher_suites; + size_t cipher_suites_len; + const uint8_t *compression_methods; + size_t compression_methods_len; + const uint8_t *extensions; + size_t extensions_len; +} /* SSL_CLIENT_HELLO */; + +// ssl_select_cert_result_t enumerates the possible results from selecting a +// certificate with |select_certificate_cb|. +enum ssl_select_cert_result_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + // ssl_select_cert_success indicates that the certificate selection was + // successful. + ssl_select_cert_success = 1, + // ssl_select_cert_retry indicates that the operation could not be + // immediately completed and must be reattempted at a later point. + ssl_select_cert_retry = 0, + // ssl_select_cert_error indicates that a fatal error occured and the + // handshake should be terminated. + ssl_select_cert_error = -1, +}; + +// SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get searches the extensions in +// |client_hello| for an extension of the given type. If not found, it returns +// zero. Otherwise it sets |out_data| to point to the extension contents (not +// including the type and length bytes), sets |out_len| to the length of the +// extension contents and returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get( + const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, uint16_t extension_type, + const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len); + +// SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb sets a callback that is called before most +// ClientHello processing and before the decision whether to resume a session +// is made. The callback may inspect the ClientHello and configure the +// connection. See |ssl_select_cert_result_t| for details of the return values. +// +// In the case that a retry is indicated, |SSL_get_error| will return +// |SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE| and the caller should arrange for the +// high-level operation on |ssl| to be retried at a later time, which will +// result in another call to |cb|. +// +// |SSL_get_servername| may be used during this callback. +// +// Note: The |SSL_CLIENT_HELLO| is only valid for the duration of the callback +// and is not valid while the handshake is paused. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, + enum ssl_select_cert_result_t (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)); + +// SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb sets a callback that is called once the +// resumption decision for a ClientHello has been made. It can return one to +// allow the handshake to continue or zero to cause the handshake to abort. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)); + +// SSL_CTX_set_reverify_on_resume configures whether the certificate +// verification callback will be used to reverify stored certificates +// when resuming a session. This only works with |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|. +// For now, this is incompatible with |SSL_VERIFY_NONE| mode, and is only +// respected on clients. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_reverify_on_resume(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled); + +// SSL_set_enforce_rsa_key_usage configures whether, when |ssl| is a client +// negotiating TLS 1.2 or below, the keyUsage extension of RSA leaf server +// certificates will be checked for consistency with the TLS usage. In all other +// cases, this check is always enabled. +// +// This parameter may be set late; it will not be read until after the +// certificate verification callback. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_enforce_rsa_key_usage(SSL *ssl, int enabled); + +// SSL_was_key_usage_invalid returns one if |ssl|'s handshake succeeded despite +// using TLS parameters which were incompatible with the leaf certificate's +// keyUsage extension. Otherwise, it returns zero. +// +// If |SSL_set_enforce_rsa_key_usage| is enabled or not applicable, this +// function will always return zero because key usages will be consistently +// checked. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_was_key_usage_invalid(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_ST_* are possible values for |SSL_state|, the bitmasks that make them up, +// and some historical values for compatibility. Only |SSL_ST_INIT| and +// |SSL_ST_OK| are ever returned. +#define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000 +#define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000 +#define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF +#define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_ACCEPT) +#define SSL_ST_OK 0x03 +#define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04 | SSL_ST_INIT) +#define SSL_ST_BEFORE (0x05 | SSL_ST_INIT) + +// TLS_ST_* are aliases for |SSL_ST_*| for OpenSSL 1.1.0 compatibility. +#define TLS_ST_OK SSL_ST_OK +#define TLS_ST_BEFORE SSL_ST_BEFORE + +// SSL_CB_* are possible values for the |type| parameter in the info +// callback and the bitmasks that make them up. +#define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 +#define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 +#define SSL_CB_READ 0x04 +#define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08 +#define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000 +#define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT | SSL_CB_READ) +#define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT | SSL_CB_WRITE) +#define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_CB_LOOP) +#define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_CB_EXIT) +#define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_CB_LOOP) +#define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_CB_EXIT) +#define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10 +#define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 + +// SSL_CTX_set_info_callback configures a callback to be run when various +// events occur during a connection's lifetime. The |type| argument determines +// the type of event and the meaning of the |value| argument. Callbacks must +// ignore unexpected |type| values. +// +// |SSL_CB_READ_ALERT| is signaled for each alert received, warning or fatal. +// The |value| argument is a 16-bit value where the alert level (either +// |SSL3_AL_WARNING| or |SSL3_AL_FATAL|) is in the most-significant eight bits +// and the alert type (one of |SSL_AD_*|) is in the least-significant eight. +// +// |SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT| is signaled for each alert sent. The |value| argument +// is constructed as with |SSL_CB_READ_ALERT|. +// +// |SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START| is signaled when a handshake begins. The |value| +// argument is always one. +// +// |SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE| is signaled when a handshake completes successfully. +// The |value| argument is always one. If a handshake False Starts, this event +// may be used to determine when the Finished message is received. +// +// The following event types expose implementation details of the handshake +// state machine. Consuming them is deprecated. +// +// |SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP| (respectively, |SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP|) is signaled when +// a server (respectively, client) handshake progresses. The |value| argument +// is always one. +// +// |SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT| (respectively, |SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT|) is signaled when +// a server (respectively, client) handshake completes, fails, or is paused. +// The |value| argument is one if the handshake succeeded and <= 0 +// otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)); + +// SSL_CTX_get_info_callback returns the callback set by +// |SSL_CTX_set_info_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, + int type, + int value); + +// SSL_set_info_callback configures a callback to be run at various events +// during a connection's lifetime. See |SSL_CTX_set_info_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_info_callback( + SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)); + +// SSL_get_info_callback returns the callback set by |SSL_set_info_callback|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, + int type, + int value); + +// SSL_state_string_long returns the current state of the handshake state +// machine as a string. This may be useful for debugging and logging. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl); + +#define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1 +#define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2 + +// SSL_get_shutdown returns a bitmask with a subset of |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| and +// |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| to query whether close_notify was sent or received, +// respectively. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm returns the signature algorithm used by the +// peer. If not applicable, it returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_client_random writes up to |max_out| bytes of the most recent +// handshake's client_random to |out| and returns the number of bytes written. +// If |max_out| is zero, it returns the size of the client_random. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t max_out); + +// SSL_get_server_random writes up to |max_out| bytes of the most recent +// handshake's server_random to |out| and returns the number of bytes written. +// If |max_out| is zero, it returns the size of the server_random. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, + size_t max_out); + +// SSL_get_pending_cipher returns the cipher suite for the current handshake or +// NULL if one has not been negotiated yet or there is no pending handshake. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs, on a server, sets whether only +// the SHA-256 hash of peer's certificate should be saved in memory and in the +// session. This can save memory, ticket size and session cache space. If +// enabled, |SSL_get_peer_certificate| will return NULL after the handshake +// completes. See |SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256| and +// |SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256| to query the hash. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL *ssl, + int enable); + +// SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs, on a server, sets whether +// only the SHA-256 hash of peer's certificate should be saved in memory and in +// the session. This can save memory, ticket size and session cache space. If +// enabled, |SSL_get_peer_certificate| will return NULL after the handshake +// completes. See |SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256| and +// |SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256| to query the hash. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int enable); + +// SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled configures whether sockets on |ctx| should enable +// GREASE. See RFC 8701. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled); + +// SSL_CTX_set_permute_extensions configures whether sockets on |ctx| should +// permute extensions. For now, this is only implemented for the ClientHello. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_permute_extensions(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled); + +// SSL_set_permute_extensions configures whether sockets on |ssl| should +// permute extensions. For now, this is only implemented for the ClientHello. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_permute_extensions(SSL *ssl, int enabled); + +// SSL_max_seal_overhead returns the maximum overhead, in bytes, of sealing a +// record with |ssl|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_false_start_allowed_without_alpn configures whether connections +// on |ctx| may use False Start (if |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START| is enabled) +// without negotiating ALPN. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_false_start_allowed_without_alpn(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int allowed); + +// SSL_used_hello_retry_request returns one if the TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest +// message has been either sent by the server or received by the client. It +// returns zero otherwise. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_used_hello_retry_request(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_jdk11_workaround configures whether to workaround various bugs in +// JDK 11's TLS 1.3 implementation by disabling TLS 1.3 for such clients. +// +// https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806 +// https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8212885 +// https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8213202 +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_jdk11_workaround(SSL *ssl, int enable); + +// SSL_set_check_client_certificate_type configures whether the client, in +// TLS 1.2 and below, will check its certificate against the server's requested +// certificate types. +// +// By default, this option is enabled. If disabled, certificate selection within +// the library may not function correctly. This flag is provided temporarily in +// case of compatibility issues. It will be removed sometime after June 2024. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_check_client_certificate_type(SSL *ssl, int enable); + +// SSL_set_check_ecdsa_curve configures whether the server, in TLS 1.2 and +// below, will check its certificate against the client's supported ECDSA +// curves. +// +// By default, this option is enabled. If disabled, certificate selection within +// the library may not function correctly. This flag is provided temporarily in +// case of compatibility issues. It will be removed sometime after June 2024. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_check_ecdsa_curve(SSL *ssl, int enable); + + +// Deprecated functions. + +// SSL_library_init calls |CRYPTO_library_init| and returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_library_init(void); + +// SSL_CIPHER_description writes a description of |cipher| into |buf| and +// returns |buf|. If |buf| is NULL, it returns a newly allocated string, to be +// freed with |OPENSSL_free|, or NULL on error. +// +// The description includes a trailing newline and has the form: +// AES128-SHA Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 +// +// Consider |SSL_CIPHER_standard_name| or |SSL_CIPHER_get_name| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, + char *buf, int len); + +// SSL_CIPHER_get_version returns the string "TLSv1/SSLv3". +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +typedef void COMP_METHOD; +typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP; + +// SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods returns NULL. +OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); + +// SSL_COMP_add_compression_method returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); + +// SSL_COMP_get_name returns NULL. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp); + +// SSL_COMP_get0_name returns the |name| member of |comp|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp); + +// SSL_COMP_get_id returns the |id| member of |comp|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp); + +// SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void); + +// SSLv23_method calls |TLS_method|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); + +// These version-specific methods behave exactly like |TLS_method| and +// |DTLS_method| except they also call |SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version| and +// |SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version| to lock connections to that protocol +// version. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void); + +// These client- and server-specific methods call their corresponding generic +// methods. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void); +OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void); + +// SSL_clear resets |ssl| to allow another connection and returns one on success +// or zero on failure. It returns most configuration state but releases memory +// associated with the current connection. +// +// Free |ssl| and create a new one instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + +// SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, + RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, + int keylength)); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_connect returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_accept returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_hits returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_misses returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_cutthrough_complete calls |SSL_in_false_start|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_num_renegotiations calls |SSL_total_renegotiations|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_need_tmp_RSA returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa); + +// SSL_set_tmp_rsa returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa); + +// SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes); + +// SSL_get_read_ahead returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_read_ahead returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes); + +// SSL_set_state does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state); + +// SSL_get_shared_ciphers writes an empty string to |buf| and returns a +// pointer to |buf|, or NULL if |len| is less than or equal to zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len); + +// SSL_get_shared_sigalgs returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, int idx, int *psign, + int *phash, int *psignandhash, + uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash); + +// SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH is the same as SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START. +#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START + +// i2d_SSL_SESSION serializes |in|, as described in |i2d_SAMPLE|. +// +// Use |SSL_SESSION_to_bytes| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp); + +// d2i_SSL_SESSION parses a serialized session from the |length| bytes pointed +// to by |*pp|, as described in |d2i_SAMPLE|. +// +// Use |SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, + long length); + +// i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio serializes |session| and writes the result to |bio|. It +// returns the number of bytes written on success and <= 0 on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(BIO *bio, const SSL_SESSION *session); + +// d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio reads a serialized |SSL_SESSION| from |bio| and returns a +// newly-allocated |SSL_SESSION| or NULL on error. If |out| is not NULL, it also +// frees |*out| and sets |*out| to the new |SSL_SESSION|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(BIO *bio, SSL_SESSION **out); + +// ERR_load_SSL_strings does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + +// SSL_load_error_strings does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_load_error_strings(void); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp calls |SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles|. It returns +// zero on success and one on failure. +// +// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value +// convention. Use |SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, + const char *profiles); + +// SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp calls |SSL_set_srtp_profiles|. It returns zero on +// success and one on failure. +// +// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value +// convention. Use |SSL_set_srtp_profiles| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles); + +// SSL_get_current_compression returns NULL. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_current_expansion returns NULL. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_server_tmp_key returns zero. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh returns 1. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh); + +// SSL_set_tmp_dh returns 1. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback( + SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + +// SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback does nothing. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, + DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, + int keylength)); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs takes |num_values| ints and interprets them as pairs +// where the first is the nid of a hash function and the second is an +// |EVP_PKEY_*| value. It configures the signature algorithm preferences for +// |ctx| based on them and returns one on success or zero on error. +// +// This API is compatible with OpenSSL. However, BoringSSL-specific code should +// prefer |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs| because it's clearer and it's +// more convenient to codesearch for specific algorithm values. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *values, + size_t num_values); + +// SSL_set1_sigalgs takes |num_values| ints and interprets them as pairs where +// the first is the nid of a hash function and the second is an |EVP_PKEY_*| +// value. It configures the signature algorithm preferences for |ssl| based on +// them and returns one on success or zero on error. +// +// This API is compatible with OpenSSL. However, BoringSSL-specific code should +// prefer |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs| because it's clearer and it's +// more convenient to codesearch for specific algorithm values. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *values, + size_t num_values); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list takes a textual specification of a set of signature +// algorithms and configures them on |ctx|. It returns one on success and zero +// on error. See +// https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list.html for +// a description of the text format. Also note that TLS 1.3 names (e.g. +// "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1") can also be used (as in OpenSSL, although OpenSSL +// doesn't document that). +// +// This API is compatible with OpenSSL. However, BoringSSL-specific code should +// prefer |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs| because it's clearer and it's +// more convenient to codesearch for specific algorithm values. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str); + +// SSL_set1_sigalgs_list takes a textual specification of a set of signature +// algorithms and configures them on |ssl|. It returns one on success and zero +// on error. See +// https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list.html for +// a description of the text format. Also note that TLS 1.3 names (e.g. +// "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1") can also be used (as in OpenSSL, although OpenSSL +// doesn't document that). +// +// This API is compatible with OpenSSL. However, BoringSSL-specific code should +// prefer |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs| because it's clearer and it's +// more convenient to codesearch for specific algorithm values. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str); + +#define SSL_set_app_data(s, arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s, 0, (char *)(arg))) +#define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s, 0)) +#define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s, a) \ + (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s, 0, (char *)(a))) +#define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s, 0)) +#define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, 0)) +#define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, arg) \ + (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, 0, (char *)(arg))) + +#define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() +#define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() + +#define SSL_get_cipher(ssl) SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl)) +#define SSL_get_cipher_bits(ssl, out_alg_bits) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl), out_alg_bits) +#define SSL_get_cipher_version(ssl) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl)) +#define SSL_get_cipher_name(ssl) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl)) +#define SSL_get_time(session) SSL_SESSION_get_time(session) +#define SSL_set_time(session, time) SSL_SESSION_set_time((session), (time)) +#define SSL_get_timeout(session) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(session) +#define SSL_set_timeout(session, timeout) \ + SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((session), (timeout)) + +struct ssl_comp_st { + int id; + const char *name; + char *method; +}; + +DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) + +// The following flags do nothing and are included only to make it easier to +// compile code with BoringSSL. +#define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0 +#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0 +#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0 +#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0 +#define SSL_OP_ALL 0 +#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0 +#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0 +#define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0 +#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0 +#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0 +#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0 +#define SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0 // ssl_renegotiate_never is the default +#define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0 +#define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0 +#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0 +#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0 +#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0 +#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0 +#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0 +#define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0 +#define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0 + +// SSL_cache_hit calls |SSL_session_reused|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_default_timeout returns |SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_version returns a string describing the TLS version used by |ssl|. +// For example, "TLSv1.2" or "DTLSv1". +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_all_version_names outputs a list of possible strings +// |SSL_get_version| may return in this version of BoringSSL. It writes at most +// |max_out| entries to |out| and returns the total number it would have +// written, if |max_out| had been large enough. |max_out| may be initially set +// to zero to size the output. +// +// This function is only intended to help initialize tables in callers that want +// possible strings pre-declared. This list would not be suitable to set a list +// of supported features. It is in no particular order, and may contain +// placeholder, experimental, or deprecated values that do not apply to every +// caller. Future versions of BoringSSL may also return strings not in this +// list, so this does not apply if, say, sending strings across services. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_all_version_names(const char **out, + size_t max_out); + +// SSL_get_cipher_list returns the name of the |n|th cipher in the output of +// |SSL_get_ciphers| or NULL if out of range. Use |SSL_get_ciphers| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n); + +// SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb sets a callback which is called on the client if +// the server requests a client certificate and none is configured. On success, +// the callback should return one and set |*out_x509| to |*out_pkey| to a leaf +// certificate and private key, respectively, passing ownership. It should +// return zero to send no certificate and -1 to fail or pause the handshake. If +// the handshake is paused, |SSL_get_error| will return +// |SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP|. +// +// The callback may call |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and +// |SSL_get_client_CA_list| for information on the server's certificate request. +// +// Use |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| instead. Configuring intermediate certificates with +// this function is confusing. This callback may not be registered concurrently +// with |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| or |SSL_set_cert_cb|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb( + SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey)); + +#define SSL_NOTHING SSL_ERROR_NONE +#define SSL_WRITING SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE +#define SSL_READING SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ + +// SSL_want returns one of the above values to determine what the most recent +// operation on |ssl| was blocked on. Use |SSL_get_error| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl); + +#define SSL_want_read(ssl) (SSL_want(ssl) == SSL_READING) +#define SSL_want_write(ssl) (SSL_want(ssl) == SSL_WRITING) + + // SSL_get_finished writes up to |count| bytes of the Finished message sent by + // |ssl| to |buf|. It returns the total untruncated length or zero if none has + // been sent yet. At TLS 1.3 and later, it returns zero. + // + // Use |SSL_get_tls_unique| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count); + + // SSL_get_peer_finished writes up to |count| bytes of the Finished message + // received from |ssl|'s peer to |buf|. It returns the total untruncated length + // or zero if none has been received yet. At TLS 1.3 and later, it returns + // zero. + // + // Use |SSL_get_tls_unique| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, + size_t count); + +// SSL_alert_type_string returns "!". Use |SSL_alert_type_string_long| +// instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); + +// SSL_alert_desc_string returns "!!". Use |SSL_alert_desc_string_long| +// instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); + +// SSL_state_string returns "!!!!!!". Use |SSL_state_string_long| for a more +// intelligible string. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_TXT_* expand to strings. +#define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM" +#define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH" +#define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS" +#define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA" +#define SSL_TXT_kDHE "kDHE" +#define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH" +#define SSL_TXT_kECDHE "kECDHE" +#define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH" +#define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK" +#define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA" +#define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA" +#define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK" +#define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" +#define SSL_TXT_DHE "DHE" +#define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH" +#define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA" +#define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH" +#define SSL_TXT_ECDHE "ECDHE" +#define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH" +#define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA" +#define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK" +#define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES" +#define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4" +#define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128" +#define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256" +#define SSL_TXT_AES "AES" +#define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM "AESGCM" +#define SSL_TXT_CHACHA20 "CHACHA20" +#define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5" +#define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1" +#define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA" +#define SSL_TXT_SHA256 "SHA256" +#define SSL_TXT_SHA384 "SHA384" +#define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3" +#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1" +#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1 "TLSv1.1" +#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2 "TLSv1.2" +#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_3 "TLSv1.3" +#define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL" +#define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" + +typedef struct ssl_conf_ctx_st SSL_CONF_CTX; + +// SSL_state returns |SSL_ST_INIT| if a handshake is in progress and |SSL_ST_OK| +// otherwise. +// +// Use |SSL_is_init| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl); + +#define SSL_get_state(ssl) SSL_state(ssl) + +// SSL_set_shutdown causes |ssl| to behave as if the shutdown bitmask (see +// |SSL_get_shutdown|) were |mode|. This may be used to skip sending or +// receiving close_notify in |SSL_shutdown| by causing the implementation to +// believe the events already happened. +// +// It is an error to use |SSL_set_shutdown| to unset a bit that has already been +// set. Doing so will trigger an |assert| in debug builds and otherwise be +// ignored. +// +// Use |SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh calls |SSL_CTX_set1_groups| with a one-element list +// containing |ec_key|'s curve. The remainder of |ec_key| is ignored. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key); + +// SSL_set_tmp_ecdh calls |SSL_set1_groups| with a one-element list containing +// |ec_key|'s curve. The remainder of |ec_key| is ignored. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key); + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_FILESYSTEM) +// SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack lists files in directory |dir|. It calls +// |SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack| on each file and returns one on success +// or zero on error. This function is only available from the libdecrepit +// library. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out, + const char *dir); +#endif + +// SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id calls |SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_enable_tls_channel_id calls |SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl); + +// BIO_f_ssl returns a |BIO_METHOD| that can wrap an |SSL*| in a |BIO*|. Note +// that this has quite different behaviour from the version in OpenSSL (notably +// that it doesn't try to auto renegotiate). +// +// IMPORTANT: if you are not curl, don't use this. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); + +// BIO_set_ssl sets |ssl| as the underlying connection for |bio|, which must +// have been created using |BIO_f_ssl|. If |take_owership| is true, |bio| will +// call |SSL_free| on |ssl| when closed. It returns one on success or something +// other than one on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT long BIO_set_ssl(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int take_owership); + +// SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto returns one. +#define SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, onoff) 1 + +// SSL_set_ecdh_auto returns one. +#define SSL_set_ecdh_auto(ssl, onoff) 1 + +// SSL_get_session returns a non-owning pointer to |ssl|'s session. For +// historical reasons, which session it returns depends on |ssl|'s state. +// +// Prior to the start of the initial handshake, it returns the session the +// caller set with |SSL_set_session|. After the initial handshake has finished +// and if no additional handshakes are in progress, it returns the currently +// active session. Its behavior is undefined while a handshake is in progress. +// +// If trying to add new sessions to an external session cache, use +// |SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb| instead. In particular, using the callback is +// required as of TLS 1.3. For compatibility, this function will return an +// unresumable session which may be cached, but will never be resumed. +// +// If querying properties of the connection, use APIs on the |SSL| object. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get0_session is an alias for |SSL_get_session|. +#define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session + +// SSL_get1_session acts like |SSL_get_session| but returns a new reference to +// the session. +OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); + +#define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS 0 +#define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS 0 +#define OPENSSL_INIT_SSL_DEFAULT 0 + +// OPENSSL_init_ssl calls |CRYPTO_library_init| and returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, + const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings); + +// The following constants are legacy aliases for RSA-PSS with rsaEncryption +// keys. Use the new names instead. +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256 SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384 SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 +#define SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512 SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 + +// SSL_set_tlsext_status_type configures a client to request OCSP stapling if +// |type| is |TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp| and disables it otherwise. It returns one +// on success and zero if handshake configuration has already been shed. +// +// Use |SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(SSL *ssl, int type); + +// SSL_get_tlsext_status_type returns |TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp| if the client +// requested OCSP stapling and |TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing| otherwise. On the +// client, this reflects whether OCSP stapling was enabled via, e.g., +// |SSL_set_tlsext_status_type|. On the server, this is determined during the +// handshake. It may be queried in callbacks set by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb|. The +// result is undefined after the handshake completes. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp sets the OCSP response. It returns one on +// success and zero on error. On success, |ssl| takes ownership of |resp|, which +// must have been allocated by |OPENSSL_malloc|. +// +// Use |SSL_set_ocsp_response| instead. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *resp, + size_t resp_len); + +// SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp sets |*out| to point to the OCSP response +// from the server. It returns the length of the response. If there was no +// response, it sets |*out| to NULL and returns zero. +// +// Use |SSL_get0_ocsp_response| instead. +// +// WARNING: the returned data is not guaranteed to be well formed. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(const SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t **out); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb configures the legacy OpenSSL OCSP callback and +// returns one. Though the type signature is the same, this callback has +// different behavior for client and server connections: +// +// For clients, the callback is called after certificate verification. It should +// return one for success, zero for a bad OCSP response, and a negative number +// for internal error. Instead, handle this as part of certificate verification. +// (Historically, OpenSSL verified certificates just before parsing stapled OCSP +// responses, but BoringSSL fixes this ordering. All server credentials are +// available during verification.) +// +// Do not use this callback as a server. It is provided for compatibility +// purposes only. For servers, it is called to configure server credentials. It +// should return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK| on success, |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK| to +// ignore OCSP requests, or |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL| on error. It is usually +// used to fetch OCSP responses on demand, which is not ideal. Instead, treat +// OCSP responses like other server credentials, such as certificates or SCT +// lists. Configure, store, and refresh them eagerly. This avoids downtime if +// the CA's OCSP responder is briefly offline. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, + void *arg)); + +// SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg sets additional data for +// |SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb|'s callback and returns one. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + +// The following symbols are compatibility aliases for reason codes used when +// receiving an alert from the peer. Use the other names instead, which fit the +// naming convention. +// +// TODO(davidben): Fix references to |SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED| and +// remove the compatibility value. The others come from OpenSSL. +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION \ + SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE \ + SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE \ + SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE \ + SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED + +// The following symbols are compatibility aliases for |SSL_GROUP_*|. +#define SSL_CURVE_SECP224R1 SSL_GROUP_SECP224R1 +#define SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1 SSL_GROUP_SECP256R1 +#define SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1 SSL_GROUP_SECP384R1 +#define SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1 SSL_GROUP_SECP521R1 +#define SSL_CURVE_X25519 SSL_GROUP_X25519 +#define SSL_CURVE_X25519_KYBER768_DRAFT00 SSL_GROUP_X25519_KYBER768_DRAFT00 + +// SSL_get_curve_id calls |SSL_get_group_id|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl); + +// SSL_get_curve_name calls |SSL_get_group_name|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_curve_name(uint16_t curve_id); + +// SSL_get_all_curve_names calls |SSL_get_all_group_names|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_all_curve_names(const char **out, size_t max_out); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_curves calls |SSL_CTX_set1_groups|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, + size_t num_curves); + +// SSL_set1_curves calls |SSL_set1_groups|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, + size_t num_curves); + +// SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list calls |SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *curves); + +// SSL_set1_curves_list calls |SSL_set1_groups_list|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, const char *curves); + +// TLSEXT_nid_unknown is a constant used in OpenSSL for +// |SSL_get_negotiated_group| to return an unrecognized group. BoringSSL never +// returns this value, but we define this constant for compatibility. +#define TLSEXT_nid_unknown 0x1000000 + +// SSL_CTX_check_private_key returns one if |ctx| has both a certificate and +// private key, and zero otherwise. +// +// This function does not check consistency because the library checks when the +// certificate and key are individually configured. However, if the private key +// is configured before the certificate, inconsistent private keys are silently +// dropped. Some callers are inadvertently relying on this function to detect +// when this happens. +// +// Instead, callers should configure the certificate first, then the private +// key, checking for errors in each. This function is then unnecessary. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +// SSL_check_private_key returns one if |ssl| has both a certificate and private +// key, and zero otherwise. +// +// See discussion in |SSL_CTX_check_private_key|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl); + + +// Compliance policy configurations +// +// A TLS connection has a large number of different parameters. Some are well +// known, like cipher suites, but many are obscure and configuration functions +// for them may not exist. These policy controls allow broad configuration +// goals to be specified so that they can flow down to all the different +// parameters of a TLS connection. + +enum ssl_compliance_policy_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT { + // ssl_compliance_policy_none does nothing. However, since setting this + // doesn't undo other policies it's an error to try and set it. + ssl_compliance_policy_none, + + // ssl_compliance_policy_fips_202205 configures a TLS connection to use: + // * TLS 1.2 or 1.3 + // * For TLS 1.2, only ECDHE_[RSA|ECDSA]_WITH_AES_*_GCM_SHA*. + // * For TLS 1.3, only AES-GCM + // * P-256 or P-384 for key agreement. + // * For server signatures, only PKCS#1/PSS with SHA256/384/512, or ECDSA + // with P-256 or P-384. + // + // Note: this policy can be configured even if BoringSSL has not been built in + // FIPS mode. Call |FIPS_mode| to check that. + // + // Note: this setting aids with compliance with NIST requirements but does not + // guarantee it. Careful reading of SP 800-52r2 is recommended. + ssl_compliance_policy_fips_202205, + + // ssl_compliance_policy_wpa3_192_202304 configures a TLS connection to use: + // * TLS 1.2 or 1.3. + // * For TLS 1.2, only TLS_ECDHE_[ECDSA|RSA]_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. + // * For TLS 1.3, only AES-256-GCM. + // * P-384 for key agreement. + // * For handshake signatures, only ECDSA with P-384 and SHA-384, or RSA + // with SHA-384 or SHA-512. + // + // No limitations on the certificate chain nor leaf public key are imposed, + // other than by the supported signature algorithms. But WPA3's "192-bit" + // mode requires at least P-384 or 3072-bit along the chain. The caller must + // enforce this themselves on the verified chain using functions such as + // `X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain`. + // + // Note that this setting is less secure than the default. The + // implementation risks of using a more obscure primitive like P-384 + // dominate other considerations. + ssl_compliance_policy_wpa3_192_202304, +}; + +// SSL_CTX_set_compliance_policy configures various aspects of |ctx| based on +// the given policy requirements. Subsequently calling other functions that +// configure |ctx| may override |policy|, or may not. This should be the final +// configuration function called in order to have defined behaviour. It's a +// fatal error if |policy| is |ssl_compliance_policy_none|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_compliance_policy( + SSL_CTX *ctx, enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy); + +// SSL_set_compliance_policy acts the same as |SSL_CTX_set_compliance_policy|, +// but only configures a single |SSL*|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_compliance_policy( + SSL *ssl, enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy); + + +// Nodejs compatibility section (hidden). +// +// These defines exist for node.js, with the hope that we can eliminate the +// need for them over time. + +#define SSLerr(function, reason) \ + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, reason, __FILE__, __LINE__) + + +// Preprocessor compatibility section (hidden). +// +// Historically, a number of APIs were implemented in OpenSSL as macros and +// constants to 'ctrl' functions. To avoid breaking #ifdefs in consumers, this +// section defines a number of legacy macros. +// +// Although using either the CTRL values or their wrapper macros in #ifdefs is +// still supported, the CTRL values may not be passed to |SSL_ctrl| and +// |SSL_CTX_ctrl|. Call the functions (previously wrapper macros) instead. +// +// See PORTING.md in the BoringSSL source tree for a table of corresponding +// functions. +// https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/PORTING.md#Replacements-for-values + +#define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT doesnt_exist +#define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_NEGOTIATED_GROUP doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_MODE doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA doesnt_exist +#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB doesnt_exist + +// |BORINGSSL_PREFIX| already makes each of these symbols into macros, so there +// is no need to define conflicting macros. +#if !defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX) + +#define DTLSv1_get_timeout DTLSv1_get_timeout +#define DTLSv1_handle_timeout DTLSv1_handle_timeout +#define SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert +#define SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert +#define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert +#define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs +#define SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs +#define SSL_CTX_clear_mode SSL_CTX_clear_mode +#define SSL_CTX_clear_options SSL_CTX_clear_options +#define SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs +#define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs +#define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list +#define SSL_CTX_get_mode SSL_CTX_get_mode +#define SSL_CTX_get_options SSL_CTX_get_options +#define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead +#define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode +#define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys +#define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA +#define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size +#define SSL_CTX_sess_number SSL_CTX_sess_number +#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size +#define SSL_CTX_set0_chain SSL_CTX_set0_chain +#define SSL_CTX_set1_chain SSL_CTX_set1_chain +#define SSL_CTX_set1_curves SSL_CTX_set1_curves +#define SSL_CTX_set1_groups SSL_CTX_set1_groups +#define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list +#define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment +#define SSL_CTX_set_mode SSL_CTX_set_mode +#define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg +#define SSL_CTX_set_options SSL_CTX_set_options +#define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead +#define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback \ + SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb +#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys +#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh +#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh +#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa +#define SSL_add0_chain_cert SSL_add0_chain_cert +#define SSL_add1_chain_cert SSL_add1_chain_cert +#define SSL_clear_chain_certs SSL_clear_chain_certs +#define SSL_clear_mode SSL_clear_mode +#define SSL_clear_options SSL_clear_options +#define SSL_get0_certificate_types SSL_get0_certificate_types +#define SSL_get0_chain_certs SSL_get0_chain_certs +#define SSL_get_max_cert_list SSL_get_max_cert_list +#define SSL_get_mode SSL_get_mode +#define SSL_get_negotiated_group SSL_get_negotiated_group +#define SSL_get_options SSL_get_options +#define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support \ + SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support +#define SSL_need_tmp_RSA SSL_need_tmp_RSA +#define SSL_num_renegotiations SSL_num_renegotiations +#define SSL_session_reused SSL_session_reused +#define SSL_set0_chain SSL_set0_chain +#define SSL_set1_chain SSL_set1_chain +#define SSL_set1_curves SSL_set1_curves +#define SSL_set1_groups SSL_set1_groups +#define SSL_set_max_cert_list SSL_set_max_cert_list +#define SSL_set_max_send_fragment SSL_set_max_send_fragment +#define SSL_set_mode SSL_set_mode +#define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg SSL_set_msg_callback_arg +#define SSL_set_mtu SSL_set_mtu +#define SSL_set_options SSL_set_options +#define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name SSL_set_tlsext_host_name +#define SSL_set_tmp_dh SSL_set_tmp_dh +#define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh SSL_set_tmp_ecdh +#define SSL_set_tmp_rsa SSL_set_tmp_rsa +#define SSL_total_renegotiations SSL_total_renegotiations + +#endif // !defined(BORINGSSL_PREFIX) + + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +} // extern C + +#if !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_CXX) + +extern "C++" { + +BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN + +BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL, SSL_free) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_CREDENTIAL, SSL_CREDENTIAL_free) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_CREDENTIAL, SSL_CREDENTIAL_up_ref) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_CTX, SSL_CTX_free) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_CTX, SSL_CTX_up_ref) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_ECH_KEYS, SSL_ECH_KEYS_free) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_ECH_KEYS, SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION_free) +BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION_up_ref) + + +// *** DEPRECATED EXPERIMENT — DO NOT USE *** +// +// Split handshakes. +// +// WARNING: This mechanism is deprecated and should not be used. It is very +// fragile and difficult to use correctly. The relationship between +// configuration options across the two halves is ill-defined and not +// self-consistent. Additionally, version skew across the two halves risks +// unusual behavior and connection failure. New development should use the +// handshake hints API. Existing deployments should migrate to handshake hints +// to reduce the risk of service outages. +// +// Split handshakes allows the handshake part of a TLS connection to be +// performed in a different process (or on a different machine) than the data +// exchange. This only applies to servers. +// +// In the first part of a split handshake, an |SSL| (where the |SSL_CTX| has +// been configured with |SSL_CTX_set_handoff_mode|) is used normally. Once the +// ClientHello message has been received, the handshake will stop and +// |SSL_get_error| will indicate |SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF|. At this point (and only +// at this point), |SSL_serialize_handoff| can be called to write the “handoff” +// state of the connection. +// +// Elsewhere, a fresh |SSL| can be used with |SSL_apply_handoff| to continue +// the connection. The connection from the client is fed into this |SSL|, and +// the handshake resumed. When the handshake stops again and |SSL_get_error| +// indicates |SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK|, |SSL_serialize_handback| should be called to +// serialize the state of the handshake again. +// +// Back at the first location, a fresh |SSL| can be used with +// |SSL_apply_handback|. Then the client's connection can be processed mostly +// as normal. +// +// Lastly, when a connection is in the handoff state, whether or not +// |SSL_serialize_handoff| is called, |SSL_decline_handoff| will move it back +// into a normal state where the connection can proceed without impact. +// +// WARNING: Currently only works with TLS 1.0–1.2. +// WARNING: The serialisation formats are not yet stable: version skew may be +// fatal. +// WARNING: The handback data contains sensitive key material and must be +// protected. +// WARNING: Some calls on the final |SSL| will not work. Just as an example, +// calls like |SSL_get0_session_id_context| and |SSL_get_privatekey| won't +// work because the certificate used for handshaking isn't available. +// WARNING: |SSL_apply_handoff| may trigger “msg” callback calls. + +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_handoff_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, bool on); +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_handoff_mode(SSL *SSL, bool on); +OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_serialize_handoff(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out, + SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out_hello); +OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_decline_handoff(SSL *ssl); +OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_apply_handoff(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> handoff); +OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_serialize_handback(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out); +OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_apply_handback(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> handback); + +// SSL_get_traffic_secrets sets |*out_read_traffic_secret| and +// |*out_write_traffic_secret| to reference the TLS 1.3 traffic secrets for +// |ssl|. This function is only valid on TLS 1.3 connections that have +// completed the handshake. It returns true on success and false on error. +OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_get_traffic_secrets( + const SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> *out_read_traffic_secret, + Span<const uint8_t> *out_write_traffic_secret); + +// SSL_CTX_set_aes_hw_override_for_testing sets |override_value| to +// override checking for aes hardware support for testing. If |override_value| +// is set to true, the library will behave as if aes hardware support is +// present. If it is set to false, the library will behave as if aes hardware +// support is not present. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_aes_hw_override_for_testing( + SSL_CTX *ctx, bool override_value); + +// SSL_set_aes_hw_override_for_testing acts the same as +// |SSL_CTX_set_aes_override_for_testing| but only configures a single |SSL*|. +OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_aes_hw_override_for_testing(SSL *ssl, + bool override_value); + +BSSL_NAMESPACE_END + +} // extern C++ + +#endif // !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_CXX) + +#endif + +#define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 +#define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 101 +#define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT 102 +#define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103 +#define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 104 +#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 105 +#define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 106 +#define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 107 +#define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 108 +#define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD 109 +#define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 110 +#define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 111 +#define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 112 +#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 113 +#define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 114 +#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 115 +#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 116 +#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 117 +#define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 118 +#define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 119 +#define SSL_R_BN_LIB 120 +#define SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 121 +#define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 122 +#define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 123 +#define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 124 +#define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 125 +#define SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR 126 +#define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 127 +#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256 128 +#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID 129 +#define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 130 +#define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED 131 +#define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 132 +#define SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED 133 +#define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 134 +#define SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_ERROR 135 +#define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 136 +#define SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR 137 +#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 138 +#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 139 +#define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 140 +#define SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG 141 +#define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 142 +#define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 143 +#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 144 +#define SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT 145 +#define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 +#define SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION 147 +#define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 148 +#define SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION 149 +#define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 150 +#define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 151 +#define SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH 152 +#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 153 +#define SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO 154 +#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 +#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 +#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 157 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 158 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE 159 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION 160 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 161 +#define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 162 +#define SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION 164 +#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 165 +#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 166 +#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 167 +#define SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS 168 +#define SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL 169 +#define SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN 170 +#define SSL_R_NESTED_GROUP 171 +#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 172 +#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 173 +#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 174 +#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 175 +#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 176 +#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 177 +#define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 178 +#define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 179 +#define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 181 +#define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 182 +#define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 183 +#define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 184 +#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 185 +#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 186 +#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 187 +#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED 188 +#define SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT 189 +#define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 190 +#define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 191 +#define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 192 +#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 193 +#define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 194 +#define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 195 +#define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 196 +#define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 197 +#define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 198 +#define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 199 +#define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 200 +#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 201 +#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 202 +#define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 203 +#define SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION 204 +#define SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION 205 +#define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 206 +#define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 207 +#define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 208 +#define SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED 209 +#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION_SENT_BY_SERVER 210 +#define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 211 +#define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 212 +#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 213 +#define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 214 +#define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 215 +#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 216 +#define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 217 +#define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 218 +#define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 219 +#define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS 220 +#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 221 +#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION 222 +#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 223 +#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP 224 +#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 225 +#define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 226 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 227 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 228 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 229 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 230 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 231 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 232 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 233 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 234 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 235 +#define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 236 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 237 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 238 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 239 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 240 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 241 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 242 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE 243 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 244 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 245 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 246 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 247 +#define SSL_R_X509_LIB 248 +#define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 249 +#define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT 250 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_OUTER_RECORD_TYPE 251 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY 252 +#define SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS 253 +#define SSL_R_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED 254 +#define SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA 255 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST 256 +#define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION 257 +#define SSL_R_MISSING_KEY_SHARE 258 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL 259 +#define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES 260 +#define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 261 +#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 262 +#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_EMS_MISMATCH 263 +#define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_KEY_SHARE 264 +#define SSL_R_NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED 265 +#define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP 266 +#define SSL_R_PRE_SHARED_KEY_MUST_BE_LAST 267 +#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_PRF_HASH_MISMATCH 268 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_SCT_LIST 269 +#define SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA 270 +#define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_BINDER_COUNT_MISMATCH 271 +#define SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT 272 +#define SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED 273 +#define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH 274 +#define SSL_R_CANNOT_HAVE_BOTH_PRIVKEY_AND_METHOD 275 +#define SSL_R_TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED 276 +#define SSL_R_ALPN_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA 277 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA 278 +#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION_ON_EARLY_DATA 279 +#define SSL_R_NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED 280 +#define SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE 281 +#define SSL_R_EMPTY_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST 282 +#define SSL_R_EARLY_DATA_NOT_IN_USE 283 +#define SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETE 284 +#define SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_TB_WITHOUT_EMS_OR_RI 285 +#define SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID 286 +#define SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION_FAILED 287 +#define SSL_R_SECOND_SERVERHELLO_VERSION_MISMATCH 288 +#define SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR 289 +#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 290 +#define SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_ON_SHUTDOWN 291 +#define SSL_R_CERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED 292 +#define SSL_R_UNCOMPRESSED_CERT_TOO_LARGE 293 +#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERT_COMPRESSION_ALG 294 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 295 +#define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 296 +#define SSL_R_TLS13_DOWNGRADE 297 +#define SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR 298 +#define SSL_R_WRONG_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_RECEIVED 299 +#define SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA 300 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_DELEGATED_CREDENTIAL 301 +#define SSL_R_KEY_USAGE_BIT_INCORRECT 302 +#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_CLIENT_HELLO 303 +#define SSL_R_CIPHER_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA 304 +#define SSL_R_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS_MISCONFIGURED 305 +#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_COMPATIBILITY_MODE 306 +#define SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 307 +#define SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_ALPS_WITHOUT_ALPN 308 +#define SSL_R_ALPS_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA 309 +#define SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH 310 +#define SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 311 +#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG 312 +#define SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_WOULD_HAVE_NO_RETRY_CONFIGS 313 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER 314 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL_LIST 315 +#define SSL_R_COULD_NOT_PARSE_HINTS 316 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_PUBLIC_NAME 317 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_CONFIG_LIST 318 +#define SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED 319 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_OUTER_EXTENSION 320 +#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_ECH_NEGOTIATION 321 +#define SSL_R_INVALID_ALPS_CODEPOINT 322 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1000 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 +#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1115 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED 1116 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 1120 +#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ECH_REQUIRED 1121 + +#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_H |