BoringSSL as optional cryptobackend for ngtcp2

PR добавляет возможность использовать BoringSSL в ngtcp2 в качестве криптобиблиотеки. Для проектов в Аркадии, уже зависящих от ngtcp2, добавлена явная зависимость от слоя абстракции quictls (сейчас в транке ngtcp2 собирается с quictls).
commit_hash:3d6607abecfcff2157859acbdd18f9d0345ac485

1 files changed, 534 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/crypto/stack/stack.c b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/crypto/stack/stack.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..78911f031ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/crypto/stack/stack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,534 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected])
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young ([email protected]).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young ([email protected])"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/err.h>
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+struct stack_st {
+  // num contains the number of valid pointers in |data|.
+  size_t num;
+  void **data;
+  // sorted is non-zero if the values pointed to by |data| are in ascending
+  // order, based on |comp|.
+  int sorted;
+  // num_alloc contains the number of pointers allocated in the buffer pointed
+  // to by |data|, which may be larger than |num|.
+  size_t num_alloc;
+  // comp is an optional comparison function.
+  OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp;
+};
+
+// kMinSize is the number of pointers that will be initially allocated in a new
+// stack.
+static const size_t kMinSize = 4;
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp) {
+  OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OPENSSL_STACK));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret->data = OPENSSL_calloc(kMinSize, sizeof(void *));
+  if (ret->data == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret->comp = comp;
+  ret->num_alloc = kMinSize;
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new(NULL); }
+
+size_t OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return sk->num;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (sk == NULL || sk->num == 0) {
+    return;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(sk->data, 0, sizeof(void*) * sk->num);
+  sk->num = 0;
+  sk->sorted = 0;
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t i) {
+  if (!sk || i >= sk->num) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return sk->data[i];
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t i, void *value) {
+  if (!sk || i >= sk->num) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return sk->data[i] = value;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(sk->data);
+  OPENSSL_free(sk);
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
+                            OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
+                            OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
+    if (sk->data[i] != NULL) {
+      call_free_func(free_func, sk->data[i]);
+    }
+  }
+  OPENSSL_sk_free(sk);
+}
+
+// Historically, |sk_pop_free| called the function as |OPENSSL_sk_free_func|
+// directly. This is undefined in C. Some callers called |sk_pop_free| directly,
+// so we must maintain a compatibility version for now.
+static void call_free_func_legacy(OPENSSL_sk_free_func func, void *ptr) {
+  func(ptr);
+}
+
+void sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
+  OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(sk, call_free_func_legacy, free_func);
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, void *p, size_t where) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (sk->num >= INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (sk->num_alloc <= sk->num + 1) {
+    // Attempt to double the size of the array.
+    size_t new_alloc = sk->num_alloc << 1;
+    size_t alloc_size = new_alloc * sizeof(void *);
+    void **data;
+
+    // If the doubling overflowed, try to increment.
+    if (new_alloc < sk->num_alloc || alloc_size / sizeof(void *) != new_alloc) {
+      new_alloc = sk->num_alloc + 1;
+      alloc_size = new_alloc * sizeof(void *);
+    }
+
+    // If the increment also overflowed, fail.
+    if (new_alloc < sk->num_alloc || alloc_size / sizeof(void *) != new_alloc) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    data = OPENSSL_realloc(sk->data, alloc_size);
+    if (data == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    sk->data = data;
+    sk->num_alloc = new_alloc;
+  }
+
+  if (where >= sk->num) {
+    sk->data[sk->num] = p;
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memmove(&sk->data[where + 1], &sk->data[where],
+                    sizeof(void *) * (sk->num - where));
+    sk->data[where] = p;
+  }
+
+  sk->num++;
+  sk->sorted = 0;
+
+  return sk->num;
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t where) {
+  void *ret;
+
+  if (!sk || where >= sk->num) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = sk->data[where];
+
+  if (where != sk->num - 1) {
+    OPENSSL_memmove(&sk->data[where], &sk->data[where + 1],
+                    sizeof(void *) * (sk->num - where - 1));
+  }
+
+  sk->num--;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, const void *p) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
+    if (sk->data[i] == p) {
+      return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, i);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_delete_if(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
+                          OPENSSL_sk_call_delete_if_func call_func,
+                          OPENSSL_sk_delete_if_func func, void *data) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  size_t new_num = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
+    if (!call_func(func, sk->data[i], data)) {
+      sk->data[new_num] = sk->data[i];
+      new_num++;
+    }
+  }
+  sk->num = new_num;
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_find(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t *out_index, const void *p,
+                    OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (sk->comp == NULL) {
+    // Use pointer equality when no comparison function has been set.
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
+      if (sk->data[i] == p) {
+        if (out_index) {
+          *out_index = i;
+        }
+        return 1;
+      }
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (p == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(sk)) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk->num; i++) {
+      if (call_cmp_func(sk->comp, p, sk->data[i]) == 0) {
+        if (out_index) {
+          *out_index = i;
+        }
+        return 1;
+      }
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The stack is sorted, so binary search to find the element.
+  //
+  // |lo| and |hi| maintain a half-open interval of where the answer may be. All
+  // indices such that |lo <= idx < hi| are candidates.
+  size_t lo = 0, hi = sk->num;
+  while (lo < hi) {
+    // Bias |mid| towards |lo|. See the |r == 0| case below.
+    size_t mid = lo + (hi - lo - 1) / 2;
+    assert(lo <= mid && mid < hi);
+    int r = call_cmp_func(sk->comp, p, sk->data[mid]);
+    if (r > 0) {
+      lo = mid + 1;  // |mid| is too low.
+    } else if (r < 0) {
+      hi = mid;  // |mid| is too high.
+    } else {
+      // |mid| matches. However, this function returns the earliest match, so we
+      // can only return if the range has size one.
+      if (hi - lo == 1) {
+        if (out_index != NULL) {
+          *out_index = mid;
+        }
+        return 1;
+      }
+      // The sample is biased towards |lo|. |mid| can only be |hi - 1| if
+      // |hi - lo| was one, so this makes forward progress.
+      assert(mid + 1 < hi);
+      hi = mid + 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  assert(lo == hi);
+  return 0;  // Not found.
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (sk->num == 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, 0);
+}
+
+size_t OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, void *p) {
+  return OPENSSL_sk_insert(sk, p, sk->num);
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (sk->num == 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return OPENSSL_sk_delete(sk, sk->num - 1);
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OPENSSL_STACK));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret->data = OPENSSL_memdup(sk->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
+  if (ret->data == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret->num = sk->num;
+  ret->sorted = sk->sorted;
+  ret->num_alloc = sk->num_alloc;
+  ret->comp = sk->comp;
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static size_t parent_idx(size_t idx) {
+  assert(idx > 0);
+  return (idx - 1) / 2;
+}
+
+static size_t left_idx(size_t idx) {
+  // The largest possible index is |PTRDIFF_MAX|, not |SIZE_MAX|. If
+  // |ptrdiff_t|, a signed type, is the same size as |size_t|, this cannot
+  // overflow.
+  assert(idx <= PTRDIFF_MAX);
+  static_assert(PTRDIFF_MAX <= (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 2, "2 * idx + 1 may oveflow");
+  return 2 * idx + 1;
+}
+
+// down_heap fixes the subtree rooted at |i|. |i|'s children must each satisfy
+// the heap property. Only the first |num| elements of |sk| are considered.
+static void down_heap(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func,
+                      size_t i, size_t num) {
+  assert(i < num && num <= sk->num);
+  for (;;) {
+    size_t left = left_idx(i);
+    if (left >= num) {
+      break;  // No left child.
+    }
+
+    // Swap |i| with the largest of its children.
+    size_t next = i;
+    if (call_cmp_func(sk->comp, sk->data[next], sk->data[left]) < 0) {
+      next = left;
+    }
+    size_t right = left + 1;  // Cannot overflow because |left < num|.
+    if (right < num &&
+        call_cmp_func(sk->comp, sk->data[next], sk->data[right]) < 0) {
+      next = right;
+    }
+
+    if (i == next) {
+      break;  // |i| is already larger than its children.
+    }
+
+    void *tmp = sk->data[i];
+    sk->data[i] = sk->data[next];
+    sk->data[next] = tmp;
+    i = next;
+  }
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
+                     OPENSSL_sk_call_cmp_func call_cmp_func) {
+  if (sk == NULL || sk->comp == NULL || sk->sorted) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (sk->num >= 2) {
+    // |qsort| lacks a context parameter in the comparison function for us to
+    // pass in |call_cmp_func| and |sk->comp|. While we could cast |sk->comp| to
+    // the expected type, it is undefined behavior in C can trip sanitizers.
+    // |qsort_r| and |qsort_s| avoid this, but using them is impractical. See
+    // https://stackoverflow.com/a/39561369
+    //
+    // Use our own heap sort instead. This is not performance-sensitive, so we
+    // optimize for simplicity and size. First, build a max-heap in place.
+    for (size_t i = parent_idx(sk->num - 1); i < sk->num; i--) {
+      down_heap(sk, call_cmp_func, i, sk->num);
+    }
+
+    // Iteratively remove the maximum element to populate the result in reverse.
+    for (size_t i = sk->num - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+      void *tmp = sk->data[0];
+      sk->data[0] = sk->data[i];
+      sk->data[i] = tmp;
+      down_heap(sk, call_cmp_func, 0, i);
+    }
+  }
+  sk->sorted = 1;
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) {
+  if (!sk) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // Zero- and one-element lists are always sorted.
+  return sk->sorted || (sk->comp != NULL && sk->num < 2);
+}
+
+OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
+                                            OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func comp) {
+  OPENSSL_sk_cmp_func old = sk->comp;
+
+  if (sk->comp != comp) {
+    sk->sorted = 0;
+  }
+  sk->comp = comp;
+
+  return old;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk,
+                                    OPENSSL_sk_call_copy_func call_copy_func,
+                                    OPENSSL_sk_copy_func copy_func,
+                                    OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
+                                    OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
+  OPENSSL_STACK *ret = OPENSSL_sk_dup(sk);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < ret->num; i++) {
+    if (ret->data[i] == NULL) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    ret->data[i] = call_copy_func(copy_func, ret->data[i]);
+    if (ret->data[i] == NULL) {
+      for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+        if (ret->data[j] != NULL) {
+          call_free_func(free_func, ret->data[j]);
+        }
+      }
+      OPENSSL_sk_free(ret);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STACK *sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new_null(); }
+
+size_t sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { return OPENSSL_sk_num(sk); }
+
+void *sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, size_t i) {
+  return OPENSSL_sk_value(sk, i);
+}
+
+void sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { OPENSSL_sk_free(sk); }
+
+size_t sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, void *p) { return OPENSSL_sk_push(sk, p); }
+
+void *sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { return OPENSSL_sk_pop(sk); }
+
+void sk_pop_free_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_call_free_func call_free_func,
+                    OPENSSL_sk_free_func free_func) {
+  OPENSSL_sk_pop_free_ex(sk, call_free_func, free_func);
+}