BoringSSL as optional cryptobackend for ngtcp2

PR добавляет возможность использовать BoringSSL в ngtcp2 в качестве криптобиблиотеки. Для проектов в Аркадии, уже зависящих от ngtcp2, добавлена явная зависимость от слоя абстракции quictls (сейчас в транке ngtcp2 собирается с quictls).
commit_hash:3d6607abecfcff2157859acbdd18f9d0345ac485

1 files changed, 372 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..98081ef0cb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    [email protected].
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * ([email protected]).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson ([email protected]). */
+
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/ecdsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/bn.h>
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/err.h>
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/mem.h>
+#include <contrib/restricted/google/boringssl/include/openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../ec/internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+// digest_to_scalar interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a scalar for
+// ECDSA.
+static void digest_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                             const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len) {
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+  size_t num_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+  // Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
+  size_t num_bytes = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
+  if (digest_len > num_bytes) {
+    digest_len = num_bytes;
+  }
+  bn_big_endian_to_words(out->words, order->width, digest, digest_len);
+
+  // If it is still too long, truncate remaining bits with a shift.
+  if (8 * digest_len > num_bits) {
+    bn_rshift_words(out->words, out->words, 8 - (num_bits & 0x7), order->width);
+  }
+
+  // |out| now has the same bit width as |order|, but this only bounds by
+  // 2*|order|. Subtract the order if out of range.
+  //
+  // Montgomery multiplication accepts the looser bounds, so this isn't strictly
+  // necessary, but it is a cleaner abstraction and has no performance impact.
+  BN_ULONG tmp[EC_MAX_WORDS];
+  bn_reduce_once_in_place(out->words, 0 /* no carry */, order->d, tmp,
+                          order->width);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) {
+  ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ECDSA_SIG));
+  if (sig == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  sig->r = BN_new();
+  sig->s = BN_new();
+  if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL) {
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return sig;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
+  if (sig == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(sig->r);
+  BN_free(sig->s);
+  OPENSSL_free(sig);
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
+  return sig->r;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
+  return sig->s;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **out_r,
+                    const BIGNUM **out_s) {
+  if (out_r != NULL) {
+    *out_r = sig->r;
+  }
+  if (out_s != NULL) {
+    *out_s = sig->s;
+  }
+}
+
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) {
+  if (r == NULL || s == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  BN_free(sig->r);
+  BN_free(sig->s);
+  sig->r = r;
+  sig->s = s;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ecdsa_do_verify_no_self_test(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                                 const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+  const EC_POINT *pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey);
+  if (group == NULL || pub_key == NULL || sig == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_SCALAR r, s, u1, u2, s_inv_mont, m;
+  if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) ||
+      !ec_bignum_to_scalar(group, &r, sig->r) ||
+      BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
+      !ec_bignum_to_scalar(group, &s, sig->s)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // s_inv_mont = s^-1 in the Montgomery domain.
+  if (!ec_scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime(group, &s_inv_mont, &s)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // u1 = m * s^-1 mod order
+  // u2 = r * s^-1 mod order
+  //
+  // |s_inv_mont| is in Montgomery form while |m| and |r| are not, so |u1| and
+  // |u2| will be taken out of Montgomery form, as desired.
+  digest_to_scalar(group, &m, digest, digest_len);
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &u1, &m, &s_inv_mont);
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &u2, &r, &s_inv_mont);
+
+  EC_JACOBIAN point;
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group, &point, &u1, &pub_key->raw, &u2)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!ec_cmp_x_coordinate(group, &point, &r)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ecc_self_test();
+
+  return ecdsa_do_verify_no_self_test(digest, digest_len, sig, eckey);
+}
+
+static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sign_impl(const EC_GROUP *group, int *out_retry,
+                                  const EC_SCALAR *priv_key, const EC_SCALAR *k,
+                                  const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len) {
+  *out_retry = 0;
+
+  // Check that the size of the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4
+  // B.5.2).
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+  if (BN_num_bits(order) < 160) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // Compute r, the x-coordinate of k * generator.
+  EC_JACOBIAN tmp_point;
+  EC_SCALAR r;
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &tmp_point, k) ||
+      !ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar(group, &r, &tmp_point)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (constant_time_declassify_int(ec_scalar_is_zero(group, &r))) {
+    *out_retry = 1;
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // s = priv_key * r. Note if only one parameter is in the Montgomery domain,
+  // |ec_scalar_mod_mul_montgomery| will compute the answer in the normal
+  // domain.
+  EC_SCALAR s;
+  ec_scalar_to_montgomery(group, &s, &r);
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &s, priv_key, &s);
+
+  // s = m + priv_key * r.
+  EC_SCALAR tmp;
+  digest_to_scalar(group, &tmp, digest, digest_len);
+  ec_scalar_add(group, &s, &s, &tmp);
+
+  // s = k^-1 * (m + priv_key * r). First, we compute k^-1 in the Montgomery
+  // domain. This is |ec_scalar_to_montgomery| followed by
+  // |ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery|, but |ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery| followed by
+  // |ec_scalar_from_montgomery| is equivalent and slightly more efficient.
+  // Then, as above, only one parameter is in the Montgomery domain, so the
+  // result is in the normal domain. Finally, note k is non-zero (or computing r
+  // would fail), so the inverse must exist.
+  ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery(group, &tmp, k);     // tmp = k^-1 R^2
+  ec_scalar_from_montgomery(group, &tmp, &tmp);  // tmp = k^-1 R
+  ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &s, &s, &tmp);
+  if (constant_time_declassify_int(ec_scalar_is_zero(group, &s))) {
+    *out_retry = 1;
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(r.words, sizeof(r.words));
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(s.words, sizeof(r.words));
+  ECDSA_SIG *ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+  if (ret == NULL ||  //
+      !bn_set_words(ret->r, r.words, order->width) ||
+      !bn_set_words(ret->s, s.words, order->width)) {
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sign_with_nonce_for_known_answer_test(const uint8_t *digest,
+                                                       size_t digest_len,
+                                                       const EC_KEY *eckey,
+                                                       const uint8_t *nonce,
+                                                       size_t nonce_len) {
+  if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+  if (group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  const EC_SCALAR *priv_key = &eckey->priv_key->scalar;
+
+  EC_SCALAR k;
+  if (!ec_scalar_from_bytes(group, &k, nonce, nonce_len)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  int retry_ignored;
+  return ecdsa_sign_impl(group, &retry_ignored, priv_key, &k, digest,
+                         digest_len);
+}
+
+// This function is only exported for testing and is not called in production
+// code.
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_sign_with_nonce_and_leak_private_key_for_testing(
+    const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const EC_KEY *eckey,
+    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ecc_self_test();
+
+  return ecdsa_sign_with_nonce_for_known_answer_test(digest, digest_len, eckey,
+                                                     nonce, nonce_len);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                         const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ecc_self_test();
+
+  if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+  if (group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+  const EC_SCALAR *priv_key = &eckey->priv_key->scalar;
+
+  // Pass a SHA512 hash of the private key and digest as additional data
+  // into the RBG. This is a hardening measure against entropy failure.
+  static_assert(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH >= 32,
+                "additional_data is too large for SHA-512");
+
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+
+  SHA512_CTX sha;
+  uint8_t additional_data[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  SHA512_Init(&sha);
+  SHA512_Update(&sha, priv_key->words, order->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  SHA512_Update(&sha, digest, digest_len);
+  SHA512_Final(additional_data, &sha);
+
+  // Cap iterations so callers who supply invalid values as custom groups do not
+  // infinite loop. This does not impact valid parameters (e.g. those covered by
+  // FIPS) because the probability of requiring even one retry is negligible,
+  // let alone 32.
+  static const int kMaxIterations = 32;
+  ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+  int iters = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    EC_SCALAR k;
+    if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &k, additional_data)) {
+      ret = NULL;
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    // TODO(davidben): Move this inside |ec_random_nonzero_scalar| or lower, so
+    // that all scalars we generate are, by default, secret.
+    CONSTTIME_SECRET(k.words, sizeof(k.words));
+
+    int retry;
+    ret = ecdsa_sign_impl(group, &retry, priv_key, &k, digest, digest_len);
+    if (ret != NULL || !retry) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    iters++;
+    if (iters > kMaxIterations) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+out:
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+  return ret;
+}