intermediate changes

ref:cde9a383711a11544ce7e107a78147fb96cc4029

1 files changed, 4299 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d701c46b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4299 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE       8
+
+typedef struct {
+  ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
+  ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
+} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE,  kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+  ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
+ * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
+ * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and  0 on error
+ * (transition not allowed)
+ */
+static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    /*
+     * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
+     * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
+     * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
+     */
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+        if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+                return 1;
+            }
+            break;
+        } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
+                return 1;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        /*
+         * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
+         * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
+         */
+        if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
+            break;
+
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
+                && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* No valid transition found */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
+ * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and  0 on error
+ * (transition not allowed)
+ */
+int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
+            goto err;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        /*
+         * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
+         * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
+         * OR
+         * 2) If we did request one then
+         *      a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
+         *      AND
+         *      b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
+         *         list if we requested a certificate)
+         */
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+            if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+                if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+                    if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+                        && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+                        /*
+                         * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
+                         * not going to accept it because we require a client
+                         * cert.
+                         */
+                        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
+                                 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+                    return 1;
+                }
+            } else {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        /*
+         * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
+         * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
+         * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
+         * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
+         * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
+         * set.
+         */
+        if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+                /*
+                 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
+                 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
+                 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
+                 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
+                 */
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        } else {
+#endif
+            if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+                return 1;
+            }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+        }
+#endif
+        break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    /* No valid transition found */
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        BIO *rbio;
+
+        /*
+         * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
+         * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
+         */
+        s->init_num = 0;
+        s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+        rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+        BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+        BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+             SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
+             SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Yes
+ *   0: No
+ */
+static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    /*
+     * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
+     * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
+     * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
+     * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
+     * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
+     * key exchange.
+     */
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
+        /*
+         * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
+         * provided
+         */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
+        || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
+            && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+        /* For other PSK always send SKE */
+        || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+        || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+        ) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Yes
+ *   0: No
+ */
+int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (
+           /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+           s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
+           /*
+            * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
+            * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
+            */
+           && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
+               || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
+           /*
+            * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
+            * a second time:
+            */
+           && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
+               !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
+           /*
+            * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
+            * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
+            * RFC 2246):
+            */
+           && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+               /*
+                * ... except when the application insists on
+                * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
+                * this for SSL 3)
+                */
+               || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+           /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+           && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+           /*
+            * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
+            * are omitted
+            */
+           && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
+ * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
+ * client.
+ */
+static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    /*
+     * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
+     * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
+     */
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Try to read from the client instead */
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+                && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+        if (s->hit)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+        else if (send_certificate_request(s))
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+            s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        } else {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        /*
+         * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
+         * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
+         * immediately.
+         */
+        if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+            s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
+        } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+            /*
+             * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
+             * handshake at this point.
+             */
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+        else
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
+         * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
+         * been configured for.
+         */
+        if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
+            /* We've written enough tickets out. */
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
+ * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
+ */
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    /*
+     * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
+     * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
+     */
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+        return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
+            /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
+            st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
+        if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+        /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
+            && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
+            st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+        } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+            /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        } else {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+            else
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        } else {
+            /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+            /* normal PSK or SRP */
+            if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+                  (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+            } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
+            } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+            } else {
+                st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+            }
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        if (s->ext.status_expected) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+        if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+        if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        }
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+            return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+        } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+        } else {
+            st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        }
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (s->hit) {
+            return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+        }
+        st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+        return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
+ * the server to the client.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* No pre work to be done */
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        s->shutdown = 0;
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
+            /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
+            st->use_timer = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /*
+             * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
+             * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
+             */
+            st->use_timer = 1;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+            /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+            return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+        }
+#endif
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
+            /*
+             * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
+             * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
+             * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
+             *
+             * Calls SSLfatal as required.
+             */
+            return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
+        } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /*
+             * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
+             * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
+             */
+            st->use_timer = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+            break;
+        /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
+        if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+            s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+        } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            /*
+             * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
+             * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
+             * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
+             * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
+             */
+            st->use_timer = 0;
+        }
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+    case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+        if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
+                && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+            return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_OK:
+        /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+        return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
+{
+    switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
+#if defined(EPIPE)
+    case EPIPE:
+        return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(ECONNRESET)
+    case ECONNRESET:
+        return 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
+    case WSAECONNRESET:
+        return 1;
+#endif
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
+ * server to the client.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    s->init_num = 0;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* No post work to be done */
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+        if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        /*
+         * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
+         * treat like it was the first packet
+         */
+        s->first_packet = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+            if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
+                    && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+                return WORK_MORE_A;
+            break;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+            unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+            char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+            size_t labellen;
+
+            /*
+             * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
+             * SCTP used.
+             */
+            memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+                   sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+            /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+            labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+            if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+                labellen += 1;
+
+            if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+                                           labellen, NULL, 0,
+                                           0) <= 0) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return WORK_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                     sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+        }
+#endif
+        if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+                || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
+                    && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
+            break;
+        /* Fall through */
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+            if (!statem_flush(s))
+                return WORK_MORE_A;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
+                || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                        SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return WORK_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
+                && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                        SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return WORK_ERROR;
+            }
+            /*
+             * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
+             * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
+             * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
+             */
+            s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
+            break;
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
+            /*
+             * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+             * no SCTP used.
+             */
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+                     0, NULL);
+        }
+#endif
+        if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                                                      SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+        {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+            /*
+             * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+             * no SCTP used.
+             */
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+                     0, NULL);
+        }
+#endif
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
+            size_t dummy;
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                        s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+                        &dummy)
+                || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                        SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+            if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+                return WORK_MORE_A;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+        if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        clear_sys_error();
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
+            if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
+                    && conn_is_closed()) {
+                /*
+                 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
+                 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
+                 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
+                 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
+                 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
+                 */
+                s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
+ * server
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ *   1: Success
+ *   0: Error
+ */
+int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+                                         confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+        return 0;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+            *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
+        else
+            *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+        break;
+
+    case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+        *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
+        *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
+        /* No construction function needed */
+        *confunc = NULL;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+        break;
+
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+        *confunc = NULL;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+        break;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+        *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
+        *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
+ * calculated as follows:
+ *
+ *  2 + # client_version
+ *  32 + # only valid length for random
+ *  1 + # length of session_id
+ *  32 + # maximum size for session_id
+ *  2 + # length of cipher suites
+ *  2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
+ *  1 + # length of compression_methods
+ *  2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
+ *  2 + # length of extensions
+ *  2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
+ */
+#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH         131396
+
+#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH      2048
+#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH           514
+
+/*
+ * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
+ * reading. Excludes the message header.
+ */
+size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        return 0;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+        return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        return s->max_cert_list;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+        return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+        return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+        return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+        return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+        return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
+        return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
+#endif
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+        return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+        return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+        return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
+
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
+ * from the client
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+    switch (st->hand_state) {
+    default:
+        /* Shouldn't happen */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return WORK_ERROR;
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+        return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
+
+    case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
+        return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret;
+    int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+    if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+        (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
+        if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
+             * login name
+             */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
+                     SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
+                     SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+            return -1;
+        } else {
+            ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                return 0;
+            if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
+                         al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
+                         ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
+                         : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
+                                  size_t cookie_len)
+{
+    /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
+            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    unsigned int cookie_leni;
+    if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+        s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+                                  &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
+        cookie_leni > 255) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
+                 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
+
+    if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
+                                              s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*-
+ * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *   signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+{
+    static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+        0x00, 0x0a,             /* elliptic_curves extension */
+        0x00, 0x08,             /* 8 bytes */
+        0x00, 0x06,             /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+        0x00, 0x17,             /* P-256 */
+        0x00, 0x18,             /* P-384 */
+        0x00, 0x19,             /* P-521 */
+
+        0x00, 0x0b,             /* ec_point_formats */
+        0x00, 0x02,             /* 2 bytes */
+        0x01,                   /* 1 point format */
+        0x00,                   /* uncompressed */
+        /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+        0x00, 0x0d,             /* signature_algorithms */
+        0x00, 0x0c,             /* 12 bytes */
+        0x00, 0x0a,             /* 10 bytes */
+        0x05, 0x01,             /* SHA-384/RSA */
+        0x04, 0x01,             /* SHA-256/RSA */
+        0x02, 0x01,             /* SHA-1/RSA */
+        0x04, 0x03,             /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+        0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+    };
+    /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
+    static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
+    unsigned int type;
+    PACKET sni, tmppkt;
+    size_t ext_len;
+
+    tmppkt = hello->extensions;
+
+    if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
+        || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+        return;
+
+    ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
+        sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
+
+    s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+                                             ext_len);
+}
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
+    PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
+    static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
+    CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
+
+    /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
+    if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+        if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
+                || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
+                    && (s->options
+                        & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
+            ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+            return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+        }
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+        s->new_session = 1;
+    }
+
+    clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
+    if (clienthello == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
+     */
+    clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
+    PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
+
+    if (clienthello->isv2) {
+        unsigned int mt;
+
+        if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
+                || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+         * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+         * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
+         * the rest right through. Its format is:
+         * Byte  Content
+         * 0-1   msg_length - decoded by the record layer
+         * 2     msg_type - s->init_msg points here
+         * 3-4   version
+         * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+         * 7-8   session_id_length
+         * 9-10  challenge_length
+         * ...   ...
+         */
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
+            || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+            /*
+             * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
+             * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
+             * in the first place
+             */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the message and load client random. */
+    if (clienthello->isv2) {
+        /*
+         * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
+         * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
+         * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
+         */
+        unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
+        PACKET challenge;
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
+                                   ciphersuite_len)
+            || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
+            /* No extensions. */
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
+
+        /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+         * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
+         * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
+         * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
+         */
+        challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+                        ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
+        memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
+                               clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+                               challenge_len, challenge_len)
+            /* Advertise only null compression. */
+            || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
+    } else {
+        /* Regular ClientHello. */
+        if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
+            || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
+                    SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
+                    &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                         SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
+                                 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
+                                 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /*
+             * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
+             * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
+             * So check cookie length...
+             */
+            if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+                if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
+                    OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
+                    return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Could be empty. */
+        if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
+            PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
+        } else {
+            if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
+                    || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                         SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
+                         MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
+                         &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
+    extensions = clienthello->extensions;
+    if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                                &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
+                                &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal already been called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    s->clienthello = clienthello;
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+
+ err:
+    if (clienthello != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+    OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned int j;
+    int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    int protverr;
+    size_t loop;
+    unsigned long id;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+#endif
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
+    CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
+    DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
+
+    /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
+    /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
+    if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
+        /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
+        switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
+        case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
+            break;
+        case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
+            s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
+            return -1;
+        case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
+        default:
+            SSLfatal(s, al,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Set up the client_random */
+    memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+    /* Choose the version */
+
+    if (clienthello->isv2) {
+        if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
+                || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
+                   != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
+            /*
+             * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
+             * support it.
+             */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* SSLv3/TLS */
+        s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
+     * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
+    } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+               DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
+        protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
+    } else {
+        protverr = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (protverr) {
+        if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+            /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+            s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
+        }
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
+        if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+            if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+                if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
+                        clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                             SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                             SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                    goto err;
+                    /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+                }
+                /* default verification */
+            } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
+                    || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+                              s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                         SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
+        }
+        if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+            protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
+            if (protverr != 0) {
+                s->version = s->client_version;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    s->hit = 0;
+
+    if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
+                              clienthello->isv2) ||
+        !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
+                              clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+    /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
+    if (scsvs != NULL) {
+        for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
+            c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
+            if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+                if (s->renegotiate) {
+                    /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                             SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                             SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+            } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
+                       !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
+                /*
+                 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
+                 * a higher version.  We should fail if the current version
+                 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
+                 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
+                 * an insecure downgrade.
+                 */
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                         SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
+            ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+        if (cipher == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+                && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
+                    || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
+            /*
+             * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
+             * just selected. Something must have changed.
+             */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+    }
+
+    /* We need to do this before getting the session */
+    if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
+                             SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                             clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
+     * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
+     *
+     * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+     * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+     * ignore resumption requests with flag
+     * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+     * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
+     * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+     * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+     * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+     * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+     * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+     * ignored.
+     */
+    if (clienthello->isv2 ||
+        (s->new_session &&
+         (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+        if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
+        if (i == 1) {
+            /* previous session */
+            s->hit = 1;
+        } else if (i == -1) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        } else {
+            /* i == 0 */
+            if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
+               s->clienthello->session_id_len);
+        s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
+     * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
+        j = 0;
+        id = s->session->cipher->id;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+#endif
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+            c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+                    i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+#endif
+            if (c->id == id) {
+                j = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (j == 0) {
+            /*
+             * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+             * to reuse it
+             */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
+        if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
+        /* no compress */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+        ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+    /* TLS extensions */
+    if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                                  clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
+     * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
+     * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
+     * processing to use it in key derivation.
+     */
+    {
+        unsigned char *pos;
+        pos = s->s3->server_random;
+        if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!s->hit
+            && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+            && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+            && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+            && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+        /*
+         * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
+         * backwards compat reasons
+         */
+        int master_key_length;
+
+        master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+        if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+                                     &master_key_length, ciphers,
+                                     &pref_cipher,
+                                     s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
+                && master_key_length > 0) {
+            s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
+            s->hit = 1;
+            s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
+            s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+            ciphers = NULL;
+
+            /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+            if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+                pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
+                                                 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+            if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                         SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
+            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+            s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
+            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+            s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+     * options, we will now look for them.  We have complen-1 compression
+     * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
+     */
+    s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        /*
+         * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
+         * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
+         * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
+         */
+        if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+    else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+        int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+        unsigned int k;
+        /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+        /* Can't disable compression */
+        if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Look for resumed compression method */
+        for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
+            comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+            if (comp_id == comp->id) {
+                s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+        for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
+            if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (s->hit) {
+        comp = NULL;
+    } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+        /* See if we have a match */
+        int m, nn, v, done = 0;
+        unsigned int o;
+
+        nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+        for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
+            comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+            v = comp->id;
+            for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
+                if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
+                    done = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (done)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (done)
+            s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+        else
+            comp = NULL;
+    }
+#else
+    /*
+     * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+     * using compression.
+     */
+    if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+     */
+
+    if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
+        s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
+        if (ciphers == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ciphers = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->hit) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+        s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
+#endif
+        if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
+    OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
+    s->clienthello = NULL;
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
+    OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
+    s->clienthello = NULL;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0.
+ */
+static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->ext.status_expected = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
+     * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
+     * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
+     * influence which certificate is sent
+     */
+    if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
+            && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
+        int ret;
+
+        /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+        if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+             * et al can pick it up.
+             */
+            s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+            ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
+            switch (ret) {
+                /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+            case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+                s->ext.status_expected = 0;
+                break;
+                /* status request response should be sent */
+            case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+                if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
+                    s->ext.status_expected = 1;
+                break;
+                /* something bad happened */
+            case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+            default:
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
+                         SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0.
+ */
+int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
+{
+    const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
+    unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+
+    if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+        int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+                                           s->s3->alpn_proposed,
+                                           (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+                                           s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
+
+        if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+            OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+            s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+            if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+                s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+            /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+            s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+            /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
+            if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
+                        || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
+                        || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
+                                  selected_len) != 0) {
+                /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
+                s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+
+                if (!s->hit) {
+                    /*
+                     * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
+                     * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
+                     * selected ALPN.
+                     */
+                    if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
+                        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
+                                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
+                                                                   selected_len);
+                    if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+                        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
+                                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+                }
+            }
+
+            return 1;
+        } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
+                     SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
+         * present.
+         */
+    }
+
+    /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
+    if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+        /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
+        s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+        int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
+        if (rv == 0) {
+            /* SSLfatal() was already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (rv < 0)
+            return WORK_MORE_A;
+        wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+    }
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+        if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
+            if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+                int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+                if (rv == 0) {
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                             SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                             SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                if (rv < 0) {
+                    s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+                    return WORK_MORE_B;
+                }
+                s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+            }
+
+            /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
+            if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+                cipher =
+                    ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+                if (cipher == NULL) {
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                             SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                             SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+            }
+            if (!s->hit) {
+                if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
+                    /* SSLfatal already called */
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+                if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+                    s->session->not_resumable =
+                        s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
+                            ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
+                              & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
+                if (s->session->not_resumable)
+                    /* do not send a session ticket */
+                    s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Session-id reuse */
+            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+        }
+
+        /*-
+         * we now have the following setup.
+         * client_random
+         * cipher_list          - our preferred list of ciphers
+         * ciphers              - the clients preferred list of ciphers
+         * compression          - basically ignored right now
+         * ssl version is set   - sslv3
+         * s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.
+         * s->hit               - session reuse flag
+         * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
+         */
+
+        /*
+         * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
+         * certificate callbacks etc above.
+         */
+        if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Call alpn_select callback if needed.  Has to be done after SNI and
+         * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
+         * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
+         * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
+         */
+        if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        wst = WORK_MORE_C;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
+        int ret;
+        if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
+            /*
+             * callback indicates further work to be done
+             */
+            s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+            return WORK_MORE_C;
+        }
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+ err:
+    return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int compm;
+    size_t sl, len;
+    int version;
+    unsigned char *session_id;
+    int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
+
+    version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
+               /*
+                * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
+                * tls_process_client_hello()
+                */
+            || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
+                               s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+                                   ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
+                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+     * back in the server hello:
+     * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+     *   we send back the old session ID.
+     * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+     *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+     *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+     * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+     *   session ID.
+     * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+     *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+     * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
+     *   regardless
+     * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+     * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+     * to send back.
+     */
+    if (s->session->not_resumable ||
+        (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+         && !s->hit))
+        s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+    if (usetls13) {
+        sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
+        session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
+    } else {
+        sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+        session_id = s->session->session_id;
+    }
+
+    if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* set up the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    compm = 0;
+#else
+    if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+        compm = 0;
+    else
+        compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+
+    if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
+            || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
+            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+                                  s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
+                                      ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+                                      : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+                                          ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+                                          : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
+                                  NULL, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+        /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = NULL;
+        s->hit = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
+         * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
+         */
+        if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+                && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+    size_t encodedlen = 0;
+    int curve_id = 0;
+#endif
+    const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
+    int i;
+    unsigned long type;
+    const BIGNUM *r[4];
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
+
+    if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
+    if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+    } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+        CERT *cert = s->cert;
+
+        EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
+        DH *dh;
+
+        if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
+            DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
+            pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
+            if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
+                DH_free(dhp);
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
+            pkdhp = pkdh;
+        } else {
+            pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+        }
+        if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+            DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+            pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
+            if (pkdh == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            pkdhp = pkdh;
+        }
+        if (pkdhp == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+                          EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+        if (dh == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+        pkdh = NULL;
+
+        DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
+        DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
+    } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+        curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
+        if (curve_id == 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
+        /* Generate a new key for this curve */
+        if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Encode the public key. */
+        encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
+                                                    &encodedPoint);
+        if (encodedlen == 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
+         * can set these to NULLs
+         */
+        r[0] = NULL;
+        r[1] = NULL;
+        r[2] = NULL;
+        r[3] = NULL;
+    } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+            (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+            (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
+        r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
+        r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
+        r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
+        || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
+        lu = NULL;
+    } else if (lu == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+        size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+                        ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+
+        /*
+         * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
+         * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
+         */
+        if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+                || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
+                                           len)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+        unsigned char *binval;
+        int res;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
+            res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
+        } else
+#endif
+            res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
+
+        if (!res) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        /*-
+         * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
+         * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
+         * as the prime
+         */
+        if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
+            size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
+
+            if (len > 0) {
+                if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                             SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto err;
+                }
+                memset(binval, 0, len);
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
+                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        /*
+         * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
+         * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+         * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
+         * point itself
+         */
+        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+                || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
+                || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
+                || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+        encodedPoint = NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* not anonymous */
+    if (lu != NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+        unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
+        size_t siglen, tbslen;
+        int rv;
+
+        if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+            /* Should never happen */
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
+        if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* send signature algorithm */
+        if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
+         * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
+         * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
+         * afterwards.
+         */
+        siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+        if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+            || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+                || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                        ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
+                                            s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
+                                            paramlen);
+        if (tbslen == 0) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
+        OPENSSL_free(tbs);
+        if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
+            || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    return 1;
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+#endif
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
+        if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
+            OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
+            s->pha_context_len = 32;
+            if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
+                s->pha_context_len = 0;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
+                    || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
+                                              s->pha_context_len)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
+            if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+                /* SSLfatal() already called */
+                return 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+                                      SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
+                                      0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+    if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+        || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+        const uint16_t *psigs;
+        size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+
+        if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+                || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
+                || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
+                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+ done:
+    s->certreqs_sent++;
+    s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+    size_t psklen;
+    PACKET psk_identity;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+                 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+                 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+                                    psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+    if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    } else if (psklen == 0) {
+        /*
+         * PSK related to the given identity not found
+         */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+                 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+        s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+    int decrypt_len;
+    unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+    size_t j, padding_len;
+    PACKET enc_premaster;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+    unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
+    if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        enc_premaster = *pkt;
+    } else {
+        if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
+     * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+     * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
+     * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
+     */
+    if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+    if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+     * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+     * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+     * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+     * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+     */
+
+    if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+                      sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
+     * the timing-sensitive code below.
+     */
+     /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+    decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
+                                           PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+                                           rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+    if (decrypt_len < 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+
+    /*
+     * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
+     * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
+     * PS is at least 8 bytes.
+     */
+    if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+                 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+    decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
+        constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
+    for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
+        decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
+    }
+    decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
+
+    /*
+     * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+     * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+     * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+     * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
+     * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
+     * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
+     */
+    version_good =
+        constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
+                           (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+    version_good &=
+        constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
+                           (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+
+    /*
+     * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+     * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+     * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+     * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+     * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
+     * clients.
+     */
+    if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
+        unsigned char workaround_good;
+        workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
+                                             (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+        workaround_good &=
+            constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
+                               (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+        version_good |= workaround_good;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
+     * remain non-zero (0xff).
+     */
+    decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+    /*
+     * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+     * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+     * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+     * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+     */
+    for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+        rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
+            constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
+                                   rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
+                                   rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
+                                    sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+    DH *cdh;
+    unsigned int i;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+               SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+    if (skey == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+                 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+                 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
+        /* We already checked we have enough data */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+                 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+    pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
+    if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        BN_free(pub_key);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+    s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
+             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
+        /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+                 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+        goto err;
+    } else {
+        unsigned int i;
+        const unsigned char *data;
+
+        /*
+         * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
+         * ClientKeyExchange message.
+         */
+
+        /* Get encoded point length */
+        if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (skey == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+                     SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+        if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+                     ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+                     ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+    s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    unsigned int i;
+    const unsigned char *data;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
+        || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
+                 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+    s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+    if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
+             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+    unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+    const unsigned char *start;
+    size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
+    unsigned long alg_a;
+    GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *ptr;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Get our certificate private key */
+    alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
+        /*
+         * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
+         */
+        pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
+        if (pk == NULL) {
+            pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
+        }
+        if (pk == NULL) {
+            pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
+        pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+    }
+
+    pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+    if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+     * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
+     * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
+     * client certificate for authorization only.
+     */
+    client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+    if (client_pub_pkey) {
+        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+
+    ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
+    /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
+     * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
+    pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
+    if (pKX == NULL
+       || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
+       || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+                  SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+         goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+                 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+                 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
+    start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
+                         inlen) <= 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+                 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Generate master secret */
+    if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+                                    sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
+                          NULL) > 0)
+        s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
+
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
+    return ret;
+#else
+    /* Should never happen */
+    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+             ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_k;
+
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+    /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+        /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+        if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+        if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+        if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+    s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
+#endif
+    return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+    if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+        if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+            unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+            char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+            size_t labellen;
+            /*
+             * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+             * used.
+             */
+            memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+                   sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+            /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
+            labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
+            if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
+                labellen += 1;
+
+            if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+                                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+                                           labellen, NULL, 0,
+                                           0) <= 0) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return WORK_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                     sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
+        /*
+         * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
+         * the handshake_buffer
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+    } else {
+        if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+        /*
+         * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
+         * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
+         */
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            return WORK_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    int i;
+    MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    unsigned long l;
+    const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+    PACKET spkt, context;
+    size_t chainidx;
+    SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
+     * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
+     * TLSv1.3
+     */
+    s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+
+    if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
+                            || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
+                            || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
+                                !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
+            || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        certstart = certbytes;
+        x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
+        if (x == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+            PACKET extensions;
+
+            if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                         SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
+                                        SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
+                                        NULL, chainidx == 0)
+                || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+                                             rawexts, x, chainidx,
+                                             PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
+                OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+        }
+
+        if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        x = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+        /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+        else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+                 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+        if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else {
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+        i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+        if (i <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (i > 1) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
+        if (pkey == NULL) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
+     * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
+     * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
+     * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
+     * session may have already gone into the session cache.
+     */
+
+    if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
+        if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = new_sess;
+    }
+
+    X509_free(s->session->peer);
+    s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+    s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+    s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+    sk = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
+     * message
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
+     * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
+     */
+
+    /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+                                sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+                                &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Resend session tickets */
+        s->sent_tickets = 0;
+    }
+
+    ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
+ err:
+    X509_free(x);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+
+    if (cpk == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
+     * for the server Certificate message
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+                                 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+    /*
+     * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
+     * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
+     * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
+     * timeout.
+     */
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
+                               (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+                               ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
+                || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
+    if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+                                      unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+    unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+    unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
+    const unsigned char *const_p;
+    int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
+    SSL_SESSION *sess;
+    unsigned int hlen;
+    SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
+    int iv_len, ok = 0;
+    size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
+
+    /* get session encoding length */
+    slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+    /*
+     * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
+     * long
+     */
+    if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+    if (senc == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    p = senc;
+    if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
+     */
+    const_p = senc;
+    sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+    if (sess == NULL) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+    if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
+        /* shouldn't ever happen */
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    p = senc;
+    if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
+     * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+     */
+    if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
+        /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+        int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+                                             hctx, 1);
+
+        if (ret == 0) {
+
+            /* Put timeout and length */
+            if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
+                    || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(senc);
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+            HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+            return 1;
+        }
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                     SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+    } else {
+        const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+
+        iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+        if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
+                || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
+                                       tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
+                || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+                                 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+                                 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+               sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
+               /* Output key name */
+            || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
+               /* output IV */
+            || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
+            || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+                                      &encdata1)
+               /* Encrypt session data */
+            || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
+            || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
+            || encdata1 != encdata2
+            || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
+            || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
+            || encdata1 + len != encdata2
+            || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
+            || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
+                            (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
+                            macendoffset - macoffset)
+            || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
+            || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
+            || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+            || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
+            || macdata1 != macdata2) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
+    if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(senc);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
+                                     unsigned char *tick_nonce)
+{
+    if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
+                        s->session->session_id_length)
+            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+    unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
+    union {
+        unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+        uint32_t age_add;
+    } age_add_u;
+
+    age_add_u.age_add = 0;
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        size_t i, hashlen;
+        uint64_t nonce;
+        static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+        const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+        int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+        /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+        if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+        /*
+         * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
+         * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
+         * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
+         */
+        if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
+            SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
+
+            if (new_sess == NULL) {
+                /* SSLfatal already called */
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+            s->session = new_sess;
+        }
+
+        if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                     SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+
+        nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
+        for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
+            tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
+            nonce >>= 8;
+        }
+
+        if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
+                               nonce_label,
+                               sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
+                               tick_nonce,
+                               TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
+                               s->session->master_key,
+                               hashlen, 1)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
+
+        s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+        if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
+            s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+                OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
+            if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+                s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                         ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+        }
+        s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+    }
+
+    if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+        tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
+     * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
+     * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+            && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
+                || (s->max_early_data > 0
+                    && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
+        if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+    } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
+                                           tick_nonce)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+                                      SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                                      NULL, 0)) {
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
+         * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
+         * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
+         */
+        s->sent_tickets++;
+        s->next_ticket_nonce++;
+        ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
+ * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+ */
+int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
+            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
+                                       s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
+ * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    PACKET next_proto, padding;
+    size_t next_proto_len;
+
+    /*-
+     * The payload looks like:
+     *   uint8 proto_len;
+     *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+     *   uint8 padding_len;
+     *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+     */
+    if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
+        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
+        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
+        s->ext.npn_len = 0;
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                                  NULL, 0)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+                 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
+            && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
+     * a record boundary.
+     */
+    if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+                 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
+    if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+}