diff options
author | deshevoy <deshevoy@yandex-team.ru> | 2022-02-10 16:46:56 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniil Cherednik <dcherednik@yandex-team.ru> | 2022-02-10 16:46:56 +0300 |
commit | e988f30484abe5fdeedcc7a5d3c226c01a21800c (patch) | |
tree | 0a217b173aabb57b7e51f8a169989b1a3e0309fe /contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | |
parent | 33ee501c05d3f24036ae89766a858930ae66c548 (diff) | |
download | ydb-e988f30484abe5fdeedcc7a5d3c226c01a21800c.tar.gz |
Restoring authorship annotation for <deshevoy@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 4310 |
1 files changed, 2155 insertions, 2155 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index 735a483c64..a987742e3a 100644 --- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -1,2164 +1,2164 @@ -/* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/comp.h> -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/conf.h> -#include "internal/nelem.h" +/* + * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/comp.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/conf.h> +#include "internal/nelem.h" #include "ssl_local.h" -#include "internal/thread_once.h" -#include "internal/cryptlib.h" - -#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 -#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 -#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 -#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 -#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 -#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 -#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 -#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 -#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 -#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 -#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 -#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 -#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 -#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 -#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 -#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 -#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 -#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 -#define SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 -#define SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 -#define SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 -#define SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 -#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 22 - -/* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ - -typedef struct { - uint32_t mask; - int nid; -} ssl_cipher_table; - -/* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ -static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { - {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ - {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ - {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ - {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ - {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ - {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ - {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ - {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ - {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ - {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ - {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ - {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ - {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ - {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ - {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ - {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ - {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ - {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ - {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 */ - {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, /* SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 */ - {SSL_ARIA128GCM, NID_aria_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 */ - {SSL_ARIA256GCM, NID_aria_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 */ -}; - -static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]; - -#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 -#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 -#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 - -static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; -#endif - -/* - * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined +#include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 +#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 +#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 +#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 +#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 +#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 +#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 +#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 +#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 +#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 +#define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 +#define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 +#define SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 +#define SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 +#define SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 +#define SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 +#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 22 + +/* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ + +typedef struct { + uint32_t mask; + int nid; +} ssl_cipher_table; + +/* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { + {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ + {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ + {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ + {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ + {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ + {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ + {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ + {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ + {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ + {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ + {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ + {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ + {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ + {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ + {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ + {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ + {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ + {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ + {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 */ + {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, /* SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 */ + {SSL_ARIA128GCM, NID_aria_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 */ + {SSL_ARIA256GCM, NID_aria_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 */ +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]; + +#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 +#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 +#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 + +static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +#endif + +/* + * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined * in the ssl_local.h - */ - -#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST - -/* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ -static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { - {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ - {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ - {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ - {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ - {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ - {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ - {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ - {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ - {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ - {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ - {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ - {0, NID_sha512} /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ -}; - -static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL -}; - -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { - {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, - {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, - {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, - {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, - {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, - {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, - {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, - {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, - {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost}, - {SSL_kANY, NID_kx_any} -}; - -static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { - {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, - {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, - {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, - {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, - {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, - {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, - {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, - {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null}, - {SSL_aANY, NID_auth_any} -}; -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - -/* Utility function for table lookup */ -static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, - size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) -{ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { - if (table->mask == mask) - return (int)i; - } - return -1; -} - -#define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ - ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) - -/* - * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation - * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is - * found - */ -static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { - /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ - EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, - /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ - EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, - /* GOST2012_512 */ - EVP_PKEY_HMAC, - /* MD5/SHA1, SHA224, SHA512 */ - NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef -}; - -static size_t ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]; - -#define CIPHER_ADD 1 -#define CIPHER_KILL 2 -#define CIPHER_DEL 3 -#define CIPHER_ORD 4 -#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 -/* - * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. - * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. - */ -#define CIPHER_BUMP 6 - -typedef struct cipher_order_st { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; - int active; - int dead; - struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; -} CIPHER_ORDER; - -static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { - /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ - {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, - /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ - {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, - - /* - * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in - * ALL!) - */ - {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, - - /* - * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here - * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE - * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) - */ - {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA}, - - {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, - {0, SSL_TXT_DH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, - - {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, - - {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kPSK}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, - {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST}, - - /* server authentication aliases */ - {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, - {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, - {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, - - /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ - {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, NULL, 0, SSL_PSK}, - {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, - - /* symmetric encryption aliases */ - {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, - {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, - {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, - {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, - {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, - {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, - SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, - SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, - SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, - {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, - {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, - {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, - - {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM}, - {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA256GCM}, - - /* MAC aliases */ - {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, - {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, - {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, - {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, - {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, - {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, - {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, - {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, - - /* protocol version aliases */ - {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, - {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, - {0, "TLSv1.0", NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, - {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, - - /* strength classes */ - {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, - {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, - {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, - /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ - {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, - - /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ - {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, - SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, - {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, - SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, - -}; - -/* - * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if - * it is available. Otherwise return 0 - */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - -static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) -{ - const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; - int pkey_id = 0; - ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); - if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - ameth) > 0) - return pkey_id; - return 0; -} - -#else - -static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) -{ - const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; - ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; - int pkey_id = 0; - ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); - if (ameth) { - if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - ameth) <= 0) - pkey_id = 0; - } - ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); - return pkey_id; -} - -#endif - -/* masks of disabled algorithms */ -static uint32_t disabled_enc_mask; -static uint32_t disabled_mac_mask; -static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask; -static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask; - -int ssl_load_ciphers(void) -{ - size_t i; - const ssl_cipher_table *t; - - disabled_enc_mask = 0; - ssl_sort_cipher_list(); - for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { - if (t->nid == NID_undef) { - ssl_cipher_methods[i] = NULL; - } else { - const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(t->nid); - ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; - if (cipher == NULL) - disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; - } - } - disabled_mac_mask = 0; - for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { - const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(t->nid); - ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; - if (md == NULL) { - disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; - } else { - int tmpsize = EVP_MD_size(md); - if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize >= 0)) - return 0; - ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize; - } - } - /* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */ - if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL)) - return 0; - if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL)) - return 0; - - disabled_mkey_mask = 0; - disabled_auth_mask = 0; - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK; - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA; -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH - disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC - disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK; - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; -#endif - - /* - * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not - * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange - */ - ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac"); - if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) - ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; - else - disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; - - ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = - get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); - if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) - ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; - else - disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; - - if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; - if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_256")) - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; - if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_512")) - disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; - /* - * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * - */ - if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == - (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) - disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; - - return 1; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - -static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) -{ - return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); -} - -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions) -{ - SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; - COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib(); - - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); - ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); - - if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { - comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); - if (comp != NULL) { - comp->method = method; - comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; - comp->name = COMP_get_name(method); - sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp); - sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); - } - } - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); - return 1; -} - -static int load_builtin_compressions(void) -{ - return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions); -} -#endif - -int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, - const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, - size_t *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) -{ - int i; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - - c = s->cipher; - if (c == NULL) - return 0; - if (comp != NULL) { - SSL_COMP ctmp; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (!load_builtin_compressions()) { - /* - * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that - * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK - */ - } -#endif - *comp = NULL; - ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; - if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { - i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); - *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); - } - /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ - if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) - return 1; - } - - if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) - return 0; - - i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); - - if (i == -1) { - *enc = NULL; - } else { - if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) - *enc = EVP_enc_null(); - else - *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i]; - } - - i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); - if (i == -1) { - *md = NULL; - if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) - *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; - if (mac_secret_size != NULL) - *mac_secret_size = 0; - if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) - mac_pkey_type = NULL; - } else { - *md = ssl_digest_methods[i]; - if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) - *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; - if (mac_secret_size != NULL) - *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; - } - - if ((*enc != NULL) && - (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) - && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { - const EVP_CIPHER *evp; - - if (use_etm) - return 1; - - if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || - s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) - return 1; - - if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 && - c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 && - (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5"))) - *enc = evp, *md = NULL; - else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && - c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && - (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) - *enc = evp, *md = NULL; - else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && - c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && - (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) - *enc = evp, *md = NULL; - else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && - c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && - (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) - *enc = evp, *md = NULL; - else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && - c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && - (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) - *enc = evp, *md = NULL; - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx) -{ - idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; - if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) - return NULL; - return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; -} - -const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s) -{ - return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); -} - -const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s) -{ - return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); -} - -#define ITEM_SEP(a) \ - (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) - -static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, - CIPHER_ORDER **tail) -{ - if (curr == *tail) - return; - if (curr == *head) - *head = curr->next; - if (curr->prev != NULL) - curr->prev->next = curr->next; - if (curr->next != NULL) - curr->next->prev = curr->prev; - (*tail)->next = curr; - curr->prev = *tail; - curr->next = NULL; - *tail = curr; -} - -static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, - CIPHER_ORDER **tail) -{ - if (curr == *head) - return; - if (curr == *tail) - *tail = curr->prev; - if (curr->next != NULL) - curr->next->prev = curr->prev; - if (curr->prev != NULL) - curr->prev->next = curr->next; - (*head)->prev = curr; - curr->next = *head; - curr->prev = NULL; - *head = curr; -} - -static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, - int num_of_ciphers, - uint32_t disabled_mkey, - uint32_t disabled_auth, - uint32_t disabled_enc, - uint32_t disabled_mac, - CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, - CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, - CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) -{ - int i, co_list_num; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - - /* - * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the - * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). - * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num - * entries. - */ - - /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ - co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ - for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { - c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); - /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ - if (c == NULL || !c->valid) - continue; - if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || - (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || - (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || - (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) - continue; - if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && - c->min_tls == 0) - continue; - if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && - c->min_dtls == 0) - continue; - - co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; - co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; - co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; - co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; - co_list_num++; - } - - /* - * Prepare linked list from list entries - */ - if (co_list_num > 0) { - co_list[0].prev = NULL; - - if (co_list_num > 1) { - co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; - - for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { - co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; - co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; - } - - co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; - } - - co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; - - *head_p = &co_list[0]; - *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; - } -} - -static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, - int num_of_group_aliases, - uint32_t disabled_mkey, - uint32_t disabled_auth, - uint32_t disabled_enc, - uint32_t disabled_mac, - CIPHER_ORDER *head) -{ - CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; - const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; - int i; - uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; - uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; - uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; - uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; - - /* - * First, add the real ciphers as already collected - */ - ciph_curr = head; - ca_curr = ca_list; - while (ciph_curr != NULL) { - *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; - ca_curr++; - ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; - } - - /* - * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. - * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which - * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), - * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). - */ - for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { - uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; - uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; - uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; - uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; - - if (algorithm_mkey) - if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) - continue; - - if (algorithm_auth) - if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) - continue; - - if (algorithm_enc) - if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) - continue; - - if (algorithm_mac) - if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) - continue; - - *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); - ca_curr++; - } - - *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ -} - -static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, - uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, - uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, - uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, - int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, - CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) -{ - CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; - const SSL_CIPHER *cp; - int reverse = 0; - -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, - "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", - rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, - algo_strength, strength_bits); -#endif - - if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) - reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently - * deleted ciphers */ - - head = *head_p; - tail = *tail_p; - - if (reverse) { - next = tail; - last = head; - } else { - next = head; - last = tail; - } - - curr = NULL; - for (;;) { - if (curr == last) - break; - - curr = next; - - if (curr == NULL) - break; - - next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; - - cp = curr->cipher; - - /* - * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits - * or the algorithms used. - */ - if (strength_bits >= 0) { - if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) - continue; - } else { -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, - "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", - cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, - cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls, - cp->algo_strength); -#endif - if (cipher_id != 0 && (cipher_id != cp->id)) - continue; - if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) - continue; - if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) - continue; - if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) - continue; - if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) - continue; - if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) - continue; - if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) - && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) - continue; - if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) - && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) - continue; - } - -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); -#endif - - /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ - if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { - /* reverse == 0 */ - if (!curr->active) { - ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); - curr->active = 1; - } - } - /* Move the added cipher to this location */ - else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { - /* reverse == 0 */ - if (curr->active) { - ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); - } - } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { - /* reverse == 1 */ - if (curr->active) { - /* - * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for - * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works - * in reverse to maintain the order) - */ - ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); - curr->active = 0; - } - } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { - if (curr->active) - ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); - } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { - /* reverse == 0 */ - if (head == curr) - head = curr->next; - else - curr->prev->next = curr->next; - if (tail == curr) - tail = curr->prev; - curr->active = 0; - if (curr->next != NULL) - curr->next->prev = curr->prev; - if (curr->prev != NULL) - curr->prev->next = curr->next; - curr->next = NULL; - curr->prev = NULL; - } - } - - *head_p = head; - *tail_p = tail; -} - -static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, - CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) -{ - int32_t max_strength_bits; - int i, *number_uses; - CIPHER_ORDER *curr; - - /* - * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting - * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting - * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. - */ - max_strength_bits = 0; - curr = *head_p; - while (curr != NULL) { - if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) - max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; - curr = curr->next; - } - - number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); - if (number_uses == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - - /* - * Now find the strength_bits values actually used - */ - curr = *head_p; - while (curr != NULL) { - if (curr->active) - number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; - curr = curr->next; - } - /* - * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending - * order. - */ - for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) - if (number_uses[i] > 0) - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, - tail_p); - - OPENSSL_free(number_uses); - return 1; -} - -static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, - CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, - CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, - const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) -{ - uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; - int min_tls; - const char *l, *buf; - int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; - uint32_t cipher_id = 0; - char ch; - - retval = 1; - l = rule_str; - for ( ; ; ) { - ch = *l; - - if (ch == '\0') - break; /* done */ - if (ch == '-') { - rule = CIPHER_DEL; - l++; - } else if (ch == '+') { - rule = CIPHER_ORD; - l++; - } else if (ch == '!') { - rule = CIPHER_KILL; - l++; - } else if (ch == '@') { - rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; - l++; - } else { - rule = CIPHER_ADD; - } - - if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { - l++; - continue; - } - - alg_mkey = 0; - alg_auth = 0; - alg_enc = 0; - alg_mac = 0; - min_tls = 0; - algo_strength = 0; - - for (;;) { - ch = *l; - buf = l; - buflen = 0; -#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC - while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || - ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || - ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || - (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) -#else - while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') - || (ch == '=')) -#endif - { - ch = *(++l); - buflen++; - } - - if (buflen == 0) { - /* - * We hit something we cannot deal with, - * it is no command or separator nor - * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); - retval = found = 0; - l++; - break; - } - - if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { - found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ - break; /* special treatment */ - } - - /* check for multi-part specification */ - if (ch == '+') { - multi = 1; - l++; - } else { - multi = 0; - } - - /* - * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful - * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation - * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher - * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. - * So additionally check whether the cipher name found - * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: - * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is - * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot - * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) - */ - j = found = 0; - cipher_id = 0; - while (ca_list[j]) { - if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 - && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { - found = 1; - break; - } else - j++; - } - - if (!found) - break; /* ignore this entry */ - - if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { - if (alg_mkey) { - alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; - if (!alg_mkey) { - found = 0; - break; - } - } else { - alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; - } - } - - if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { - if (alg_auth) { - alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; - if (!alg_auth) { - found = 0; - break; - } - } else { - alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; - } - } - - if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { - if (alg_enc) { - alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; - if (!alg_enc) { - found = 0; - break; - } - } else { - alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; - } - } - - if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { - if (alg_mac) { - alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; - if (!alg_mac) { - found = 0; - break; - } - } else { - alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; - } - } - - if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { - if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { - algo_strength &= - (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | - ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; - if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { - found = 0; - break; - } - } else { - algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; - } - } - - if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { - if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { - algo_strength &= - (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | - ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; - if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { - found = 0; - break; - } - } else { - algo_strength |= - ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; - } - } - - if (ca_list[j]->valid) { - /* - * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not - * become part of the search pattern! - */ - - cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; - } else { - /* - * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the - * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern - */ - - if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { - if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { - found = 0; - break; - } else { - min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; - } - } - } - - if (!multi) - break; - } - - /* - * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it - */ - if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ - ok = 0; - if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0) { - ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); - } else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) { - int level = buf[9] - '0'; - if (level < 0 || level > 5) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, - SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); - } else { - c->sec_level = level; - ok = 1; - } - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); - } - if (ok == 0) - retval = 0; - /* - * We do not support any "multi" options - * together with "@", so throw away the - * rest of the command, if any left, until - * end or ':' is found. - */ - while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) - l++; - } else if (found) { - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, - alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, - min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, - tail_p); - } else { - while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) - l++; - } - if (*l == '\0') - break; /* done */ - } - - return retval; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, - const char **prule_str) -{ - unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; - if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { - suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; - } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { - suiteb_comb2 = 1; - suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; - } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { - suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; - } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { - suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; - } - - if (suiteb_flags) { - c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; - c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; - } else { - suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; - } - - if (!suiteb_flags) - return 1; - /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ - - if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - switch (suiteb_flags) { - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: - if (suiteb_comb2) - *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; - else - *prule_str = - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; - break; - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: - *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; - break; - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: - *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; - break; - } - return 1; -# else - SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; -# endif -} -#endif - -static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg; - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; - /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */ - char name[80]; - - if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); - return 0; - } - - memcpy(name, elem, len); - name[len] = '\0'; - - cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name); - if (cipher == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); - return 0; - } - - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); - - if (newciphers == NULL) - return 0; - - /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */ - if (*str != '\0' - && !CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers)) { - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers); - return 0; - } - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers); - *currciphers = newciphers; - - return 1; -} - -static int update_cipher_list_by_id(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); - - if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); - *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; - - (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); - - return 1; -} - -static int update_cipher_list(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites) -{ - int i; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(*cipher_list); - - if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) - return 0; - - /* - * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the - * list. - */ - while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tmp_cipher_list) > 0 - && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tmp_cipher_list, 0)->min_tls - == TLS1_3_VERSION) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tmp_cipher_list, 0); - - /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_insert(tmp_cipher_list, - sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i), i); - - if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, tmp_cipher_list)) - return 0; - - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); - *cipher_list = tmp_cipher_list; - - return 1; -} - -int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) -{ - int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str); - + */ + +#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST + +/* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ + {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ + {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ + {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ + {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ + {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ + {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ + {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ + {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ + {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ + {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ + {0, NID_sha512} /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ +}; + +static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL +}; + +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { + {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, + {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, + {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, + {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, + {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, + {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, + {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, + {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, + {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost}, + {SSL_kANY, NID_kx_any} +}; + +static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { + {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, + {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, + {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, + {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, + {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, + {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, + {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, + {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null}, + {SSL_aANY, NID_auth_any} +}; +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +/* Utility function for table lookup */ +static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, + size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { + if (table->mask == mask) + return (int)i; + } + return -1; +} + +#define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ + ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) + +/* + * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation + * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is + * found + */ +static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { + /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, + /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, + /* GOST2012_512 */ + EVP_PKEY_HMAC, + /* MD5/SHA1, SHA224, SHA512 */ + NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef +}; + +static size_t ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]; + +#define CIPHER_ADD 1 +#define CIPHER_KILL 2 +#define CIPHER_DEL 3 +#define CIPHER_ORD 4 +#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 +/* + * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. + * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. + */ +#define CIPHER_BUMP 6 + +typedef struct cipher_order_st { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + int active; + int dead; + struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; +} CIPHER_ORDER; + +static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { + /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ + {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, + /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, + + /* + * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in + * ALL!) + */ + {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, + + /* + * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here + * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE + * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) + */ + {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, + {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST}, + + /* server authentication aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, + + /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ + {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, NULL, 0, SSL_PSK}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, + + /* symmetric encryption aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, + {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, + {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, + {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, + + {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM}, + {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA256GCM}, + + /* MAC aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, + {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, + {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, + + /* protocol version aliases */ + {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, + {0, "TLSv1.0", NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, + {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, + + /* strength classes */ + {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, + {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, + {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, + /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ + {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, + + /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ + {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, + {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, + +}; + +/* + * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if + * it is available. Otherwise return 0 + */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + +static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) +{ + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; + int pkey_id = 0; + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); + if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) > 0) + return pkey_id; + return 0; +} + +#else + +static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) +{ + const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; + ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; + int pkey_id = 0; + ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); + if (ameth) { + if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + ameth) <= 0) + pkey_id = 0; + } + ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); + return pkey_id; +} + +#endif + +/* masks of disabled algorithms */ +static uint32_t disabled_enc_mask; +static uint32_t disabled_mac_mask; +static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask; +static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask; + +int ssl_load_ciphers(void) +{ + size_t i; + const ssl_cipher_table *t; + + disabled_enc_mask = 0; + ssl_sort_cipher_list(); + for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { + if (t->nid == NID_undef) { + ssl_cipher_methods[i] = NULL; + } else { + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(t->nid); + ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; + if (cipher == NULL) + disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; + } + } + disabled_mac_mask = 0; + for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { + const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(t->nid); + ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; + if (md == NULL) { + disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; + } else { + int tmpsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize >= 0)) + return 0; + ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize; + } + } + /* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */ + if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL)) + return 0; + if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL)) + return 0; + + disabled_mkey_mask = 0; + disabled_auth_mask = 0; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK; + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK; + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; +#endif + + /* + * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not + * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange + */ + ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac"); + if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; + else + disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; + + ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = + get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); + if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) + ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; + else + disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; + + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_256")) + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; + if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_512")) + disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; + /* + * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * + */ + if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == + (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) + disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + +static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) +{ + return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); +} + +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions) +{ + SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; + COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib(); + + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); + ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); + + if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { + comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); + if (comp != NULL) { + comp->method = method; + comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; + comp->name = COMP_get_name(method); + sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp); + sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); + } + } + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + return 1; +} + +static int load_builtin_compressions(void) +{ + return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions); +} +#endif + +int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, + const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, + size_t *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) +{ + int i; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + c = s->cipher; + if (c == NULL) + return 0; + if (comp != NULL) { + SSL_COMP ctmp; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (!load_builtin_compressions()) { + /* + * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that + * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK + */ + } +#endif + *comp = NULL; + ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; + if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { + i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); + *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); + } + /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ + if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) + return 1; + } + + if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) + return 0; + + i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); + + if (i == -1) { + *enc = NULL; + } else { + if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) + *enc = EVP_enc_null(); + else + *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i]; + } + + i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); + if (i == -1) { + *md = NULL; + if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) + *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; + if (mac_secret_size != NULL) + *mac_secret_size = 0; + if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) + mac_pkey_type = NULL; + } else { + *md = ssl_digest_methods[i]; + if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) + *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; + if (mac_secret_size != NULL) + *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; + } + + if ((*enc != NULL) && + (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) + && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { + const EVP_CIPHER *evp; + + if (use_etm) + return 1; + + if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || + s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) + return 1; + + if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && + c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && + (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) + *enc = evp, *md = NULL; + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx) +{ + idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; + if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) + return NULL; + return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; +} + +const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s) +{ + return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); +} + +const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s) +{ + return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); +} + +#define ITEM_SEP(a) \ + (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) + +static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) +{ + if (curr == *tail) + return; + if (curr == *head) + *head = curr->next; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + (*tail)->next = curr; + curr->prev = *tail; + curr->next = NULL; + *tail = curr; +} + +static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail) +{ + if (curr == *head) + return; + if (curr == *tail) + *tail = curr->prev; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + (*head)->prev = curr; + curr->next = *head; + curr->prev = NULL; + *head = curr; +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, + int num_of_ciphers, + uint32_t disabled_mkey, + uint32_t disabled_auth, + uint32_t disabled_enc, + uint32_t disabled_mac, + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + int i, co_list_num; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + /* + * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the + * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). + * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num + * entries. + */ + + /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ + co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { + c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); + /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ + if (c == NULL || !c->valid) + continue; + if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || + (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || + (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || + (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) + continue; + if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && + c->min_tls == 0) + continue; + if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && + c->min_dtls == 0) + continue; + + co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; + co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; + co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; + co_list_num++; + } + + /* + * Prepare linked list from list entries + */ + if (co_list_num > 0) { + co_list[0].prev = NULL; + + if (co_list_num > 1) { + co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; + + for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { + co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; + co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; + } + + co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; + + *head_p = &co_list[0]; + *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; + } +} + +static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, + int num_of_group_aliases, + uint32_t disabled_mkey, + uint32_t disabled_auth, + uint32_t disabled_enc, + uint32_t disabled_mac, + CIPHER_ORDER *head) +{ + CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; + int i; + uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; + uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; + uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; + uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; + + /* + * First, add the real ciphers as already collected + */ + ciph_curr = head; + ca_curr = ca_list; + while (ciph_curr != NULL) { + *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; + ca_curr++; + ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; + } + + /* + * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. + * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which + * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), + * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { + uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; + uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; + uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; + uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; + + if (algorithm_mkey) + if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_auth) + if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_enc) + if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) + continue; + + if (algorithm_mac) + if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) + continue; + + *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); + ca_curr++; + } + + *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ +} + +static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, + uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, + uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, + uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, + int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; + const SSL_CIPHER *cp; + int reverse = 0; + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", + rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, + algo_strength, strength_bits); +#endif + + if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) + reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently + * deleted ciphers */ + + head = *head_p; + tail = *tail_p; + + if (reverse) { + next = tail; + last = head; + } else { + next = head; + last = tail; + } + + curr = NULL; + for (;;) { + if (curr == last) + break; + + curr = next; + + if (curr == NULL) + break; + + next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; + + cp = curr->cipher; + + /* + * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits + * or the algorithms used. + */ + if (strength_bits >= 0) { + if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) + continue; + } else { +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", + cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, + cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls, + cp->algo_strength); +#endif + if (cipher_id != 0 && (cipher_id != cp->id)) + continue; + if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) + continue; + if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) + continue; + if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) + continue; + if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) + continue; + if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) + && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) + continue; + if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) + && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) + continue; + } + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); +#endif + + /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ + if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (!curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 1; + } + } + /* Move the added cipher to this location */ + else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (curr->active) { + ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { + /* reverse == 1 */ + if (curr->active) { + /* + * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for + * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works + * in reverse to maintain the order) + */ + ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); + curr->active = 0; + } + } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { + if (curr->active) + ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); + } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { + /* reverse == 0 */ + if (head == curr) + head = curr->next; + else + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + if (tail == curr) + tail = curr->prev; + curr->active = 0; + if (curr->next != NULL) + curr->next->prev = curr->prev; + if (curr->prev != NULL) + curr->prev->next = curr->next; + curr->next = NULL; + curr->prev = NULL; + } + } + + *head_p = head; + *tail_p = tail; +} + +static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) +{ + int32_t max_strength_bits; + int i, *number_uses; + CIPHER_ORDER *curr; + + /* + * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting + * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting + * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. + */ + max_strength_bits = 0; + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) + max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; + curr = curr->next; + } + + number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); + if (number_uses == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now find the strength_bits values actually used + */ + curr = *head_p; + while (curr != NULL) { + if (curr->active) + number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; + curr = curr->next; + } + /* + * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending + * order. + */ + for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) + if (number_uses[i] > 0) + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, + tail_p); + + OPENSSL_free(number_uses); + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, + CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, + CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) +{ + uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; + int min_tls; + const char *l, *buf; + int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; + uint32_t cipher_id = 0; + char ch; + + retval = 1; + l = rule_str; + for ( ; ; ) { + ch = *l; + + if (ch == '\0') + break; /* done */ + if (ch == '-') { + rule = CIPHER_DEL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '+') { + rule = CIPHER_ORD; + l++; + } else if (ch == '!') { + rule = CIPHER_KILL; + l++; + } else if (ch == '@') { + rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; + l++; + } else { + rule = CIPHER_ADD; + } + + if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { + l++; + continue; + } + + alg_mkey = 0; + alg_auth = 0; + alg_enc = 0; + alg_mac = 0; + min_tls = 0; + algo_strength = 0; + + for (;;) { + ch = *l; + buf = l; + buflen = 0; +#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC + while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || + ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || + ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || + (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) +#else + while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') + || (ch == '=')) +#endif + { + ch = *(++l); + buflen++; + } + + if (buflen == 0) { + /* + * We hit something we cannot deal with, + * it is no command or separator nor + * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + retval = found = 0; + l++; + break; + } + + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { + found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ + break; /* special treatment */ + } + + /* check for multi-part specification */ + if (ch == '+') { + multi = 1; + l++; + } else { + multi = 0; + } + + /* + * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful + * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation + * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher + * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. + * So additionally check whether the cipher name found + * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: + * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is + * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot + * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) + */ + j = found = 0; + cipher_id = 0; + while (ca_list[j]) { + if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 + && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { + found = 1; + break; + } else + j++; + } + + if (!found) + break; /* ignore this entry */ + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { + if (alg_mkey) { + alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + if (!alg_mkey) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { + if (alg_auth) { + alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + if (!alg_auth) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { + if (alg_enc) { + alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + if (!alg_enc) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { + if (alg_mac) { + alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + if (!alg_mac) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { + if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { + algo_strength &= + (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | + ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; + if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { + if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { + algo_strength &= + (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | + ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; + if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { + found = 0; + break; + } + } else { + algo_strength |= + ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; + } + } + + if (ca_list[j]->valid) { + /* + * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not + * become part of the search pattern! + */ + + cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; + } else { + /* + * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the + * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern + */ + + if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { + if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { + found = 0; + break; + } else { + min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; + } + } + } + + if (!multi) + break; + } + + /* + * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it + */ + if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ + ok = 0; + if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0) { + ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); + } else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) { + int level = buf[9] - '0'; + if (level < 0 || level > 5) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + } else { + c->sec_level = level; + ok = 1; + } + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + } + if (ok == 0) + retval = 0; + /* + * We do not support any "multi" options + * together with "@", so throw away the + * rest of the command, if any left, until + * end or ':' is found. + */ + while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) + l++; + } else if (found) { + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, + alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, + min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, + tail_p); + } else { + while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) + l++; + } + if (*l == '\0') + break; /* done */ + } + + return retval; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, + const char **prule_str) +{ + unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; + if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { + suiteb_comb2 = 1; + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { + suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; + } + + if (suiteb_flags) { + c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; + } else { + suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; + } + + if (!suiteb_flags) + return 1; + /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ + + if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, + SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; + } +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + switch (suiteb_flags) { + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: + if (suiteb_comb2) + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + else + *prule_str = + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + break; + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; + break; + case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: + *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + break; + } + return 1; +# else + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; +# endif +} +#endif + +static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg; + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */ + char name[80]; + + if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + + memcpy(name, elem, len); + name[len] = '\0'; + + cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name); + if (cipher == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); + + if (newciphers == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */ + if (*str != '\0' + && !CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers)) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers); + return 0; + } + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers); + *currciphers = newciphers; + + return 1; +} + +static int update_cipher_list_by_id(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); + + if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); + *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; + + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); + + return 1; +} + +static int update_cipher_list(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites) +{ + int i; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(*cipher_list); + + if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the + * list. + */ + while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tmp_cipher_list) > 0 + && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tmp_cipher_list, 0)->min_tls + == TLS1_3_VERSION) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tmp_cipher_list, 0); + + /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_insert(tmp_cipher_list, + sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i), i); + + if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, tmp_cipher_list)) + return 0; + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); + *cipher_list = tmp_cipher_list; + + return 1; +} + +int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) +{ + int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str); + if (ret && ctx->cipher_list != NULL) - return update_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, - ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); - - return ret; -} - -int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str) -{ + return update_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, + ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); + + return ret; +} + +int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str) +{ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; - int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(s->tls13_ciphersuites), str); - + int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(s->tls13_ciphersuites), str); + if (s->cipher_list == NULL) { if ((cipher_list = SSL_get_ciphers(s)) != NULL) s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list); } if (ret && s->cipher_list != NULL) - return update_cipher_list(&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, - s->tls13_ciphersuites); - - return ret; -} - -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, - const char *rule_str, - CERT *c) -{ - int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases, i; - uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack; - const char *rule_p; - CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; - const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; - - /* - * Return with error if nothing to do. - */ - if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) - return NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) - return NULL; -#endif - - /* - * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled - * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. - */ - - disabled_mkey = disabled_mkey_mask; - disabled_auth = disabled_auth_mask; - disabled_enc = disabled_enc_mask; - disabled_mac = disabled_mac_mask; - - /* - * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled - * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so - * it is used for allocation. - */ - num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); - - co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); - if (co_list == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; /* Failure */ - } - - ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, - disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, - disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); - - /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ - - /* - * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key - * exchange mechanisms. - * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the - * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client - * preference). - */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, - -1, &head, &tail); - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, - &tail); - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, - &tail); - - /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, - &head, &tail); - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, - &head, &tail); - - /* - * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. - * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by - * strength. - */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, - -1, &head, &tail); - - /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); - - /* Low priority for MD5 */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, - &tail); - - /* - * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain - * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but - * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) - */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, - &tail); - - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, - &tail); - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, - &tail); - - /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move to the end */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, - &tail); - - /* - * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains - * in force within each class - */ - if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { - OPENSSL_free(co_list); - return NULL; - } - - /* - * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. - * TODO(openssl-team): is there an easier way to accomplish all this? - */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, - &head, &tail); - - /* - * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: - * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. - * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous - * preference, i.e., - * 1) ECDHE > DHE - * 2) GCM > CHACHA - * 3) AES > rest - * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy - * - * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in - * reverse order of preference. - */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, - &head, &tail); - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, - CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); - - /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ - ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); - - /* - * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. - * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names - * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. - * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher - * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise - * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). - */ - num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); - num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; - ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); - if (ca_list == NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(co_list); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; /* Failure */ - } - ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, - disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, - disabled_mac, head); - - /* - * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule - * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. - */ - ok = 1; - rule_p = rule_str; - if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { - ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, - &head, &tail, ca_list, c); - rule_p += 7; - if (*rule_p == ':') - rule_p++; - } - - if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) - ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); - - OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ - - if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ - OPENSSL_free(co_list); - return NULL; - } - - /* - * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error - * if we cannot get one. - */ - if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(co_list); - return NULL; - } - - /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) { - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, - sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i))) { - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); - return NULL; - } - } - - /* - * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added - * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). - */ - for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { - if (curr->active) { - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { - OPENSSL_free(co_list); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); - return NULL; - } -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); -#endif - } - } - OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ - - if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, cipherstack)) { - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); - return NULL; - } - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); - *cipher_list = cipherstack; - - return cipherstack; -} - -char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) -{ - const char *ver; - const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; - uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; - static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; - - if (buf == NULL) { - len = 128; - if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_DESCRIPTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - } else if (len < 128) { - return NULL; - } - - alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; - alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; - alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; - - ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); - - switch (alg_mkey) { - case SSL_kRSA: - kx = "RSA"; - break; - case SSL_kDHE: - kx = "DH"; - break; - case SSL_kECDHE: - kx = "ECDH"; - break; - case SSL_kPSK: - kx = "PSK"; - break; - case SSL_kRSAPSK: - kx = "RSAPSK"; - break; - case SSL_kECDHEPSK: - kx = "ECDHEPSK"; - break; - case SSL_kDHEPSK: - kx = "DHEPSK"; - break; - case SSL_kSRP: - kx = "SRP"; - break; - case SSL_kGOST: - kx = "GOST"; - break; - case SSL_kANY: - kx = "any"; - break; - default: - kx = "unknown"; - } - - switch (alg_auth) { - case SSL_aRSA: - au = "RSA"; - break; - case SSL_aDSS: - au = "DSS"; - break; - case SSL_aNULL: - au = "None"; - break; - case SSL_aECDSA: - au = "ECDSA"; - break; - case SSL_aPSK: - au = "PSK"; - break; - case SSL_aSRP: - au = "SRP"; - break; - case SSL_aGOST01: - au = "GOST01"; - break; - /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ - case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): - au = "GOST12"; - break; - case SSL_aANY: - au = "any"; - break; - default: - au = "unknown"; - break; - } - - switch (alg_enc) { - case SSL_DES: - enc = "DES(56)"; - break; - case SSL_3DES: - enc = "3DES(168)"; - break; - case SSL_RC4: - enc = "RC4(128)"; - break; - case SSL_RC2: - enc = "RC2(128)"; - break; - case SSL_IDEA: - enc = "IDEA(128)"; - break; - case SSL_eNULL: - enc = "None"; - break; - case SSL_AES128: - enc = "AES(128)"; - break; - case SSL_AES256: - enc = "AES(256)"; - break; - case SSL_AES128GCM: - enc = "AESGCM(128)"; - break; - case SSL_AES256GCM: - enc = "AESGCM(256)"; - break; - case SSL_AES128CCM: - enc = "AESCCM(128)"; - break; - case SSL_AES256CCM: - enc = "AESCCM(256)"; - break; - case SSL_AES128CCM8: - enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; - break; - case SSL_AES256CCM8: - enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; - break; - case SSL_CAMELLIA128: - enc = "Camellia(128)"; - break; - case SSL_CAMELLIA256: - enc = "Camellia(256)"; - break; - case SSL_ARIA128GCM: - enc = "ARIAGCM(128)"; - break; - case SSL_ARIA256GCM: - enc = "ARIAGCM(256)"; - break; - case SSL_SEED: - enc = "SEED(128)"; - break; - case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: - case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: - enc = "GOST89(256)"; - break; - case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: - enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; - break; - default: - enc = "unknown"; - break; - } - - switch (alg_mac) { - case SSL_MD5: - mac = "MD5"; - break; - case SSL_SHA1: - mac = "SHA1"; - break; - case SSL_SHA256: - mac = "SHA256"; - break; - case SSL_SHA384: - mac = "SHA384"; - break; - case SSL_AEAD: - mac = "AEAD"; - break; - case SSL_GOST89MAC: - case SSL_GOST89MAC12: - mac = "GOST89"; - break; - case SSL_GOST94: - mac = "GOST94"; - break; - case SSL_GOST12_256: - case SSL_GOST12_512: - mac = "GOST2012"; - break; - default: - mac = "unknown"; - break; - } - - BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); - - return buf; -} - -const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - if (c == NULL) - return "(NONE)"; - - /* - * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS - * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". - */ - if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) - return "TLSv1.0"; - return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); -} - -/* return the actual cipher being used */ -const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - if (c != NULL) - return c->name; - return "(NONE)"; -} - -/* return the actual cipher being used in RFC standard name */ -const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - if (c != NULL) - return c->stdname; - return "(NONE)"; -} - -/* return the OpenSSL name based on given RFC standard name */ -const char *OPENSSL_cipher_name(const char *stdname) -{ - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - - if (stdname == NULL) - return "(NONE)"; - c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(stdname); - return SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); -} - -/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ -int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) -{ - int ret = 0; - - if (c != NULL) { - if (alg_bits != NULL) - *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; - ret = (int)c->strength_bits; - } - return ret; -} - -uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - return c->id; -} - -uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - return c->id & 0xFFFF; -} - -SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) -{ - SSL_COMP *ctmp; - int i, nn; - - if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) - return NULL; - nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); - for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { - ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); - if (ctmp->id == n) - return ctmp; - } - return NULL; -} - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) -{ - return NULL; -} - -STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) - *meths) -{ - return meths; -} - -int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) -{ - return 1; -} - -#else -STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) -{ - load_builtin_compressions(); - return ssl_comp_methods; -} - -STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) - *meths) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; - ssl_comp_methods = meths; - return old_meths; -} - -static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) -{ - OPENSSL_free(cm); -} - -void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; - ssl_comp_methods = NULL; - sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); -} - -int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) -{ - SSL_COMP *comp; - - if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) - return 1; - - /*- - * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the - * compression number ranges should be the following: - * - * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF - * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA - * 193 to 255: reserved for private use - */ - if (id < 193 || id > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, - SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); - return 1; - } - - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); - comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); - if (comp == NULL) { - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 1; - } - - comp->id = id; - comp->method = cm; - load_builtin_compressions(); - if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { - OPENSSL_free(comp); - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, - SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); - return 1; - } - if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { - OPENSSL_free(comp); - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 1; - } - CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); - return 0; -} -#endif - -const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; -#else - return NULL; -#endif -} - -const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - return comp->name; -#else - return NULL; -#endif -} - -int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - return comp->id; -#else - return -1; -#endif -} - -const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr, - int all) -{ - const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); - - if (c == NULL || (!all && c->valid == 0)) - return NULL; - return c; -} - -const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) -{ - return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); -} - -int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - int i; - if (c == NULL) - return NID_undef; - i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); - if (i == -1) - return NID_undef; - return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; -} - -int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); - - if (i == -1) - return NID_undef; - return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; -} - -int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); - - if (i == -1) - return NID_undef; - return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; -} - -int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); - - if (i == -1) - return NID_undef; - return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; -} - -const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; - - if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) - return NULL; - return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; -} - -int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) -{ - return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; -} - -int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead, - size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize, - size_t *ext_overhead) -{ - size_t mac = 0, in = 0, blk = 0, out = 0; - - /* Some hard-coded numbers for the CCM/Poly1305 MAC overhead - * because there are no handy #defines for those. */ - if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AESGCM | SSL_ARIAGCM)) { - out = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM)) { - out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 16; - } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) { - out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 8; - } else if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { - out = 16; - } else if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) { - /* We're supposed to have handled all the AEAD modes above */ - return 0; - } else { - /* Non-AEAD modes. Calculate MAC/cipher overhead separately */ - int digest_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(c); - const EVP_MD *e_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid); - - if (e_md == NULL) - return 0; - - mac = EVP_MD_size(e_md); - if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL) { - int cipher_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(c); - const EVP_CIPHER *e_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid); - - /* If it wasn't AEAD or SSL_eNULL, we expect it to be a - known CBC cipher. */ - if (e_ciph == NULL || - EVP_CIPHER_mode(e_ciph) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - return 0; - - in = 1; /* padding length byte */ - out = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(e_ciph); - blk = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(e_ciph); - } - } - - *mac_overhead = mac; - *int_overhead = in; - *blocksize = blk; - *ext_overhead = out; - - return 1; -} - -int ssl_cert_is_disabled(size_t idx) -{ - const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *cl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(idx); - - if (cl == NULL || (cl->amask & disabled_auth_mask) != 0) - return 1; - return 0; -} + return update_cipher_list(&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, + s->tls13_ciphersuites); + + return ret; +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, + const char *rule_str, + CERT *c) +{ + int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases, i; + uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack; + const char *rule_p; + CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; + const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; + + /* + * Return with error if nothing to do. + */ + if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) + return NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) + return NULL; +#endif + + /* + * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled + * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. + */ + + disabled_mkey = disabled_mkey_mask; + disabled_auth = disabled_auth_mask; + disabled_enc = disabled_enc_mask; + disabled_mac = disabled_mac_mask; + + /* + * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled + * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so + * it is used for allocation. + */ + num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); + + co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); + if (co_list == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; /* Failure */ + } + + ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, + disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, + disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); + + /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ + + /* + * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key + * exchange mechanisms. + * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the + * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client + * preference). + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, + -1, &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, + &head, &tail); + + /* + * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. + * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by + * strength. + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, + -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Low priority for MD5 */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* + * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain + * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but + * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move to the end */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, + &tail); + + /* + * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains + * in force within each class + */ + if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. + * TODO(openssl-team): is there an easier way to accomplish all this? + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, + &head, &tail); + + /* + * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: + * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. + * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous + * preference, i.e., + * 1) ECDHE > DHE + * 2) GCM > CHACHA + * 3) AES > rest + * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy + * + * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in + * reverse order of preference. + */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, + &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, + CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ + ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); + + /* + * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. + * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names + * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. + * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher + * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise + * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). + */ + num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); + num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; + ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); + if (ca_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; /* Failure */ + } + ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, + disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, + disabled_mac, head); + + /* + * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule + * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. + */ + ok = 1; + rule_p = rule_str; + if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, + &head, &tail, ca_list, c); + rule_p += 7; + if (*rule_p == ':') + rule_p++; + } + + if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) + ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); + + OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ + + if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error + * if we cannot get one. + */ + if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + return NULL; + } + + /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) { + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, + sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i))) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + return NULL; + } + } + + /* + * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added + * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). + */ + for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { + if (curr->active) { + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + return NULL; + } +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); +#endif + } + } + OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ + + if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, cipherstack)) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); + return NULL; + } + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); + *cipher_list = cipherstack; + + return cipherstack; +} + +char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) +{ + const char *ver; + const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; + uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; + static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; + + if (buf == NULL) { + len = 128; + if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_DESCRIPTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } else if (len < 128) { + return NULL; + } + + alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; + alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; + alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; + + ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); + + switch (alg_mkey) { + case SSL_kRSA: + kx = "RSA"; + break; + case SSL_kDHE: + kx = "DH"; + break; + case SSL_kECDHE: + kx = "ECDH"; + break; + case SSL_kPSK: + kx = "PSK"; + break; + case SSL_kRSAPSK: + kx = "RSAPSK"; + break; + case SSL_kECDHEPSK: + kx = "ECDHEPSK"; + break; + case SSL_kDHEPSK: + kx = "DHEPSK"; + break; + case SSL_kSRP: + kx = "SRP"; + break; + case SSL_kGOST: + kx = "GOST"; + break; + case SSL_kANY: + kx = "any"; + break; + default: + kx = "unknown"; + } + + switch (alg_auth) { + case SSL_aRSA: + au = "RSA"; + break; + case SSL_aDSS: + au = "DSS"; + break; + case SSL_aNULL: + au = "None"; + break; + case SSL_aECDSA: + au = "ECDSA"; + break; + case SSL_aPSK: + au = "PSK"; + break; + case SSL_aSRP: + au = "SRP"; + break; + case SSL_aGOST01: + au = "GOST01"; + break; + /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ + case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): + au = "GOST12"; + break; + case SSL_aANY: + au = "any"; + break; + default: + au = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_enc) { + case SSL_DES: + enc = "DES(56)"; + break; + case SSL_3DES: + enc = "3DES(168)"; + break; + case SSL_RC4: + enc = "RC4(128)"; + break; + case SSL_RC2: + enc = "RC2(128)"; + break; + case SSL_IDEA: + enc = "IDEA(128)"; + break; + case SSL_eNULL: + enc = "None"; + break; + case SSL_AES128: + enc = "AES(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256: + enc = "AES(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256GCM: + enc = "AESGCM(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128CCM: + enc = "AESCCM(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256CCM: + enc = "AESCCM(256)"; + break; + case SSL_AES128CCM8: + enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; + break; + case SSL_AES256CCM8: + enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA128: + enc = "Camellia(128)"; + break; + case SSL_CAMELLIA256: + enc = "Camellia(256)"; + break; + case SSL_ARIA128GCM: + enc = "ARIAGCM(128)"; + break; + case SSL_ARIA256GCM: + enc = "ARIAGCM(256)"; + break; + case SSL_SEED: + enc = "SEED(128)"; + break; + case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: + case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: + enc = "GOST89(256)"; + break; + case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: + enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; + break; + default: + enc = "unknown"; + break; + } + + switch (alg_mac) { + case SSL_MD5: + mac = "MD5"; + break; + case SSL_SHA1: + mac = "SHA1"; + break; + case SSL_SHA256: + mac = "SHA256"; + break; + case SSL_SHA384: + mac = "SHA384"; + break; + case SSL_AEAD: + mac = "AEAD"; + break; + case SSL_GOST89MAC: + case SSL_GOST89MAC12: + mac = "GOST89"; + break; + case SSL_GOST94: + mac = "GOST94"; + break; + case SSL_GOST12_256: + case SSL_GOST12_512: + mac = "GOST2012"; + break; + default: + mac = "unknown"; + break; + } + + BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); + + return buf; +} + +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + if (c == NULL) + return "(NONE)"; + + /* + * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS + * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". + */ + if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) + return "TLSv1.0"; + return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); +} + +/* return the actual cipher being used */ +const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + if (c != NULL) + return c->name; + return "(NONE)"; +} + +/* return the actual cipher being used in RFC standard name */ +const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + if (c != NULL) + return c->stdname; + return "(NONE)"; +} + +/* return the OpenSSL name based on given RFC standard name */ +const char *OPENSSL_cipher_name(const char *stdname) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + if (stdname == NULL) + return "(NONE)"; + c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(stdname); + return SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); +} + +/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ +int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (c != NULL) { + if (alg_bits != NULL) + *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; + ret = (int)c->strength_bits; + } + return ret; +} + +uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + return c->id; +} + +uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + return c->id & 0xFFFF; +} + +SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) +{ + SSL_COMP *ctmp; + int i, nn; + + if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) + return NULL; + nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); + for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { + ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); + if (ctmp->id == n) + return ctmp; + } + return NULL; +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) + *meths) +{ + return meths; +} + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) +{ + return 1; +} + +#else +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) +{ + load_builtin_compressions(); + return ssl_comp_methods; +} + +STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) + *meths) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; + ssl_comp_methods = meths; + return old_meths; +} + +static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) +{ + OPENSSL_free(cm); +} + +void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; + ssl_comp_methods = NULL; + sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); +} + +int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) +{ + SSL_COMP *comp; + + if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) + return 1; + + /*- + * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the + * compression number ranges should be the following: + * + * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF + * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA + * 193 to 255: reserved for private use + */ + if (id < 193 || id > 255) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, + SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); + return 1; + } + + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); + comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); + if (comp == NULL) { + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 1; + } + + comp->id = id; + comp->method = cm; + load_builtin_compressions(); + if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(comp); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, + SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); + return 1; + } + if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { + OPENSSL_free(comp); + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 1; + } + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); + return 0; +} +#endif + +const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + return comp->name; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + return comp->id; +#else + return -1; +#endif +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr, + int all) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); + + if (c == NULL || (!all && c->valid == 0)) + return NULL; + return c; +} + +const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) +{ + return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i; + if (c == NULL) + return NID_undef; + i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); + + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); + + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); + + if (i == -1) + return NID_undef; + return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; +} + +const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; + + if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) + return NULL; + return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; +} + +int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) +{ + return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; +} + +int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead, + size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize, + size_t *ext_overhead) +{ + size_t mac = 0, in = 0, blk = 0, out = 0; + + /* Some hard-coded numbers for the CCM/Poly1305 MAC overhead + * because there are no handy #defines for those. */ + if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AESGCM | SSL_ARIAGCM)) { + out = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM)) { + out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 16; + } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) { + out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 8; + } else if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { + out = 16; + } else if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) { + /* We're supposed to have handled all the AEAD modes above */ + return 0; + } else { + /* Non-AEAD modes. Calculate MAC/cipher overhead separately */ + int digest_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(c); + const EVP_MD *e_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid); + + if (e_md == NULL) + return 0; + + mac = EVP_MD_size(e_md); + if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL) { + int cipher_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(c); + const EVP_CIPHER *e_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid); + + /* If it wasn't AEAD or SSL_eNULL, we expect it to be a + known CBC cipher. */ + if (e_ciph == NULL || + EVP_CIPHER_mode(e_ciph) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + return 0; + + in = 1; /* padding length byte */ + out = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(e_ciph); + blk = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(e_ciph); + } + } + + *mac_overhead = mac; + *int_overhead = in; + *blocksize = blk; + *ext_overhead = out; + + return 1; +} + +int ssl_cert_is_disabled(size_t idx) +{ + const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *cl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(idx); + + if (cl == NULL || (cl->amask & disabled_auth_mask) != 0) + return 1; + return 0; +} |