Restoring authorship annotation for <deshevoy@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.

1 files changed, 723 insertions, 723 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 394e1180df..b2e0bd272b 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -1,731 +1,731 @@
-/*
+/* 
  * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- *
- * Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester,
- * for the EdelKey project.
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved. 
+ * 
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use 
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy 
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 
+ * 
+ * Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester, 
+ * for the EdelKey project. 
+ */ 
+ 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h" 
 # include "crypto/evp.h"
-# include <openssl/sha.h>
-# include <openssl/srp.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/buffer.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-
-# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
-# define MAX_LEN 2500
-
-/*
- * Note that SRP uses its own variant of base 64 encoding. A different base64
- * alphabet is used and no padding '=' characters are added. Instead we pad to
- * the front with 0 bytes and subsequently strip off leading encoded padding.
- * This variant is used for compatibility with other SRP implementations -
- * notably libsrp, but also others. It is also required for backwards
- * compatibility in order to load verifier files from other OpenSSL versions.
- */
-
-/*
- * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
- * Returns the length of the decoded data, or -1 on error.
- */
-static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
-{
-    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx;
-    int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
-    size_t size, padsize;
-    const unsigned char *pad = (const unsigned char *)"00";
-
-    while (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
-        ++src;
-    size = strlen(src);
-    padsize = 4 - (size & 3);
-    padsize &= 3;
-
-    /* Four bytes in src become three bytes output. */
-    if (size > INT_MAX || ((size + padsize) / 4) * 3 > alen)
-        return -1;
-
-    ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
-    if (ctx == NULL)
-        return -1;
-
-    /*
-     * This should never occur because 1 byte of data always requires 2 bytes of
-     * encoding, i.e.
-     *  0 bytes unencoded = 0 bytes encoded
-     *  1 byte unencoded  = 2 bytes encoded
-     *  2 bytes unencoded = 3 bytes encoded
-     *  3 bytes unencoded = 4 bytes encoded
-     *  4 bytes unencoded = 6 bytes encoded
-     *  etc
-     */
-    if (padsize == 3) {
-        outl = -1;
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Valid padsize values are now 0, 1 or 2 */
-
-    EVP_DecodeInit(ctx);
-    evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
-
-    /* Add any encoded padding that is required */
-    if (padsize != 0
-            && EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl, pad, padsize) < 0) {
-        outl = -1;
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl2, (const unsigned char *)src, size) < 0) {
-        outl = -1;
-        goto err;
-    }
-    outl += outl2;
-    EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, a + outl, &outl2);
-    outl += outl2;
-
-    /* Strip off the leading padding */
-    if (padsize != 0) {
-        if ((int)padsize >= outl) {
-            outl = -1;
-            goto err;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * If we added 1 byte of padding prior to encoding then we have 2 bytes
-         * of "real" data which gets spread across 4 encoded bytes like this:
-         *   (6 bits pad)(2 bits pad | 4 bits data)(6 bits data)(6 bits data)
-         * So 1 byte of pre-encoding padding results in 1 full byte of encoded
-         * padding.
-         * If we added 2 bytes of padding prior to encoding this gets encoded
-         * as:
-         *   (6 bits pad)(6 bits pad)(4 bits pad | 2 bits data)(6 bits data)
-         * So 2 bytes of pre-encoding padding results in 2 full bytes of encoded
-         * padding, i.e. we have to strip the same number of bytes of padding
-         * from the encoded data as we added to the pre-encoded data.
-         */
-        memmove(a, a + padsize, outl - padsize);
-        outl -= padsize;
-    }
-
- err:
-    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
-
-    return outl;
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
- * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
- */
-static int t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
-{
-    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
-    int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
-    unsigned char pad[2] = {0, 0};
-    size_t leadz = 0;
-
-    if (ctx == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
-    EVP_EncodeInit(ctx);
-    evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_NO_NEWLINES
-                                  | EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
-
-    /*
-     * We pad at the front with zero bytes until the length is a multiple of 3
-     * so that EVP_EncodeUpdate/EVP_EncodeFinal does not add any of its own "="
-     * padding
-     */
-    leadz = 3 - (size % 3);
-    if (leadz != 3
-            && !EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst, &outl, pad,
-                                 leadz)) {
-        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2, src,
-                          size)) {
-        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    outl += outl2;
-    EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2);
-    outl += outl2;
-
-    /* Strip the encoded padding at the front */
-    if (leadz != 3) {
-        memmove(dst, dst + leadz, outl - leadz);
-        dst[outl - leadz] = '\0';
-    }
-
-    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
-{
-    if (user_pwd == NULL)
-        return;
-    BN_free(user_pwd->s);
-    BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
-    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
-    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
-    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
-}
-
-static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
-{
-    SRP_user_pwd *ret;
-
-    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
-        /* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    ret->N = NULL;
-    ret->g = NULL;
-    ret->s = NULL;
-    ret->v = NULL;
-    ret->id = NULL;
-    ret->info = NULL;
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
-                                const BIGNUM *N)
-{
-    vinfo->N = N;
-    vinfo->g = g;
-}
-
-static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
-                                const char *info)
-{
-    if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id)))
-        return 0;
-    return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info)));
-}
-
-static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
-                               const char *v)
-{
-    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
-    int len;
-
-    vinfo->v = NULL;
-    vinfo->s = NULL;
-
-    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v);
-    if (len < 0)
-        return 0;
-    if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
-        return 0;
-    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s);
-    if (len < 0)
-        goto err;
-    vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
-    if (vinfo->s == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    return 1;
- err:
-    BN_free(vinfo->v);
-    vinfo->v = NULL;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
-{
-    vinfo->v = v;
-    vinfo->s = s;
-    return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
-}
-
-static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
-{
-    SRP_user_pwd *ret;
-
-    if (src == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N);
-    if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info)
-        || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) {
-            SRP_user_pwd_free(ret);
-            return NULL;
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-
-SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
-{
-    SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb));
-
-    if (vb == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL
-        || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_free(vb);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    vb->default_g = NULL;
-    vb->default_N = NULL;
-    vb->seed_key = NULL;
-    if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
-        sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
-        sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
-        OPENSSL_free(vb);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    return vb;
-}
-
-void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
-{
-    if (!vb)
-        return;
-    sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
-    sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
-    OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
-    OPENSSL_free(vb);
-}
-
-static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
-{
-    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
-    int len;
-    SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN));
-
-    if (newgN == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch);
-    if (len < 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
-        return newgN;
-
-    OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
- err:
-    OPENSSL_free(newgN);
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
-{
-    if (gN_cache == NULL)
-        return;
-    OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
-    BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
-    OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
-}
-
-static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
-{
-    int i;
-
-    SRP_gN *gN;
-    if (gN_tab != NULL)
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) {
-            gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
-            if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0))
-                return gN;
-        }
-
-    return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
-{
-    int i;
-    if (gN_cache == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    /* search if we have already one... */
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
-        SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
-        if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0)
-            return cache->bn;
-    }
-    {                           /* it is the first time that we find it */
-        SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
-        if (newgN) {
-            if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0)
-                return newgN->bn;
-            SRP_gN_free(newgN);
-        }
-    }
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * this function parses verifier file. Format is:
- * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
- * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
- */
-
-int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
-{
-    int error_code;
-    STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
-    char *last_index = NULL;
-    int i;
-    char **pp;
-
-    SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
-    SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
-
-    TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
-    BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-
-    error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
-
-    if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
-
-    if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
-
-    if (vb->seed_key) {
-        last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
-        pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
-        if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
-            /*
-             * we add this couple in the internal Stack
-             */
-
-            if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL)
-                goto err;
-
-            if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL
-                || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
-                        == NULL
-                || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
-                        == NULL
-                || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
-                goto err;
-
-            gN = NULL;
-
-            if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
-                last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
-            }
-        } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
-            /* it is a user .... */
-            const SRP_gN *lgN;
-
-            if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
-                error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
-                if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-
-                SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
-                if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
-                    (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
-                    goto err;
-
-                error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
-                if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
-                    (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
-                    goto err;
-
-                if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
-                    goto err;
-                user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (last_index != NULL) {
-        /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
-
-        if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
-            error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
-            goto err;
-        }
-        vb->default_g = gN->g;
-        vb->default_N = gN->N;
-        gN = NULL;
-    }
-    error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
-
- err:
-    /*
-     * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
-     * terminates most likely
-     */
-
-    if (gN != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
-        OPENSSL_free(gN);
-    }
-
-    SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
-
-    TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
-    BIO_free_all(in);
-
-    sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
-
-    return error_code;
-
-}
-
-static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
-{
-    int i;
-    SRP_user_pwd *user;
-
-    if (vb == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
-        user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
-        if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
-            return user;
-    }
-
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-/*
- * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead.
- * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
- * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
- * In other words, caller must not free the result.
- */
-SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
-{
-    return find_user(vb, username);
-}
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
- * In other words, caller must free the result once done.
- */
-SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
-{
-    SRP_user_pwd *user;
-    unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-    unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-    EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL;
-
-    if (vb == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL)
-        return srp_user_pwd_dup(user);
-
-    if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
-        (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
-        return NULL;
-
-/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
-
-    if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-
-    SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N);
-
-    if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (RAND_priv_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
-        goto err;
-    ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    if (ctxt == NULL
-        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key))
-        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username))
-        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL))
-        goto err;
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
-    ctxt = NULL;
-    if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user,
-                               BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
-                               BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
-        return user;
-
- err:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
-    SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
- */
-char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
-                          char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
-{
-    int len;
-    char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
-    const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL;
-    BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
-    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
-    unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
-    char *defgNid = NULL;
-    int vfsize = 0;
-
-    if ((user == NULL) ||
-        (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (N) {
-        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
-            goto err;
-        N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
-        if (N_bn_alloc == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
-        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
-            goto err;
-        g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
-        if (g_bn_alloc == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
-        defgNid = "*";
-    } else {
-        SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
-        if (gN == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        N_bn = gN->N;
-        g_bn = gN->g;
-        defgNid = gN->id;
-    }
-
-    if (*salt == NULL) {
-        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
-    } else {
-        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0)
-            goto err;
-        s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
-    }
-    if (s == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_bn2bin(v, tmp) < 0)
-        goto err;
-    vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
-    if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
-        goto err;
-    if (!t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (*salt == NULL) {
-        char *tmp_salt;
-
-        if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
-            goto err;
-        }
-        if (!t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN)) {
-            OPENSSL_free(tmp_salt);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        *salt = tmp_salt;
-    }
-
-    *verifier = vf;
-    vf = NULL;
-    result = defgNid;
-
- err:
-    BN_free(N_bn_alloc);
-    BN_free(g_bn_alloc);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
-    BN_clear_free(s);
-    BN_clear_free(v);
-    return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
- * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
- * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
- * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
- * random salt.
- * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
- * BIGNUMS.
- */
-int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
-                           BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
-                           const BIGNUM *g)
-{
-    int result = 0;
-    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-    unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+# include <openssl/sha.h> 
+# include <openssl/srp.h> 
+# include <openssl/evp.h> 
+# include <openssl/buffer.h> 
+# include <openssl/rand.h> 
+# include <openssl/txt_db.h> 
+# include <openssl/err.h> 
+ 
+# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20 
+# define MAX_LEN 2500 
+ 
+/* 
+ * Note that SRP uses its own variant of base 64 encoding. A different base64 
+ * alphabet is used and no padding '=' characters are added. Instead we pad to 
+ * the front with 0 bytes and subsequently strip off leading encoded padding. 
+ * This variant is used for compatibility with other SRP implementations - 
+ * notably libsrp, but also others. It is also required for backwards 
+ * compatibility in order to load verifier files from other OpenSSL versions. 
+ */ 
+ 
+/* 
+ * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation. 
+ * Returns the length of the decoded data, or -1 on error. 
+ */ 
+static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src) 
+{ 
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx; 
+    int outl = 0, outl2 = 0; 
+    size_t size, padsize; 
+    const unsigned char *pad = (const unsigned char *)"00"; 
+ 
+    while (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n') 
+        ++src; 
+    size = strlen(src); 
+    padsize = 4 - (size & 3); 
+    padsize &= 3; 
+ 
+    /* Four bytes in src become three bytes output. */ 
+    if (size > INT_MAX || ((size + padsize) / 4) * 3 > alen) 
+        return -1; 
+ 
+    ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); 
+    if (ctx == NULL) 
+        return -1; 
+ 
+    /* 
+     * This should never occur because 1 byte of data always requires 2 bytes of 
+     * encoding, i.e. 
+     *  0 bytes unencoded = 0 bytes encoded 
+     *  1 byte unencoded  = 2 bytes encoded 
+     *  2 bytes unencoded = 3 bytes encoded 
+     *  3 bytes unencoded = 4 bytes encoded 
+     *  4 bytes unencoded = 6 bytes encoded 
+     *  etc 
+     */ 
+    if (padsize == 3) { 
+        outl = -1; 
+        goto err; 
+    } 
+ 
+    /* Valid padsize values are now 0, 1 or 2 */ 
+ 
+    EVP_DecodeInit(ctx); 
+    evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET); 
+ 
+    /* Add any encoded padding that is required */ 
+    if (padsize != 0 
+            && EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl, pad, padsize) < 0) { 
+        outl = -1; 
+        goto err; 
+    } 
+    if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl2, (const unsigned char *)src, size) < 0) { 
+        outl = -1; 
+        goto err; 
+    } 
+    outl += outl2; 
+    EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, a + outl, &outl2); 
+    outl += outl2; 
+ 
+    /* Strip off the leading padding */ 
+    if (padsize != 0) { 
+        if ((int)padsize >= outl) { 
+            outl = -1; 
+            goto err; 
+        } 
+ 
+        /* 
+         * If we added 1 byte of padding prior to encoding then we have 2 bytes 
+         * of "real" data which gets spread across 4 encoded bytes like this: 
+         *   (6 bits pad)(2 bits pad | 4 bits data)(6 bits data)(6 bits data) 
+         * So 1 byte of pre-encoding padding results in 1 full byte of encoded 
+         * padding. 
+         * If we added 2 bytes of padding prior to encoding this gets encoded 
+         * as: 
+         *   (6 bits pad)(6 bits pad)(4 bits pad | 2 bits data)(6 bits data) 
+         * So 2 bytes of pre-encoding padding results in 2 full bytes of encoded 
+         * padding, i.e. we have to strip the same number of bytes of padding 
+         * from the encoded data as we added to the pre-encoded data. 
+         */ 
+        memmove(a, a + padsize, outl - padsize); 
+        outl -= padsize; 
+    } 
+ 
+ err: 
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); 
+ 
+    return outl; 
+} 
+ 
+/* 
+ * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string. 
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. 
+ */ 
+static int t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size) 
+{ 
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); 
+    int outl = 0, outl2 = 0; 
+    unsigned char pad[2] = {0, 0}; 
+    size_t leadz = 0; 
+ 
+    if (ctx == NULL) 
+        return 0; 
+ 
+    EVP_EncodeInit(ctx); 
+    evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_NO_NEWLINES 
+                                  | EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET); 
+ 
+    /* 
+     * We pad at the front with zero bytes until the length is a multiple of 3 
+     * so that EVP_EncodeUpdate/EVP_EncodeFinal does not add any of its own "=" 
+     * padding 
+     */ 
+    leadz = 3 - (size % 3); 
+    if (leadz != 3 
+            && !EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst, &outl, pad, 
+                                 leadz)) { 
+        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); 
+        return 0; 
+    } 
+ 
+    if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2, src, 
+                          size)) { 
+        EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); 
+        return 0; 
+    } 
+    outl += outl2; 
+    EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2); 
+    outl += outl2; 
+ 
+    /* Strip the encoded padding at the front */ 
+    if (leadz != 3) { 
+        memmove(dst, dst + leadz, outl - leadz); 
+        dst[outl - leadz] = '\0'; 
+    } 
+ 
+    EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); 
+    return 1; 
+} 
+ 
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd) 
+{ 
+    if (user_pwd == NULL) 
+        return; 
+    BN_free(user_pwd->s); 
+    BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v); 
+    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id); 
+    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info); 
+    OPENSSL_free(user_pwd); 
+} 
+ 
+static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void) 
+{ 
+    SRP_user_pwd *ret; 
+ 
+    if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { 
+        /* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/ 
+        return NULL; 
+    } 
+    ret->N = NULL; 
+    ret->g = NULL; 
+    ret->s = NULL; 
+    ret->v = NULL; 
+    ret->id = NULL; 
+    ret->info = NULL; 
+    return ret; 
+} 
+ 
+static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g, 
+                                const BIGNUM *N) 
+{ 
+    vinfo->N = N; 
+    vinfo->g = g; 
+} 
+ 
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id, 
+                                const char *info) 
+{ 
+    if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id))) 
+        return 0; 
+    return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info))); 
+} 
+ 
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s, 
+                               const char *v) 
+{ 
+    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; 
+    int len; 
+ 
+    vinfo->v = NULL; 
+    vinfo->s = NULL; 
+ 
+    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v); 
+    if (len < 0) 
+        return 0; 
+    if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL))) 
+        return 0; 
+    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s); 
+    if (len < 0) 
+        goto err; 
+    vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); 
+    if (vinfo->s == NULL) 
+        goto err; 
+    return 1; 
+ err: 
+    BN_free(vinfo->v); 
+    vinfo->v = NULL; 
+    return 0; 
+} 
+ 
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v) 
+{ 
+    vinfo->v = v; 
+    vinfo->s = s; 
+    return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL); 
+} 
+ 
+static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src) 
+{ 
+    SRP_user_pwd *ret; 
+ 
+    if (src == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+    if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N); 
+    if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info) 
+        || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) { 
+            SRP_user_pwd_free(ret); 
+            return NULL; 
+    } 
+    return ret; 
+} 
+ 
+SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key) 
+{ 
+    SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb)); 
+ 
+    if (vb == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+    if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL 
+        || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) { 
+        OPENSSL_free(vb); 
+        return NULL; 
+    } 
+    vb->default_g = NULL; 
+    vb->default_N = NULL; 
+    vb->seed_key = NULL; 
+    if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) { 
+        sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd); 
+        sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache); 
+        OPENSSL_free(vb); 
+        return NULL; 
+    } 
+    return vb; 
+} 
+ 
+void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb) 
+{ 
+    if (!vb) 
+        return; 
+    sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free); 
+    sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache); 
+    OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key); 
+    OPENSSL_free(vb); 
+} 
+ 
+static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch) 
+{ 
+    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; 
+    int len; 
+    SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN)); 
+ 
+    if (newgN == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch); 
+    if (len < 0) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL))) 
+        return newgN; 
+ 
+    OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn); 
+ err: 
+    OPENSSL_free(newgN); 
+    return NULL; 
+} 
+ 
+static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache) 
+{ 
+    if (gN_cache == NULL) 
+        return; 
+    OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn); 
+    BN_free(gN_cache->bn); 
+    OPENSSL_free(gN_cache); 
+} 
+ 
+static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab) 
+{ 
+    int i; 
+ 
+    SRP_gN *gN; 
+    if (gN_tab != NULL) 
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) { 
+            gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i); 
+            if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0)) 
+                return gN; 
+        } 
+ 
+    return SRP_get_default_gN(id); 
+} 
+ 
+static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch) 
+{ 
+    int i; 
+    if (gN_cache == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    /* search if we have already one... */ 
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) { 
+        SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i); 
+        if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0) 
+            return cache->bn; 
+    } 
+    {                           /* it is the first time that we find it */ 
+        SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch); 
+        if (newgN) { 
+            if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0) 
+                return newgN->bn; 
+            SRP_gN_free(newgN); 
+        } 
+    } 
+    return NULL; 
+} 
+ 
+/* 
+ * this function parses verifier file. Format is: 
+ * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0 
+ * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index) 
+ */ 
+ 
+int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file) 
+{ 
+    int error_code; 
+    STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null(); 
+    char *last_index = NULL; 
+    int i; 
+    char **pp; 
+ 
+    SRP_gN *gN = NULL; 
+    SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL; 
+ 
+    TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL; 
+    BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); 
+ 
+    error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE; 
+ 
+    if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE; 
+ 
+    if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY; 
+ 
+    if (vb->seed_key) { 
+        last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id; 
+    } 
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) { 
+        pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i); 
+        if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) { 
+            /* 
+             * we add this couple in the internal Stack 
+             */ 
+ 
+            if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL) 
+                goto err; 
+ 
+            if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL 
+                || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier])) 
+                        == NULL 
+                || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt])) 
+                        == NULL 
+                || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0) 
+                goto err; 
+ 
+            gN = NULL; 
+ 
+            if (vb->seed_key != NULL) { 
+                last_index = pp[DB_srpid]; 
+            } 
+        } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) { 
+            /* it is a user .... */ 
+            const SRP_gN *lgN; 
+ 
+            if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) { 
+                error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY; 
+                if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) 
+                    goto err; 
+ 
+                SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N); 
+                if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids 
+                    (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo])) 
+                    goto err; 
+ 
+                error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB; 
+                if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv 
+                    (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier])) 
+                    goto err; 
+ 
+                if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0) 
+                    goto err; 
+                user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */ 
+            } 
+        } 
+    } 
+ 
+    if (last_index != NULL) { 
+        /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */ 
+ 
+        if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) { 
+            error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB; 
+            goto err; 
+        } 
+        vb->default_g = gN->g; 
+        vb->default_N = gN->N; 
+        gN = NULL; 
+    } 
+    error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR; 
+ 
+ err: 
+    /* 
+     * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application 
+     * terminates most likely 
+     */ 
+ 
+    if (gN != NULL) { 
+        OPENSSL_free(gN->id); 
+        OPENSSL_free(gN); 
+    } 
+ 
+    SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd); 
+ 
+    TXT_DB_free(tmpdb); 
+    BIO_free_all(in); 
+ 
+    sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab); 
+ 
+    return error_code; 
+ 
+} 
+ 
+static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) 
+{ 
+    int i; 
+    SRP_user_pwd *user; 
+ 
+    if (vb == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) { 
+        user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i); 
+        if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0) 
+            return user; 
+    } 
+ 
+    return NULL; 
+} 
+ 
+# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L 
+/* 
+ * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. 
+ * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. 
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller. 
+ * In other words, caller must not free the result. 
+ */ 
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) 
+{ 
+    return find_user(vb, username); 
+} 
+# endif 
+ 
+/* 
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller. 
+ * In other words, caller must free the result once done. 
+ */ 
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) 
+{ 
+    SRP_user_pwd *user; 
+    unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 
+    unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL; 
+ 
+    if (vb == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL) 
+        return srp_user_pwd_dup(user); 
+ 
+    if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) || 
+        (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL)) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */ 
+ 
+    if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N); 
+ 
+    if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL)) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if (RAND_priv_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) 
+        goto err; 
+    ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 
+    if (ctxt == NULL 
+        || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL) 
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key)) 
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username)) 
+        || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL)) 
+        goto err; 
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); 
+    ctxt = NULL; 
+    if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user, 
+                               BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL), 
+                               BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL))) 
+        return user; 
+ 
+ err: 
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); 
+    SRP_user_pwd_free(user); 
+    return NULL; 
+} 
+ 
+/* 
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64) 
+ */ 
+char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, 
+                          char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g) 
+{ 
+    int len; 
+    char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL; 
+    const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL; 
+    BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL; 
+    unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; 
+    unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; 
+    char *defgNid = NULL; 
+    int vfsize = 0; 
+ 
+    if ((user == NULL) || 
+        (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL)) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if (N) { 
+        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0) 
+            goto err; 
+        N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); 
+        if (N_bn_alloc == NULL) 
+            goto err; 
+        N_bn = N_bn_alloc; 
+        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0) 
+            goto err; 
+        g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); 
+        if (g_bn_alloc == NULL) 
+            goto err; 
+        g_bn = g_bn_alloc; 
+        defgNid = "*"; 
+    } else { 
+        SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL); 
+        if (gN == NULL) 
+            goto err; 
+        N_bn = gN->N; 
+        g_bn = gN->g; 
+        defgNid = gN->id; 
+    } 
+ 
+    if (*salt == NULL) { 
+        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) 
+            goto err; 
+ 
+        s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); 
+    } else { 
+        if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0) 
+            goto err; 
+        s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL); 
+    } 
+    if (s == NULL) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn)) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if (BN_bn2bin(v, tmp) < 0) 
+        goto err; 
+    vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2; 
+    if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL)) 
+        goto err; 
+    if (!t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v))) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if (*salt == NULL) { 
+        char *tmp_salt; 
+ 
+        if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) { 
+            goto err; 
+        } 
+        if (!t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN)) { 
+            OPENSSL_free(tmp_salt); 
+            goto err; 
+        } 
+        *salt = tmp_salt; 
+    } 
+ 
+    *verifier = vf; 
+    vf = NULL; 
+    result = defgNid; 
+ 
+ err: 
+    BN_free(N_bn_alloc); 
+    BN_free(g_bn_alloc); 
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize); 
+    BN_clear_free(s); 
+    BN_clear_free(v); 
+    return result; 
+} 
+ 
+/* 
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL 
+ * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point 
+ * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not 
+ * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a 
+ * random salt. 
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier 
+ * BIGNUMS. 
+ */ 
+int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, 
+                           BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N, 
+                           const BIGNUM *g) 
+{ 
+    int result = 0; 
+    BIGNUM *x = NULL; 
+    BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 
+    unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; 
     BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL, *verif;
-
-    if ((user == NULL) ||
-        (pass == NULL) ||
-        (salt == NULL) ||
-        (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (*salt == NULL) {
-        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
-        if (salttmp == NULL)
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        salttmp = *salt;
-    }
-
-    x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
-    if (x == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
+ 
+    if ((user == NULL) || 
+        (pass == NULL) || 
+        (salt == NULL) || 
+        (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    if (*salt == NULL) { 
+        if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) 
+            goto err; 
+ 
+        salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); 
+        if (salttmp == NULL) 
+            goto err; 
+    } else { 
+        salttmp = *salt; 
+    } 
+ 
+    x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass); 
+    if (x == NULL) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
     verif = BN_new();
     if (verif == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
+        goto err; 
+ 
     if (!BN_mod_exp(verif, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) {
         BN_clear_free(verif);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    result = 1;
-    *salt = salttmp;
+        goto err; 
+    } 
+ 
+    result = 1; 
+    *salt = salttmp; 
     *verifier = verif;
-
- err:
-    if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp)
-        BN_clear_free(salttmp);
-    BN_clear_free(x);
-    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-    return result;
-}
-
-#endif
+ 
+ err: 
+    if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp) 
+        BN_clear_free(salttmp); 
+    BN_clear_free(x); 
+    BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 
+    return result; 
+} 
+ 
+#endif