intermediate changes

ref:ca7a95e8c9a9d780f96497136a152091d54e61b5

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 313 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 302360a964..0000000000
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
-
-/*
- * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL:
- * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security
- * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new
- * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern,
- * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL:
- * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements
- * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of
- * one-wayness.  For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion.
- */
-
-#include "internal/constant_time.h"
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include "rsa_local.h"
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-                               const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-                               const unsigned char *param, int plen)
-{
-    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
-                                           param, plen, NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-                                    const unsigned char *param, int plen,
-                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
-{
-    int rv = 0;
-    int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
-    unsigned char *db, *seed;
-    unsigned char *dbmask = NULL;
-    unsigned char seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    int mdlen, dbmask_len = 0;
-
-    if (md == NULL)
-        md = EVP_sha1();
-    if (mgf1md == NULL)
-        mgf1md = md;
-
-    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
-    if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-               RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    to[0] = 0;
-    seed = to + 1;
-    db = to + mdlen + 1;
-
-    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
-        goto err;
-    memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
-    db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
-    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
-    if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    dbmask_len = emlen - mdlen;
-    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(dbmask_len);
-    if (dbmask == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, dbmask_len, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
-        goto err;
-    for (i = 0; i < dbmask_len; i++)
-        db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
-
-    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, dbmask_len, mgf1md) < 0)
-        goto err;
-    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
-        seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
-    rv = 1;
-
- err:
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(seedmask, sizeof(seedmask));
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(dbmask, dbmask_len);
-    return rv;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-                                 const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
-                                 const unsigned char *param, int plen)
-{
-    return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num,
-                                             param, plen, NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-                                      const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-                                      int num, const unsigned char *param,
-                                      int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
-                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
-{
-    int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
-    unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
-    const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
-    /*
-     * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
-     * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB
-     */
-    unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
-        phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    int mdlen;
-
-    if (md == NULL)
-        md = EVP_sha1();
-    if (mgf1md == NULL)
-        mgf1md = md;
-
-    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
-    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
-        return -1;
-    /*
-     * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
-     * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
-     * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-     * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
-     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
-     * This does not leak any side-channel information.
-     */
-    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-               RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
-    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
-    if (db == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (em == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
-     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
-     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
-     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
-     */
-    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
-        flen -= 1 & mask;
-        from -= 1 & mask;
-        *--em = *from & mask;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
-     * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
-     * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
-     */
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
-
-    maskedseed = em + 1;
-    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
-
-    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
-        goto cleanup;
-    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
-        seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
-
-    if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
-        goto cleanup;
-    for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
-        db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
-
-    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
-        goto cleanup;
-
-    good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));
-
-    found_one_byte = 0;
-    for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {
-        /*
-         * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.
-         */
-        unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
-        one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
-                                             i, one_index);
-        found_one_byte |= equals1;
-        good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
-    }
-
-    good &= found_one_byte;
-
-    /*
-     * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
-     * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
-     * concern.
-     */
-    msg_index = one_index + 1;
-    mlen = dblen - msg_index;
-
-    /*
-     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
-     */
-    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
-
-    /*
-     * Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left.
-     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|.
-     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
-     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
-     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
-     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
-     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
-     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
-     */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
-                                    dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
-    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) {
-        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0);
-        for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++)
-            db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]);
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
-     * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
-     */
-    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
-           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
-    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
- cleanup:
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
-
-    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
-}
-
-int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
-               const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
-{
-    long i, outlen = 0;
-    unsigned char cnt[4];
-    EVP_MD_CTX *c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    int mdlen;
-    int rv = -1;
-
-    if (c == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
-    if (mdlen < 0)
-        goto err;
-    for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) {
-        cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
-        cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
-        cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
-        cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
-        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, dgst, NULL)
-            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, seed, seedlen)
-            || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, cnt, 4))
-            goto err;
-        if (outlen + mdlen <= len) {
-            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, mask + outlen, NULL))
-                goto err;
-            outlen += mdlen;
-        } else {
-            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, md, NULL))
-                goto err;
-            memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
-            outlen = len;
-        }
-    }
-    rv = 0;
- err:
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(md, sizeof(md));
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
-    return rv;
-}