Restoring authorship annotation for <deshevoy@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.

1 files changed, 311 insertions, 311 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 229ce864a3..3a03f993c3 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -1,314 +1,314 @@
-/*
+/* 
  * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-# include <unixio.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
+ * 
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use 
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy 
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 
+ */ 
+ 
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h" 
+ 
+#include <errno.h> 
+#include <stdio.h> 
+#include <stdlib.h> 
+#include <string.h> 
+ 
+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 
+#include <openssl/rand.h> 
+#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h> 
+#include <openssl/buffer.h> 
+ 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS 
+# include <unixio.h> 
+#endif 
+#include <sys/types.h> 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO 
+# include <sys/stat.h> 
+# include <fcntl.h> 
 # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
-#  include <windows.h>
-#  include <io.h>
-#  define stat    _stat
-#  define chmod   _chmod
-#  define open    _open
-#  define fdopen  _fdopen
-#  define fstat   _fstat
-#  define fileno  _fileno
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
- * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
- * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
- * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
- * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
- */
-# if !defined(S_ISREG)
-#   define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG)
-# endif
-
-#define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024
-#define RFILE ".rnd"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-/*
- * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
- * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what.  We know that
- * stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
- *
- * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
- * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
- */
-static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
-        (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
-# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \
-        "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
-# define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
- * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c  If |bytes| is
- * -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount.
- */
-int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
-{
-    /*
-     * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount
-     * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose
-     * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such
-     * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk
-     * (unless it's the only one).
-     */
-#define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH)
-    unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE];
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
-    struct stat sb;
-#endif
-    int i, n, ret = 0;
-    FILE *in;
-
-    if (bytes == 0)
-        return 0;
-
-    if ((in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb")) == NULL) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE);
-        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
-    if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
-        fclose(in);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (bytes < 0) {
-        if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
-            bytes = sb.st_size;
-        else
-            bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH;
-    }
-#endif
-    /*
-     * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
-     * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
-     * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer
-     * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning
-     * temporarily.
-     */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
-# pragma environment save
-# pragma message disable maylosedata2
-#endif
-    /*
-     * Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have
-     * no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its
-     * contents lying around?
-     */
-    setbuf(in, NULL);
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
-# pragma environment restore
-#endif
-
-    for ( ; ; ) {
-        if (bytes > 0)
-            n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE;
-        else
-            n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE;
-        i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
-#ifdef EINTR
-        if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){
-            clearerr(in);
-            if (i == 0)
-                continue;
-        }
-#endif
-        if (i == 0)
-            break;
-
-        RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
-        ret += i;
-
-        /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */
-        if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0)
-            break;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
-    fclose(in);
-    if (!RAND_status()) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
-        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
-{
-    unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE];
-    int ret = -1;
-    FILE *out = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
-    struct stat sb;
-
-    if (stat(file, &sb) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE);
-        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
-        return -1;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /* Collect enough random data. */
-    if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)) != 1)
-        return  -1;
-
-#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \
-    !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
-    {
-# ifndef O_BINARY
-#  define O_BINARY 0
-# endif
-        /*
-         * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
-         * should be restrictive from the start
-         */
-        int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
-        if (fd != -1)
-            out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
-    }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-    /*
-     * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
-     * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
-     * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
-     * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
-     * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
-     * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
-     * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
-     * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
-     * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
-     * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
-     * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
-     * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
-     * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
-     * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
-     * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
-     */
-    out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+");
-#endif
-
-    if (out == NULL)
-        out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb");
-    if (out == NULL) {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE);
-        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
-    /*
-     * Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing.
-     */
-    chmod(file, 0600);
-#endif
-
-    ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out);
-    fclose(out);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-    char *s = NULL;
-    size_t len;
-    int use_randfile = 1;
-
+#  include <windows.h> 
+#  include <io.h> 
+#  define stat    _stat 
+#  define chmod   _chmod 
+#  define open    _open 
+#  define fdopen  _fdopen 
+#  define fstat   _fstat 
+#  define fileno  _fileno 
+# endif 
+#endif 
+ 
+/* 
+ * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter 
+ * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally 
+ * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they 
+ * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability 
+ * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback... 
+ */ 
+# if !defined(S_ISREG) 
+#   define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG) 
+# endif 
+ 
+#define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024 
+#define RFILE ".rnd" 
+ 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS 
+/* 
+ * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically) 
+ * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what.  We know that 
+ * stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it). 
+ * 
+ * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for 
+ * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89 
+ */ 
+static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = 
+        (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; 
+# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \ 
+        "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" 
+# define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS) 
+#endif 
+ 
+/* 
+ * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy 
+ * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c  If |bytes| is 
+ * -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount. 
+ */ 
+int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) 
+{ 
+    /* 
+     * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount 
+     * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose 
+     * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such 
+     * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk 
+     * (unless it's the only one). 
+     */ 
+#define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH) 
+    unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE]; 
+ 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO 
+    struct stat sb; 
+#endif 
+    int i, n, ret = 0; 
+    FILE *in; 
+ 
+    if (bytes == 0) 
+        return 0; 
+ 
+    if ((in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb")) == NULL) { 
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE); 
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); 
+        return -1; 
+    } 
+ 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO 
+    if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) { 
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); 
+        fclose(in); 
+        return -1; 
+    } 
+ 
+    if (bytes < 0) { 
+        if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) 
+            bytes = sb.st_size; 
+        else 
+            bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH; 
+    } 
+#endif 
+    /* 
+     * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation 
+     * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. 
+     * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer 
+     * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning 
+     * temporarily. 
+     */ 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) 
+# pragma environment save 
+# pragma message disable maylosedata2 
+#endif 
+    /* 
+     * Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have 
+     * no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its 
+     * contents lying around? 
+     */ 
+    setbuf(in, NULL); 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) 
+# pragma environment restore 
+#endif 
+ 
+    for ( ; ; ) { 
+        if (bytes > 0) 
+            n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE; 
+        else 
+            n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE; 
+        i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); 
+#ifdef EINTR 
+        if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){ 
+            clearerr(in); 
+            if (i == 0) 
+                continue; 
+        } 
+#endif 
+        if (i == 0) 
+            break; 
+ 
+        RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i); 
+        ret += i; 
+ 
+        /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */ 
+        if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0) 
+            break; 
+    } 
+ 
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); 
+    fclose(in); 
+    if (!RAND_status()) { 
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); 
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); 
+        return -1; 
+    } 
+ 
+    return ret; 
+} 
+ 
+int RAND_write_file(const char *file) 
+{ 
+    unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE]; 
+    int ret = -1; 
+    FILE *out = NULL; 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO 
+    struct stat sb; 
+ 
+    if (stat(file, &sb) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { 
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE); 
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); 
+        return -1; 
+    } 
+#endif 
+ 
+    /* Collect enough random data. */ 
+    if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)) != 1) 
+        return  -1; 
+ 
+#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \ 
+    !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) 
+    { 
+# ifndef O_BINARY 
+#  define O_BINARY 0 
+# endif 
+        /* 
+         * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions 
+         * should be restrictive from the start 
+         */ 
+        int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); 
+        if (fd != -1) 
+            out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); 
+    } 
+#endif 
+ 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS 
+    /* 
+     * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of 
+     * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all 
+     * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version 
+     * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race 
+     * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help 
+     * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares 
+     * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be 
+     * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code 
+     * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete 
+     * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop 
+     * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The 
+     * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid 
+     * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the 
+     * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent 
+     * rand file in a concurrent use situation. 
+     */ 
+    out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+"); 
+#endif 
+ 
+    if (out == NULL) 
+        out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb"); 
+    if (out == NULL) { 
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE); 
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file); 
+        return -1; 
+    } 
+ 
+#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) 
+    /* 
+     * Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing. 
+     */ 
+    chmod(file, 0600); 
+#endif 
+ 
+    ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out); 
+    fclose(out); 
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE); 
+    return ret; 
+} 
+ 
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) 
+{ 
+    char *s = NULL; 
+    size_t len; 
+    int use_randfile = 1; 
+ 
 #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
-    DWORD envlen;
-    WCHAR *var;
-
-    /* Look up various environment variables. */
-    if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"RANDFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) {
-        use_randfile = 0;
-        if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"HOME", NULL, 0)) == 0
-                && (envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"USERPROFILE",
-                                                  NULL, 0)) == 0)
-            envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"SYSTEMROOT", NULL, 0);
-    }
-
-    /* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */
-    if (envlen != 0) {
-        int sz;
-        WCHAR *val = _alloca(envlen * sizeof(WCHAR));
-
-        if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, envlen) < envlen
-                && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0,
-                                             NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
-            s = _alloca(sz);
-            if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz,
-                                    NULL, NULL) == 0)
-                s = NULL;
-        }
-    }
-#else
-    if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') {
-        use_randfile = 0;
-        s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME");
-    }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
-    if (!use_randfile && s == NULL)
-        s = DEFAULT_HOME;
-#endif
-    if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
-        return NULL;
-
-    len = strlen(s);
-    if (use_randfile) {
-        if (len + 1 >= size)
-            return NULL;
-        strcpy(buf, s);
-    } else {
-        if (len + 1 + strlen(RFILE) + 1 >= size)
-            return NULL;
-        strcpy(buf, s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-        strcat(buf, "/");
-#endif
-        strcat(buf, RFILE);
-    }
-
-    return buf;
-}
+    DWORD envlen; 
+    WCHAR *var; 
+ 
+    /* Look up various environment variables. */ 
+    if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"RANDFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) { 
+        use_randfile = 0; 
+        if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"HOME", NULL, 0)) == 0 
+                && (envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"USERPROFILE", 
+                                                  NULL, 0)) == 0) 
+            envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"SYSTEMROOT", NULL, 0); 
+    } 
+ 
+    /* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */ 
+    if (envlen != 0) { 
+        int sz; 
+        WCHAR *val = _alloca(envlen * sizeof(WCHAR)); 
+ 
+        if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, envlen) < envlen 
+                && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0, 
+                                             NULL, NULL)) != 0) { 
+            s = _alloca(sz); 
+            if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz, 
+                                    NULL, NULL) == 0) 
+                s = NULL; 
+        } 
+    } 
+#else 
+    if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') { 
+        use_randfile = 0; 
+        s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME"); 
+    } 
+#endif 
+ 
+#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME 
+    if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) 
+        s = DEFAULT_HOME; 
+#endif 
+    if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') 
+        return NULL; 
+ 
+    len = strlen(s); 
+    if (use_randfile) { 
+        if (len + 1 >= size) 
+            return NULL; 
+        strcpy(buf, s); 
+    } else { 
+        if (len + 1 + strlen(RFILE) + 1 >= size) 
+            return NULL; 
+        strcpy(buf, s); 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS 
+        strcat(buf, "/"); 
+#endif 
+        strcat(buf, RFILE); 
+    } 
+ 
+    return buf; 
+}