intermediate changes

ref:cde9a383711a11544ce7e107a78147fb96cc4029

1 files changed, 314 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..229ce864a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# include <unixio.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+#  include <windows.h>
+#  include <io.h>
+#  define stat    _stat
+#  define chmod   _chmod
+#  define open    _open
+#  define fdopen  _fdopen
+#  define fstat   _fstat
+#  define fileno  _fileno
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
+ * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
+ * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
+ * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
+ * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
+ */
+# if !defined(S_ISREG)
+#   define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG)
+# endif
+
+#define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024
+#define RFILE ".rnd"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+/*
+ * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
+ * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what.  We know that
+ * stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
+ *
+ * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
+ * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
+ */
+static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
+        (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
+# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \
+        "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
+# define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
+ * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c  If |bytes| is
+ * -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount.
+ */
+int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
+{
+    /*
+     * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount
+     * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose
+     * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such
+     * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk
+     * (unless it's the only one).
+     */
+#define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH)
+    unsigned char buf[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE];
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+    struct stat sb;
+#endif
+    int i, n, ret = 0;
+    FILE *in;
+
+    if (bytes == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb")) == NULL) {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+    if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
+        fclose(in);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (bytes < 0) {
+        if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
+            bytes = sb.st_size;
+        else
+            bytes = RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH;
+    }
+#endif
+    /*
+     * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
+     * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
+     * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer
+     * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning
+     * temporarily.
+     */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma environment save
+# pragma message disable maylosedata2
+#endif
+    /*
+     * Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have
+     * no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its
+     * contents lying around?
+     */
+    setbuf(in, NULL);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
+# pragma environment restore
+#endif
+
+    for ( ; ; ) {
+        if (bytes > 0)
+            n = (bytes <= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE) ? (int)bytes : RAND_BUF_SIZE;
+        else
+            n = RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE;
+        i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
+#ifdef EINTR
+        if (ferror(in) && errno == EINTR){
+            clearerr(in);
+            if (i == 0)
+                continue;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (i == 0)
+            break;
+
+        RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
+        ret += i;
+
+        /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */
+        if (bytes > 0 && (bytes -= i) <= 0)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
+    fclose(in);
+    if (!RAND_status()) {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[RAND_BUF_SIZE];
+    int ret = -1;
+    FILE *out = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+    struct stat sb;
+
+    if (stat(file, &sb) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
+        return -1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Collect enough random data. */
+    if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf, (int)sizeof(buf)) != 1)
+        return  -1;
+
+#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+    {
+# ifndef O_BINARY
+#  define O_BINARY 0
+# endif
+        /*
+         * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
+         * should be restrictive from the start
+         */
+        int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
+        if (fd != -1)
+            out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+    /*
+     * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
+     * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
+     * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
+     * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
+     * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
+     * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
+     * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
+     * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
+     * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
+     * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
+     * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
+     * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
+     * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
+     * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
+     * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
+     */
+    out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+");
+#endif
+
+    if (out == NULL)
+        out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb");
+    if (out == NULL) {
+        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+    /*
+     * Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing.
+     */
+    chmod(file, 0600);
+#endif
+
+    ret = fwrite(buf, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE, out);
+    fclose(out);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, RAND_BUF_SIZE);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+    char *s = NULL;
+    size_t len;
+    int use_randfile = 1;
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+    DWORD envlen;
+    WCHAR *var;
+
+    /* Look up various environment variables. */
+    if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"RANDFILE", NULL, 0)) == 0) {
+        use_randfile = 0;
+        if ((envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"HOME", NULL, 0)) == 0
+                && (envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"USERPROFILE",
+                                                  NULL, 0)) == 0)
+            envlen = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var = L"SYSTEMROOT", NULL, 0);
+    }
+
+    /* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */
+    if (envlen != 0) {
+        int sz;
+        WCHAR *val = _alloca(envlen * sizeof(WCHAR));
+
+        if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, envlen) < envlen
+                && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0,
+                                             NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+            s = _alloca(sz);
+            if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz,
+                                    NULL, NULL) == 0)
+                s = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    if ((s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL || *s == '\0') {
+        use_randfile = 0;
+        s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME");
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
+    if (!use_randfile && s == NULL)
+        s = DEFAULT_HOME;
+#endif
+    if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
+        return NULL;
+
+    len = strlen(s);
+    if (use_randfile) {
+        if (len + 1 >= size)
+            return NULL;
+        strcpy(buf, s);
+    } else {
+        if (len + 1 + strlen(RFILE) + 1 >= size)
+            return NULL;
+        strcpy(buf, s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+        strcat(buf, "/");
+#endif
+        strcat(buf, RFILE);
+    }
+
+    return buf;
+}