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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ 
#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 
#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 
 
/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies 
   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the 
   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be 
   changed from user-level. */ 
#define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X)) 
 
#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 
 
/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support 
   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under 
   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks 
   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is 
   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the 
   executable file. */ 
#define SECURE_NOROOT			0 
#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED		1  /* make bit-0 immutable */ 
 
#define SECBIT_NOROOT		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) 
#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) 
 
/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". 
   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on 
   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause 
   capabilities to be gained/lost. */ 
#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP		2 
#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED	3  /* make bit-2 immutable */ 
 
#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) 
#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ 
			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) 
 
/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after 
   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by 
   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both 
   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d 
   child can use this feature again. */ 
#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS		4 
#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED		5  /* make bit-4 immutable */ 
 
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS	(issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) 
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) 
 
/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */ 
#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE		6 
#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED	7  /* make bit-6 immutable */ 
 
#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)) 
#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \ 
			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED)) 
 
#define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ 
				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ 
				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \ 
				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)) 
#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) 
 
#endif /* _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */