// Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../../internal.h" #include "../../mem_internal.h" #include "internal.h" using namespace bssl; size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->key_len; } size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->nonce_len; } size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->overhead; } size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->max_tag_len; } void EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD_CTX)); } EVP_AEAD_CTX *EVP_AEAD_CTX_new(const EVP_AEAD *aead, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx = New(); if (!ctx) { return nullptr; } EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(ctx); if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx, aead, key, key_len, tag_len, nullptr)) { return ctx; } EVP_AEAD_CTX_free(ctx); return nullptr; } void EVP_AEAD_CTX_free(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == nullptr) { return; } EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); Delete(ctx); } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl) { if (!aead->init) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_NO_DIRECTION_SET); ctx->aead = nullptr; return 0; } return EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx, aead, key, key_len, tag_len, evp_aead_open); } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { if (key_len != aead->key_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE); ctx->aead = nullptr; return 0; } ctx->aead = aead; int ok; if (aead->init) { ok = aead->init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len); } else { ok = aead->init_with_direction(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir); } if (!ok) { ctx->aead = nullptr; } return ok; } void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->aead == nullptr) { return; } ctx->aead->cleanup(ctx); ctx->aead = nullptr; } // check_alias returns 1 if |out| is compatible with |in| and 0 otherwise. If // |in| and |out| alias, we require that |in| == |out|. static int check_alias(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) { if (!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, out_len)) { return 1; } return in == out; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out_len); *out_len = 0; } }); if (max_out_len < in_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; iovec[0].in = in; iovec[0].out = out; iovec[0].len = in_len; CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; aadvec[0].in = ad; aadvec[0].len = ad_len; if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_sealv(ctx, iovec, 1, out + in_len, out_len, max_out_len - in_len, nonce, nonce_len, aadvec, 1)) { *out_len = 0; return 0; } *out_len += in_len; ok = true; return 1; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, in_len); OPENSSL_memset(out_tag, 0, max_out_tag_len); *out_tag_len = 0; } }); CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[2]; iovec[0].in = in; iovec[0].out = out; iovec[0].len = in_len; iovec[1].in = extra_in; iovec[1].out = out_tag; iovec[1].len = extra_in_len; CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; aadvec[0].in = ad; aadvec[0].len = ad_len; if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_sealv( ctx, iovec, extra_in_len ? 2 : 1, out_tag + extra_in_len, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len - extra_in_len, nonce, nonce_len, aadvec, 1)) { *out_tag_len = 0; return 0; } *out_tag_len += extra_in_len; ok = true; return 1; } static bool check_iovec_internal_alias(Span iovecs) { for (size_t i = 0; i < iovecs.size(); ++i) { // Same index check. if (!check_alias(iovecs[i].in, iovecs[i].len, iovecs[i].out, iovecs[i].len)) { return false; } #if !defined(NDEBUG) // Unrealistic cases; they'd be harmful but also extremely unlikely anyone // will ever get those wrong. Thus skip them in release builds. for (size_t j = i + 1; j < iovecs.size(); ++j) { if (buffers_alias(iovecs[i].in, iovecs[i].len, // iovecs[j].out, iovecs[j].len) || buffers_alias(iovecs[i].out, iovecs[i].len, // iovecs[j].in, iovecs[j].len) || buffers_alias(iovecs[i].out, iovecs[i].len, // iovecs[j].out, iovecs[j].len)) { return false; } } #endif } return true; } #if !defined(NDEBUG) static bool check_ivec_buf_alias(Span ivecs, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) { for (const CRYPTO_IVEC &ivec : ivecs) { if (buffers_alias(ivec.in, ivec.len, buf, buf_len)) { return false; } } return true; } static bool check_iovec_out_ivec_alias(Span iovecs, Span ivecs) { for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { if (!check_ivec_buf_alias(ivecs, iovec.out, iovec.len)) { return false; } } return true; } static bool check_iovec_buf_alias(Span iovecs, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) { for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { if (buffers_alias(iovec.in, iovec.len, buf, buf_len)) { return false; } if (buffers_alias(iovec.out, iovec.len, buf, buf_len)) { return false; } } return true; } static bool check_iovec_out_buf_alias(Span iovecs, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len) { for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { if (buffers_alias(iovec.out, iovec.len, buf, buf_len)) { return false; } } return true; } #endif static bool check_iovec_alias(Span iovecs, Span aadvecs, const uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in1, size_t in1_len, const uint8_t *in2, size_t in2_len) { return #if !defined(NDEBUG) // Unrealistic cases; they'd be harmful but also extremely unlikely anyone // will ever get those wrong. Thus skip them in release builds. // // iovec.out <-> aadvec. check_iovec_out_ivec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs) && // iovec <-> out. check_iovec_buf_alias(iovecs, out, out_len) && // iovec.out <-> in1. check_iovec_out_buf_alias(iovecs, in1, in1_len) && // iovec.out <-> in2. check_iovec_out_buf_alias(iovecs, in2, in2_len) && // aadvec <-> out. check_ivec_buf_alias(aadvecs, out, out_len) && // out <-> in1. !buffers_alias(out, out_len, in1, in1_len) && // out <-> in2. !buffers_alias(out, out_len, in2, in2_len) && #endif // iovec <-> iovec. check_iovec_internal_alias(iovecs); } static void clear_iovec(Span iovecs) { for (const CRYPTO_IOVEC &iovec : iovecs) { OPENSSL_memset(iovec.out, 0, iovec.len); } } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_sealv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const CRYPTO_IOVEC *iovec, size_t num_iovec, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const CRYPTO_IVEC *aadvec, size_t num_aadvec) { Span iovecs(iovec, num_iovec); Span aadvecs(aadvec, num_aadvec); bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. clear_iovec(iovecs); OPENSSL_memset(out_tag, 0, max_out_tag_len); *out_tag_len = 0; } }); if (!bssl::iovec::IsValid(iovecs) || !bssl::iovec::IsValid(aadvecs)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } // Enforce aliasing rules: no output may alias any input, with the one // exception that an iovec member's |in| and |out| pointers may be identical // for in-place operation. if (!check_iovec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs, out_tag, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, nullptr, 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); return 0; } if (!ctx->aead->sealv) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } if (ctx->aead->sealv(ctx, iovecs, Span(out_tag, max_out_tag_len), out_tag_len, Span(nonce, nonce_len), aadvecs)) { ok = true; return 1; } return 0; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad // data. OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out_len); *out_len = 0; } }); if (ctx->tag_len) { // If the tag length is known, the caller only needs to provide enough // space for in_len - tag_len. if (in_len < ctx->tag_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } size_t plaintext_len = in_len - ctx->tag_len; if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; iovec[0].in = in; iovec[0].out = out; iovec[0].len = plaintext_len; CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; aadvec[0].in = ad; aadvec[0].len = ad_len; if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv_detached(ctx, iovec, 1, nonce, nonce_len, in + plaintext_len, ctx->tag_len, aadvec, 1)) { return 0; } *out_len = plaintext_len; ok = true; return 1; } if (max_out_len < in_len) { // Variable tag length AEADs need to be able to decrypt the entire // plaintext before they can split it up. So the caller has to provide // sufficient max_out_len for temporary data. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; iovec[0].in = in; iovec[0].out = out; iovec[0].len = in_len; CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; aadvec[0].in = ad; aadvec[0].len = ad_len; if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv(ctx, iovec, 1, out_len, nonce, nonce_len, aadvec, 1)) { return 0; } ok = true; return 1; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad // data. OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, in_len); } }); CRYPTO_IOVEC iovec[1]; iovec[0].in = in; iovec[0].out = out; iovec[0].len = in_len; CRYPTO_IVEC aadvec[1]; aadvec[0].in = ad; aadvec[0].len = ad_len; if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv_detached(ctx, iovec, 1, nonce, nonce_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, aadvec, 1)) { return 0; } ok = true; return 1; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const CRYPTO_IOVEC *iovec, size_t num_iovec, size_t *out_total_bytes, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const CRYPTO_IVEC *aadvec, size_t num_aadvec) { Span iovecs(iovec, num_iovec); Span aadvecs(aadvec, num_aadvec); bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad // data. clear_iovec(iovecs); *out_total_bytes = 0; } }); if (!bssl::iovec::IsValid(iovecs) || !bssl::iovec::IsValid(aadvecs)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } // Enforce aliasing rules: no output may alias any input, with the one // exception that an iovec member's |in| and |out| pointers may be identical // for in-place operation. if (!check_iovec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs, nullptr, 0, nonce, nonce_len, nullptr, 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); return 0; } if (!ctx->aead->openv) { if (ctx->tag_len && ctx->aead->openv_detached) { // Try with a detached tag. InplaceVector detached_iovecs; detached_iovecs.CopyFrom(iovecs); uint8_t tagbuf[EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD]; std::optional> tag = bssl::iovec::GetAndRemoveSuffix( Span(tagbuf).first(ctx->tag_len), Span(detached_iovecs)); if (!tag.has_value()) { // I.e. no |ctx->tag_len| bytes available. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } if (ctx->aead->openv_detached(ctx, detached_iovecs, Span(nonce, nonce_len), *tag, aadvecs)) { ok = true; *out_total_bytes = bssl::iovec::TotalLength(Span(detached_iovecs)); return 1; } return 0; } OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } if (ctx->aead->openv(ctx, iovecs, out_total_bytes, Span(nonce, nonce_len), aadvecs)) { ok = true; return 1; } return 0; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_openv_detached(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const CRYPTO_IOVEC *iovec, size_t num_iovec, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, const CRYPTO_IVEC *aadvec, size_t num_aadvec) { Span iovecs(iovec, num_iovec); Span aadvecs(aadvec, num_aadvec); bool ok = false; Cleanup cleanup([&] { if (!ok) { // In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller // that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad // data. clear_iovec(iovecs); } }); if (!bssl::iovec::IsValid(iovecs) || !bssl::iovec::IsValid(aadvecs)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (in_tag_len > EVP_AEAD_MAX_OPEN_OVERHEAD) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_TAG_SIZE); return 0; } // Enforce aliasing rules: no output may alias any input, with the one // exception that an iovec member's |in| and |out| pointers may be identical // for in-place operation. if (!check_iovec_alias(iovecs, aadvecs, nullptr, 0, nonce, nonce_len, in_tag, in_tag_len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); return 0; } if (!ctx->aead->openv_detached) { // AEADs with variable overhead may provide openv instead of openv_detached. // While one might call openv and then, on success, discard the result if // the length was wrong, this requires callers to predict the plaintext // length first. We do not expect callers to do this, especially in the TLS // CBC construction, where this length is sensitive to the Lucky 13 attack. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } if (ctx->aead->openv_detached(ctx, iovecs, Span(nonce, nonce_len), Span(in_tag, in_tag_len), aadvecs)) { ok = true; return 1; } return 0; } const EVP_AEAD *EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->aead; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_len) { if (ctx->aead->get_iv == nullptr) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return ctx->aead->get_iv(ctx, out_iv, out_len); } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, size_t *out_tag_len, const size_t in_len, const size_t extra_in_len) { size_t tag_len; if (ctx->aead->tag_len) { if (in_len + extra_in_len < in_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); *out_tag_len = 0; return 0; } tag_len = ctx->aead->tag_len(ctx, in_len + extra_in_len); } else { tag_len = ctx->tag_len; } if (extra_in_len + tag_len < extra_in_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); *out_tag_len = 0; return 0; } *out_tag_len = extra_in_len + tag_len; return 1; }