Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.

6 files changed, 96 insertions, 96 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
index 0f39275baa..de5434b142 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
@@ -1054,18 +1054,18 @@ static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
      */
     if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
             && s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
-            && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL
-            && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0
+            && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL 
+            && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0 
             && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
         /* we are using an ECC cipher */
         size_t i;
-        unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats;
+        unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats; 
 
-        for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) { 
             if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
                 break;
         }
-        if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) {
+        if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) { 
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
                      SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
             return 0;
@@ -1476,13 +1476,13 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
     unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     unsigned char *early_secret;
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC 
     static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = { 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 };
-    static const unsigned char external_label[]   = { 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 };
-#else
+    static const unsigned char external_label[]   = { 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 }; 
+#else 
     static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
     static const unsigned char external_label[] = "ext binder";
-#endif
+#endif 
     const unsigned char *label;
     size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize;
     int hashsizei = EVP_MD_size(md);
@@ -1681,9 +1681,9 @@ static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
             || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
             || !s->ext.early_data_ok
             || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
-            || (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL
-                && !s->allow_early_data_cb(s,
-                                         s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) {
+            || (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL 
+                && !s->allow_early_data_cb(s, 
+                                         s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) { 
         s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
     } else {
         s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index ce8a75794c..f57548985e 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
     int dores = 0;
 
-    s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+    s->ext.tick_identity = 0; 
 
     /*
      * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
         agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
 
         reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
-        s->ext.tick_identity++;
+        s->ext.tick_identity++; 
         dores = 1;
     }
 
@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
                      ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
         }
-        s->ext.tick_identity++;
+        s->ext.tick_identity++; 
     }
 
     if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
@@ -1372,20 +1372,20 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
             return 0;
         }
 
-        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
-        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
-        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
-        if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
+        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; 
+        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); 
+        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); 
+        if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) { 
             s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return 0;
         }
 
-        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
+        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; 
 
         if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
-                               s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
+                               s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, 
                                ecpointformats_len)) {
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1868,8 +1868,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-    if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
+    skey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 
+    if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) { 
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
@@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     }
 
     if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
-            || !s->hit) {
+            || !s->hit) { 
         /*
          * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
          * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
@@ -1962,28 +1962,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
-                 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
-     * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
-     * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
-     */
-    if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
+    if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) { 
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, 
+                 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); 
+        return 0; 
+    } 
+ 
+    /* 
+     * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the 
+     * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we 
+     * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket. 
+     */ 
+    if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) { 
         s->hit = 1;
         SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
         s->psksession = NULL;
         return 1;
     }
 
-    if (s->psksession == NULL) {
-        /* Should never happen */
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
-                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    if (s->psksession == NULL) { 
+        /* Should never happen */ 
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, 
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -2002,9 +2002,9 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
     s->session = s->psksession;
     s->psksession = NULL;
     s->hit = 1;
-    /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
-    if (identity != 0)
-        s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+    /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */ 
+    if (identity != 0) 
+        s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 
 #endif
 
     return 1;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 04f64f8106..5655567d09 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -259,8 +259,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
 
     if (!s->hit) {
         if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
-                           &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
-                           &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
+                           &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, 
+                           &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) { 
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return 0;
@@ -967,12 +967,12 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     }
 
     if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
-        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
-        s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
-        s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
+        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups); 
+        s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL; 
+        s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0; 
         if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
-                           &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
-                           &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) {
+                           &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups, 
+                           &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) { 
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
                      ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
         goto err;
     }
 
-    s->ext.tick_identity = id;
+    s->ext.tick_identity = id; 
 
     SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
     s->session = sess;
@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
     unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
     unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
     int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
-                    && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
+                    && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL); 
     const unsigned char *plist;
     size_t plistlen;
 
@@ -1498,10 +1498,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
                                              unsigned int context, X509 *x,
                                              size_t chainidx)
 {
-    /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
-    if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
-        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
-
+    /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */ 
+    if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) 
+        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 
+ 
     if (!s->ext.status_expected)
         return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
 
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
             || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
-            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
+            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity) 
             || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                  SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index d1a3969812..705b4a77ac 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -1608,7 +1608,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
          * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
          * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
          */
-        if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+        if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { 
             tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
             if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
                 /* SSLfatal() already called */
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index c3b6f8f456..3a1897edf1 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -168,19 +168,19 @@ int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
                                     void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
 {
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC 
     static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
-     0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
-     0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
-     0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
+     0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 
+     0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, 
+     0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; 
     static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
-     0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
-     0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
-     0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
-#else
+     0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 
+     0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, 
+     0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; 
+#else 
     static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
     static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
-#endif
+#endif 
     if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
         size_t hashlen;
 
@@ -655,9 +655,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     /*
      * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
      * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
-     * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
+     * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). 
      */
-    if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
+    if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) 
         s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
 
     if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index d701c46b43..911d9f8d80 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -792,10 +792,10 @@ static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
     case ECONNRESET:
         return 1;
 #endif
-#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
-    case WSAECONNRESET:
-        return 1;
-#endif
+#if defined(WSAECONNRESET) 
+    case WSAECONNRESET: 
+        return 1; 
+#endif 
     default:
         return 0;
     }
@@ -1946,14 +1946,14 @@ static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
                 && master_key_length > 0) {
             s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
             s->hit = 1;
-            s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
+            s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; 
             s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
 
             ciphers = NULL;
 
             /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
             if (pref_cipher == NULL)
-                pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
+                pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, 
                                                  SSL_get_ciphers(s));
             if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
                 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
@@ -1964,9 +1964,9 @@ static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
             s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-            s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
+            s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); 
             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-            s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
+            s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers); 
         }
     }
 
@@ -2066,12 +2066,12 @@ static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
     /*
-     * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+     * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 
      */
 
     if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
-        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
-        s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); 
+        s->peer_ciphers = ciphers; 
         if (ciphers == NULL) {
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
@@ -2087,10 +2087,10 @@ static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #else
         s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
 #endif
-        if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
-            /* SSLfatal() already called */
-            goto err;
-        }
+        if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 
+            /* SSLfatal() already called */ 
+            goto err; 
+        } 
     }
 
     sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
@@ -2259,25 +2259,25 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
     if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
         if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
             /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
-            if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
-                int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
-                if (rv == 0) {
-                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                             SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
-                             SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+            if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { 
+                int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 
+                if (rv == 0) { 
+                    SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 
+                             SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, 
+                             SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 
                     goto err;
                 }
-                if (rv < 0) {
-                    s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-                    return WORK_MORE_B;
-                }
-                s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+                if (rv < 0) { 
+                    s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 
+                    return WORK_MORE_B; 
+                } 
+                s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 
             }
 
             /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
             if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
                 cipher =
-                    ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+                    ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 
 
                 if (cipher == NULL) {
                     SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,