Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.

1 files changed, 31 insertions, 31 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index ce8a75794c..f57548985e 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
     int dores = 0;
 
-    s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+    s->ext.tick_identity = 0; 
 
     /*
      * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
         agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
 
         reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
-        s->ext.tick_identity++;
+        s->ext.tick_identity++; 
         dores = 1;
     }
 
@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
                      ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
         }
-        s->ext.tick_identity++;
+        s->ext.tick_identity++; 
     }
 
     if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
@@ -1372,20 +1372,20 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
             return 0;
         }
 
-        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
-        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
-        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
-        if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
+        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; 
+        OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); 
+        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); 
+        if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) { 
             s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             return 0;
         }
 
-        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
+        s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; 
 
         if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
-                               s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
+                               s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, 
                                ecpointformats_len)) {
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1868,8 +1868,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-    if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
+    skey = EVP_PKEY_new(); 
+    if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) { 
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
@@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     }
 
     if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
-            || !s->hit) {
+            || !s->hit) { 
         /*
          * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
          * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
@@ -1962,28 +1962,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
-                 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
-     * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
-     * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
-     */
-    if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
+    if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) { 
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, 
+                 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); 
+        return 0; 
+    } 
+ 
+    /* 
+     * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the 
+     * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we 
+     * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket. 
+     */ 
+    if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) { 
         s->hit = 1;
         SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
         s->psksession = NULL;
         return 1;
     }
 
-    if (s->psksession == NULL) {
-        /* Should never happen */
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
-                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    if (s->psksession == NULL) { 
+        /* Should never happen */ 
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, 
+                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -2002,9 +2002,9 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
     s->session = s->psksession;
     s->psksession = NULL;
     s->hit = 1;
-    /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
-    if (identity != 0)
-        s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+    /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */ 
+    if (identity != 0) 
+        s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 
 #endif
 
     return 1;