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author | orivej <orivej@yandex-team.ru> | 2022-02-10 16:44:49 +0300 |
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committer | Daniil Cherednik <dcherednik@yandex-team.ru> | 2022-02-10 16:44:49 +0300 |
commit | 718c552901d703c502ccbefdfc3c9028d608b947 (patch) | |
tree | 46534a98bbefcd7b1f3faa5b52c138ab27db75b7 /contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c | |
parent | e9656aae26e0358d5378e5b63dcac5c8dbe0e4d0 (diff) | |
download | ydb-718c552901d703c502ccbefdfc3c9028d608b947.tar.gz |
Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c index 0f39275baa..de5434b142 100644 --- a/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c +++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c @@ -1054,18 +1054,18 @@ static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) */ if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL && s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0 - && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL - && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0 + && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL + && s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len > 0 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { /* we are using an ECC cipher */ size_t i; - unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats; + unsigned char *list = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats; - for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) { if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) break; } - if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) { + if (i == s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); return 0; @@ -1476,13 +1476,13 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart, unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *early_secret; -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC +#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = { 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 }; - static const unsigned char external_label[] = { 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 }; -#else + static const unsigned char external_label[] = { 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x20, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00 }; +#else static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "res binder"; static const unsigned char external_label[] = "ext binder"; -#endif +#endif const unsigned char *label; size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize; int hashsizei = EVP_MD_size(md); @@ -1681,9 +1681,9 @@ static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING || !s->ext.early_data_ok || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE - || (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL - && !s->allow_early_data_cb(s, - s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) { + || (s->allow_early_data_cb != NULL + && !s->allow_early_data_cb(s, + s->allow_early_data_cb_data))) { s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; } else { s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; |