Restoring authorship annotation for <heretic@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.

12 files changed, 216 insertions, 216 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/t_x509.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
index ece987a6bd..9f872c7d13 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/t_x509.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -365,9 +365,9 @@ int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent)
         BIO_puts(out, "\n");
     } else
         BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
-    alias = X509_alias_get0(x, &i);
+    alias = X509_alias_get0(x, &i); 
     if (alias)
-        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %.*s\n", indent, "", i, alias);
+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %.*s\n", indent, "", i, alias); 
     keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen);
     if (keyid) {
         BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_att.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
index cc9f9d1909..998a5b3c44 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_att.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
     return ret;
 }
 
-void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x,
+void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, 
                               const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type)
 {
     int i;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 1d8d2d7b28..7c00c644fc 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
-    if (f == NULL)
-        goto err;
+    if (f == NULL) 
+        goto err; 
     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
@@ -135,21 +135,21 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
  */
 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
-    int rv = 0;
-
-    if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
-        return 0;
-
-    /* try to make sure hash is valid */
-    (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
-    (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
-
-    if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
-            && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
-        rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    if (rv != 0)
+    int rv = 0; 
+
+    if (a == b) /* for efficiency */ 
+        return 0; 
+
+    /* try to make sure hash is valid */ 
+    (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); 
+    (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); 
+ 
+    if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 
+            && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) 
+        rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 
+    if (rv != 0) 
         return rv;
-
+ 
     /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
     if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
         if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
index bdd1e67cd3..d5384a6206 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, 0), "X509_print_ex_fp"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, 0),
      "x509_pubkey_decode"},
-    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get"}, 
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get0"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_set"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, 0),
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_local.h b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_local.h
index 10807e1def..23987859a5 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_local.h
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_local.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ DEFINE_STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY)
 
 void x509_set_signature_info(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
                              const ASN1_STRING *sig);
-int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject);
-int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject);
+int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject); 
+int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject); 
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
index dd674926dd..1a70be5cfd 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -286,18 +286,18 @@ void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
         *palg = &req->sig_alg;
 }
 
-void X509_REQ_set0_signature(X509_REQ *req, ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig)
-{
-    if (req->signature)
-           ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(req->signature);
-    req->signature = psig;
-}
-
-int X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(X509_REQ *req, X509_ALGOR *palg)
-{
-    return X509_ALGOR_copy(&req->sig_alg, palg);
-}
-
+void X509_REQ_set0_signature(X509_REQ *req, ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig) 
+{ 
+    if (req->signature) 
+           ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(req->signature); 
+    req->signature = psig; 
+} 
+ 
+int X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(X509_REQ *req, X509_ALGOR *palg) 
+{ 
+    return X509_ALGOR_copy(&req->sig_alg, palg); 
+} 
+ 
 int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req)
 {
     return OBJ_obj2nid(req->sig_alg.algorithm);
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index 02bde640d8..8b15e957b7 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
         return "OCSP verification failed";
     case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
         return "OCSP unknown cert";
-    case X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS:
-        return "Certificate public key has explicit ECC parameters";
+    case X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS: 
+        return "Certificate public key has explicit ECC parameters"; 
 
     default:
         /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 20a36e763c..bb787e8dda 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
-static int check_curve(X509 *cert);
+static int check_curve(X509 *cert); 
 
 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
                          unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
     return ok;
 }
 
-/*
- * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error.
- * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions()
- * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
- * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc.
- */
+/* 
+ * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error. 
+ * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions() 
+ * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any 
+ * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc. 
+ */ 
 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
 {
     if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
@@ -137,9 +137,9 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
         xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
         if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
             break;
-        xtmp = NULL;
+        xtmp = NULL; 
     }
-    if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp))
+    if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp)) 
         xtmp = NULL;
     sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
     return xtmp;
@@ -272,24 +272,24 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) {
-        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-        return -1;
-    }
-
+    if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) { 
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 
+        return -1; 
+    } 
+ 
     /*
      * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
      * the first entry is in place
      */
-    if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
-            || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
-        X509_free(ctx->cert);
+    if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL 
+            || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { 
+        X509_free(ctx->cert); 
         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
         return -1;
     }
-
+ 
     ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
 
     /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
@@ -312,21 +312,21 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     return ret;
 }
 
-static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
-{
-    int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
-
-    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
-        if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
-            return 1;
-    return 0;
-}
-
+static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) 
+{ 
+    int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); 
+ 
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) 
+        if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) 
+            return 1; 
+    return 0; 
+} 
+ 
 /*
- * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x.
- * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
- * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
- * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one.
+ * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x. 
+ * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case 
+ * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed. 
+ * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one. 
  */
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 {
@@ -335,9 +335,9 @@ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
         issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)
-            && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
-                || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) {
+        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) 
+            && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 
+                || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { 
             rv = issuer;
             if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
                 break;
@@ -346,25 +346,25 @@ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
     return rv;
 }
 
-/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
+/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */ 
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 {
-    return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK;
+    return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK; 
 }
 
 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 {
     *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
-
-    if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer))
-        goto err;
-
-    return 1;
-
- err:
-    *issuer = NULL;
-    return 0;
+ 
+    if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer)) 
+        goto err; 
+ 
+    return 1; 
+ 
+ err: 
+    *issuer = NULL; 
+    return 0; 
 }
 
 static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
@@ -376,16 +376,16 @@ static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
         if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
-            if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
-                sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
-                X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-                return NULL;
-            }
+            if (!X509_up_ref(x)) { 
+                sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 
+                X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 
+                return NULL; 
+            } 
             if (sk == NULL)
                 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
-            if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
-                X509_free(x);
+            if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 
+                X509_free(x); 
                 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
                 X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
@@ -524,19 +524,19 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                 ret = 1;
             break;
         }
-        if (ret > 0
-            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
-            /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
-            ret = check_curve(x);
-            if (ret < 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-                ret = 0;
-            } else if (ret == 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
-            }
-        }
-        if (ret > 0
-            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
+        if (ret > 0 
+            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) { 
+            /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ 
+            ret = check_curve(x); 
+            if (ret < 0) { 
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 
+                ret = 0; 
+            } else if (ret == 0) { 
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS; 
+            } 
+        } 
+        if (ret > 0 
+            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 
             && x->ex_pathlen != -1
             && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
             ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
     return 1;
 }
 
-/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
+/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */ 
 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
@@ -1742,25 +1742,25 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
         xs = xi;
         xi = NULL;
-        goto check_cert_time;
+        goto check_cert_time; 
     }
 
     if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
-        xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
+        xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */ 
     else {
         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
             xs = xi;
-            goto check_cert_time;
-        }
-        if (n <= 0) {
-            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
-                                X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE))
-                return 0;
-
-            xs = xi;
-            goto check_cert_time;
+            goto check_cert_time; 
         }
-
+        if (n <= 0) { 
+            if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, 
+                                X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE)) 
+                return 0; 
+ 
+            xs = xi; 
+            goto check_cert_time; 
+        } 
+ 
         n--;
         ctx->error_depth = n;
         xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
@@ -1772,54 +1772,54 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      */
     while (n >= 0) {
         /*
-         * For each iteration of this loop:
-         * n is the subject depth
-         * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
-         * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
-         * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
-         *
-         * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
-         * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
+         * For each iteration of this loop: 
+         * n is the subject depth 
+         * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked 
+         * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use 
+         * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. 
+         * 
+         * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly 
+         * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. 
          */
-        if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
-                         && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) {
-            EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-            /*
-             * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
-             * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
-             * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
-             */
-            int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1);
-            /*
-             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
-             * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
-             * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
-             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
-             * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
-             * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
-             * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
-             * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
-             * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
-             * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
-             * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
-             */
-            int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
-                ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
-
-            if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
-                return 0;
+        if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) 
+                         && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) { 
+            EVP_PKEY *pkey; 
+            /* 
+             * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage 
+             * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer 
+             * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). 
+             */ 
+            int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); 
+            /* 
+             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 
+             * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert 
+             * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. 
+             * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 
+             * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the 
+             * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. 
+             * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is 
+             * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., 
+             * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply 
+             * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus 
+             * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. 
+             */ 
+            int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 
+                ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); 
+ 
+            if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) 
+                return 0; 
             if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
-                ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
+                ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 
+                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) 
                     return 0;
             } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
-                ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret))
+                ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 
+                if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret)) 
                     return 0;
             }
         }
 
-    check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
+    check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */ 
         /* Calls verify callback as needed */
         if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
             return 0;
@@ -3221,16 +3221,16 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
             /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
             (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
 
-            if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) {
-                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-                search = 0;
-                continue;
-            }
-
+            if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) { 
+                X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
+                trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; 
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 
+                search = 0; 
+                continue; 
+            } 
+ 
             if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
-                X509_free(xtmp);
+                X509_free(xtmp); 
                 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
@@ -3238,7 +3238,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                 continue;
             }
 
-            x = xtmp;
+            x = xtmp; 
             ++ctx->num_untrusted;
             ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
 
@@ -3330,32 +3330,32 @@ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
 }
 
 /*
- * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
- * for an elliptic curve.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
- */
-static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
-
-    /* Unsupported or malformed key */
-    if (pkey == NULL)
-        return -1;
-
-    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-        int ret;
-
-        ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
-        return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
+ * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params 
+ * for an elliptic curve. 
+ * 
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. 
+ */ 
+static int check_curve(X509 *cert) 
+{ 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); 
+ 
+    /* Unsupported or malformed key */ 
+    if (pkey == NULL) 
+        return -1; 
+ 
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 
+        int ret; 
+ 
+        ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); 
+        return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret; 
+    } 
+#endif 
+ 
+    return 1; 
+} 
+ 
+/* 
  * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
  * level of ``ctx``.  Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
  * self-signed or otherwise).
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index 535f169a29..75b3600d01 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *dest,
             return 0;
     }
 
-    x509_verify_param_copy(hostflags, 0);
-
+    x509_verify_param_copy(hostflags, 0); 
+ 
     if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(hosts, NULL)) {
         sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(dest->hosts, str_free);
         dest->hosts = NULL;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_all.c
index a4e9cdaee8..a45f90e6f3 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
                 unsigned int *len)
 {
     if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0
-            && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) {
+            && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) { 
         /* Asking for SHA1 and we already computed it. */
         if (len != NULL)
             *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash);
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
index 7342c4f6bc..8823fa5382 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value)
 {
     X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret = NULL;
     ASN1_TYPE *val = NULL;
-    ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *oid; 
 
-    if ((oid = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL)
-        return NULL;
+    if ((oid = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) 
+        return NULL; 
     if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL)
         return NULL;
-    ret->object = oid;
+    ret->object = oid; 
     if ((val = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
         goto err;
     if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(ret->set, val))
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
index 9be7e92865..aa86785d44 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -169,11 +169,11 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *ret = X509_PUBKEY_get0(key);
-
-    if (ret != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret)) {
-        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        ret = NULL;
-    }
+ 
+    if (ret != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret)) { 
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 
+        ret = NULL; 
+    } 
     return ret;
 }