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author | orivej <orivej@yandex-team.ru> | 2022-02-10 16:45:01 +0300 |
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committer | Daniil Cherednik <dcherednik@yandex-team.ru> | 2022-02-10 16:45:01 +0300 |
commit | 2d37894b1b037cf24231090eda8589bbb44fb6fc (patch) | |
tree | be835aa92c6248212e705f25388ebafcf84bc7a1 /contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | |
parent | 718c552901d703c502ccbefdfc3c9028d608b947 (diff) | |
download | ydb-2d37894b1b037cf24231090eda8589bbb44fb6fc.tar.gz |
Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 2 of 2.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 48 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c index ab93a61e3f..302360a964 100644 --- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, - * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of + * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. * This does not leak any side-channel information. */ @@ -185,10 +185,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). */ - good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); + good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); - maskedseed = em + 1; - maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; + maskedseed = em + 1; + maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; @@ -229,31 +229,31 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, mlen = dblen - msg_index; /* - * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well. + * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well. */ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen); /* - * Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left. - * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|. - * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged. - * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of - * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying - * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real - * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern. - * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)). + * Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left. + * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|. + * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged. + * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of + * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying + * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real + * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern. + * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)). */ - tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen), - dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen); - for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) { - mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0); - for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++) - db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]); + tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen), + dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen); + for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) { + mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0); + for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++) + db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]); + } + for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { + mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); + to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]); } - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); - to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]); - } /* * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not |