Restoring authorship annotation for <heretic@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 2 of 2.

6 files changed, 203 insertions, 203 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
index 39a3a08345..c8b3bd79bb 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 #include "modes_local.h"
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
 #include "rand_local.h"
-#include "sanitizers.h" 
+#include "sanitizers.h"
 
 /*
  * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
@@ -64,15 +64,15 @@ static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
  * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
  */
 __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
-                                const unsigned char *in, int len) 
+                                const unsigned char *in, int len)
 {
     int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
         out[i] ^= in[i];
 
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len) 
-        || outlen != len) 
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len)
+        || outlen != len)
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -83,16 +83,16 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
  */
 __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
 {
-    unsigned char in_tmp[48]; 
-    unsigned char num_of_blk = 2; 
- 
-    memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16); 
-    memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16); 
-    if (ctr->keylen != 16) { 
-        memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16); 
-        num_of_blk = 3; 
-    } 
-    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk); 
+    unsigned char in_tmp[48];
+    unsigned char num_of_blk = 2;
+
+    memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16);
+    memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16);
+    if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+        memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16);
+        num_of_blk = 3;
+    }
+    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -101,14 +101,14 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
  */
 __owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
 {
-    unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0}; 
-    unsigned char num_of_blk; 
- 
+    unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0};
+    unsigned char num_of_blk;
+
     memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
-    num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3; 
-    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1; 
-    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2; 
-    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); 
+    num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3;
+    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1;
+    bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2;
+    return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -197,20 +197,20 @@ __owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
         || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr))
         return 0;
     /* Set up key K */
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1)) 
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1))
         return 0;
     /* X follows key K */
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, 
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen,
                           AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         return 0;
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, 
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX,
                           AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
         return 0;
     if (ctr->keylen != 16)
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, 
-                              ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) 
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen,
+                              ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
             || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
             return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -229,25 +229,25 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 {
     RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
     int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-    unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48]; 
-    unsigned char len; 
+    unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48];
+    unsigned char len;
 
     /* correct key is already set up. */
-    memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16); 
+    memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16);
     inc_128(ctr);
-    memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16); 
-    if (ctr->keylen == 16) { 
-        len = 32; 
-    } else { 
+    memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16);
+    if (ctr->keylen == 16) {
+        len = 32;
+    } else {
         inc_128(ctr);
-        memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16); 
-        len = 48; 
+        memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16);
+        len = 48;
     }
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len) 
-            || outlen != len) 
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len)
+            || outlen != len)
         return 0;
-    memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen); 
-    memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16); 
+    memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen);
+    memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16);
 
     if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) {
         /* If no input reuse existing derived value */
@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
         ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
     }
 
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1) 
-        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) 
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)
+        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
@@ -280,10 +280,10 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 
     memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
     memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) 
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1))
         return 0;
- 
-    inc_128(ctr); 
+
+    inc_128(ctr);
     if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen))
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -293,40 +293,40 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                                   const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen,
                                   const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
-    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; 
- 
+    RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
+
     if (entropy == NULL)
         return 0;
- 
-    inc_128(ctr); 
+
+    inc_128(ctr);
     if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0))
         return 0;
     return 1;
 }
 
-static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter) 
-{ 
-    u32 n = 12, c = 1; 
- 
-    do { 
-        --n; 
-        c += counter[n]; 
-        counter[n] = (u8)c; 
-        c >>= 8; 
-    } while (n); 
-} 
- 
+static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+    u32 n = 12, c = 1;
+
+    do {
+        --n;
+        c += counter[n];
+        counter[n] = (u8)c;
+        c >>= 8;
+    } while (n);
+}
+
 __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                                     unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
                                     const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
 {
     RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
-    unsigned int ctr32, blocks; 
-    int outl, buflen; 
+    unsigned int ctr32, blocks;
+    int outl, buflen;
 
     if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
-        inc_128(ctr); 
- 
+        inc_128(ctr);
+
         if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
             return 0;
         /* This means we reuse derived value */
@@ -338,54 +338,54 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
         adinlen = 0;
     }
 
-    inc_128(ctr); 
+    inc_128(ctr);
 
-    if (outlen == 0) { 
+    if (outlen == 0) {
         inc_128(ctr);
- 
-        if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) 
+
+        if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
             return 0;
-        return 1; 
+        return 1;
     }
 
-    memset(out, 0, outlen); 
-    __msan_unpoison(ctr->V, 16 * sizeof(char)); 
- 
-    do { 
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, 
-                               NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1)) 
-            return 0; 
- 
-        /*- 
-         * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an 
-         * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more 
-         * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate 
-         * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple 
-         * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1. 
-         */ 
-        buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen; 
-        blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16; 
- 
-        ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks; 
-        if (ctr32 < blocks) { 
-            /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */ 
-            if (ctr32 != 0) { 
-                blocks -= ctr32; 
-                buflen = blocks * 16; 
-                ctr32 = 0; 
-            } 
-            ctr96_inc(ctr->V); 
-        } 
-        PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32); 
- 
-        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen) 
-            || outl != buflen) 
-            return 0; 
- 
-        out += buflen; 
-        outlen -= buflen; 
-    } while (outlen); 
- 
+    memset(out, 0, outlen);
+    __msan_unpoison(ctr->V, 16 * sizeof(char));
+
+    do {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
+                               NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1))
+            return 0;
+
+        /*-
+         * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an
+         * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more
+         * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate
+         * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple
+         * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1.
+         */
+        buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen;
+        blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16;
+
+        ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks;
+        if (ctr32 < blocks) {
+            /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */
+            if (ctr32 != 0) {
+                blocks -= ctr32;
+                buflen = blocks * 16;
+                ctr32 = 0;
+            }
+            ctr96_inc(ctr->V);
+        }
+        PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32);
+
+        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen)
+            || outl != buflen)
+            return 0;
+
+        out += buflen;
+        outlen -= buflen;
+    } while (outlen);
+
     if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0))
         return 0;
     return 1;
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
 
 static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
 {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb); 
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr); 
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr);
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
     return 1;
@@ -418,36 +418,36 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
         return 0;
     case NID_aes_128_ctr:
         keylen = 16;
-        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); 
-        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr(); 
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
         break;
     case NID_aes_192_ctr:
         keylen = 24;
-        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); 
-        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr(); 
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
         break;
     case NID_aes_256_ctr:
         keylen = 32;
-        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); 
-        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr(); 
+        ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+        ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
         break;
     }
 
     drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
 
     ctr->keylen = keylen;
-    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL) 
-        ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); 
-    if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL) 
-        ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); 
-    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL 
-        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, 
-                              ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) 
-        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, 
-                              ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) 
+    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL)
+        ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL)
+        ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL
+        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb,
+                              ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
+        || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr,
+                              ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1))
         return 0;
- 
-    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; 
+
+    drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
     drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
     drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
 
@@ -465,8 +465,8 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
         if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL)
             return 0;
         /* Set key schedule for df_key */
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, 
-                               ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) 
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df,
+                               ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1))
             return 0;
 
         drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
index 4faa48b6d5..8c7c28c970 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
@@ -352,15 +352,15 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
     }
 
     drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
-    drbg->generate_counter = 1; 
+    drbg->generate_counter = 1;
     drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
-    if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) { 
-        if (drbg->parent == NULL) 
-            tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); 
-        else 
-            tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, 
-                       tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)); 
-    } 
+    if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) {
+        if (drbg->parent == NULL)
+            tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter);
+        else
+            tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter,
+                       tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter));
+    }
 
  end:
     if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
@@ -442,15 +442,15 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
         goto end;
 
     drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
-    drbg->generate_counter = 1; 
+    drbg->generate_counter = 1;
     drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
-    if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) { 
-        if (drbg->parent == NULL) 
-            tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); 
-        else 
-            tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, 
-                       tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)); 
-    } 
+    if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) {
+        if (drbg->parent == NULL)
+            tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter);
+        else
+            tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter,
+                       tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter));
+    }
 
  end:
     if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
@@ -551,9 +551,9 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
             drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
         } else if (reseeded == 0) {
             /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
-            if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0)) { 
-                RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); 
-            } 
+            if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+                RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
     }
 
     if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
-        if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) 
+        if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
     if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
@@ -620,8 +620,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
             || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
-    if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent != NULL) { 
-        if (drbg->reseed_counter != tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)) 
+    if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent != NULL) {
+        if (drbg->reseed_counter != tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter))
             reseed_required = 1;
     }
 
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    drbg->generate_counter++; 
+    drbg->generate_counter++;
 
     return 1;
 }
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
                             RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
                             RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
 {
-    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) 
+    if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
         return 0;
     drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
     drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
@@ -878,9 +878,9 @@ static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent)
     if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
         goto err;
 
-    /* enable reseed propagation */ 
-    drbg->enable_reseed_propagation = 1; 
-    drbg->reseed_counter = 1; 
+    /* enable reseed propagation */
+    drbg->enable_reseed_propagation = 1;
+    drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
 
     /*
      * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index bf0b661efc..5c72fad8ca 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -432,13 +432,13 @@ err:
 RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
                          size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
 {
-    RAND_POOL *pool; 
+    RAND_POOL *pool;
     size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
 
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) 
-        return NULL; 
- 
-    pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); 
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+        return NULL;
+
+    pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
     if (pool == NULL) {
         RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return NULL;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_local.h b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
index 2e7dcd0778..a5de5252dc 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_method_st {
  * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
  */
 typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb; 
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr; 
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb; 
-    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr; 
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr;
     size_t keylen;
     unsigned char K[32];
     unsigned char V[16];
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct rand_drbg_st {
     size_t max_perslen, max_adinlen;
 
     /* Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed. */
-    unsigned int generate_counter; 
+    unsigned int generate_counter;
     /*
      * Maximum number of generate requests until a reseed is required.
      * This value is ignored if it is zero.
@@ -248,15 +248,15 @@ struct rand_drbg_st {
      * This value is ignored if it is zero.
      */
     time_t reseed_time_interval;
- 
+
+    /*
+     * Enables reseed propagation (see following comment)
+     */
+    unsigned int enable_reseed_propagation;
+
     /*
-     * Enables reseed propagation (see following comment) 
-     */ 
-    unsigned int enable_reseed_propagation; 
- 
-    /* 
      * Counts the number of reseeds since instantiation.
-     * This value is ignored if enable_reseed_propagation is zero. 
+     * This value is ignored if enable_reseed_propagation is zero.
      *
      * This counter is used only for seed propagation from the <master> DRBG
      * to its two children, the <public> and <private> DRBG. This feature is
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ struct rand_drbg_st {
      * is added by RAND_add() or RAND_seed() will have an immediate effect on
      * the output of RAND_bytes() resp. RAND_priv_bytes().
      */
-    TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_counter; 
+    TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_counter;
 
     size_t seedlen;
     DRBG_STATUS state;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 184095115b..5766e5abe7 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@
 #  include <sys/utsname.h>
 # endif
 #endif
-#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) 
+#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 # include <sys/types.h>
 # include <sys/sysctl.h>
 # include <sys/param.h>
 #endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__) 
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
 # include <sys/param.h>
 #endif
-#if defined(__APPLE__) 
-# include <CommonCrypto/CommonRandom.h> // Y_IGNORE 
-#endif 
+#if defined(__APPLE__)
+# include <CommonCrypto/CommonRandom.h> // Y_IGNORE
+#endif
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__)
 # include <sys/types.h>
@@ -250,12 +250,12 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
      * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
      * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
      */
-#if   defined(__FreeBSD__) 
+#if   defined(__FreeBSD__)
     if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
         errno = EINVAL;
         return -1;
     }
-#endif 
+#endif
 
     /*
      * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
     mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
 
     do {
-        len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; 
+        len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
         if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
             return done > 0 ? done : -1;
         done += len;
@@ -368,24 +368,24 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
      * - OpenBSD since 5.6
      * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
      * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
-     * 
-     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented 
-     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS 
+     *
+     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
+     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
      */
 #  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
     extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
 
-    if (getentropy != NULL) { 
-        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0) 
-            return (ssize_t)buflen; 
-        if (errno != ENOSYS) 
-            return -1; 
-    } 
-#  elif defined(__APPLE__) 
-    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess) 
-	    return (ssize_t)buflen; 
- 
-    return -1; 
+    if (getentropy != NULL) {
+        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
+            return (ssize_t)buflen;
+        if (errno != ENOSYS)
+            return -1;
+    }
+#  elif defined(__APPLE__)
+    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
+	    return (ssize_t)buflen;
+
+    return -1;
 #  else
     union {
         void *p;
@@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ static struct random_device {
 } random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
 static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
 
-#   if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \ 
-       && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) 
+#   if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \
+       && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
 static void *shm_addr;
 
 static void cleanup_shm(void)
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int wait_random_seeded(void)
     }
     return seeded;
 }
-#   else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */ 
+#   else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */
 static int wait_random_seeded(void)
 {
     return 1;
diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 957a68ccfc..229ce864a3 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
 # include <sys/stat.h>
 # include <fcntl.h>
-# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) 
+# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
 #  include <windows.h>
 #  include <io.h>
 #  define stat    _stat