Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 2 of 2.

1 files changed, 91 insertions, 91 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 32de11b5e9..2c2812fdf1 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/contrib/libs/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -386,25 +386,25 @@ static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                               const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
 {
     EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- 
+
     if (!iv && !key)
         return 1;
 
     if (key) {
-        /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ 
-        const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2; 
- 
-        /* 
-         * Verify that the two keys are different. 
-         *  
-         * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. 
-         * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. 
-         */ 
-        if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { 
-            EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); 
-            return 0; 
-        } 
- 
+        /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+        const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+
+        /*
+         * Verify that the two keys are different.
+         * 
+         * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
+         * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
+         */
+        if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
         /* key_len is two AES keys */
         if (enc) {
             aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
@@ -805,26 +805,26 @@ static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                                const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
 {
     EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- 
+
     if (!iv && !key)
         return 1;
 
     if (key) {
-        /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ 
-        const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2; 
-        const int bits = bytes * 8; 
- 
-        /* 
-         * Verify that the two keys are different. 
-         *  
-         * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. 
-         * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. 
-         */ 
-        if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { 
-            EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); 
-            return 0; 
-        } 
- 
+        /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+        const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+        const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+        /*
+         * Verify that the two keys are different.
+         * 
+         * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
+         * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
+         */
+        if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
         xctx->stream = NULL;
         /* key_len is two AES keys */
         if (enc) {
@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
 
     switch (type) {
     case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
-        ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher); 
+        ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher);
         iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
         gctx->key_set = 0;
         gctx->iv_set = 0;
@@ -1636,10 +1636,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
         gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
         return 1;
 
-    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: 
-        *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; 
-        return 1; 
- 
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
+        *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
+        return 1;
+
     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
         if (arg <= 0)
             return 0;
@@ -2272,10 +2272,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         return len;
     }
 
-    /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ 
-    if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) 
-        return -1; 
- 
+    /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */
+    if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
+        return -1;
+
     /* Update(): Process message. */
 
     if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
@@ -2333,10 +2333,10 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
         cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1;
         return 1;
 
-    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: 
-        *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l; 
-        return 1; 
- 
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
+        *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l;
+        return 1;
+
     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
         if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
             return 0;
@@ -2852,17 +2852,17 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
     case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
         gctx->key_set = 0;
         gctx->iv_set = 0;
-        gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher); 
+        gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher);
         gctx->iv = c->iv;
         gctx->taglen = -1;
         gctx->iv_gen = 0;
         gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
         return 1;
 
-    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: 
-        *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; 
-        return 1; 
- 
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
+        *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
+        return 1;
+
     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
         if (arg <= 0)
             return 0;
@@ -3313,7 +3313,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 #define CUSTOM_FLAGS    (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
                 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
                 | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
-                | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV_LENGTH) 
+                | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV_LENGTH)
 
 BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
                     EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
@@ -3324,12 +3324,12 @@ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
 
 static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
 {
-    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c); 
- 
+    EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c);
+
     if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
         EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out);
- 
+
         if (xctx->xts.key1) {
             if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
                 return 0;
@@ -3353,36 +3353,36 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
 {
     EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- 
+
     if (!iv && !key)
         return 1;
 
     if (key)
         do {
-            /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ 
-            const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2; 
- 
-            /* 
-             * Verify that the two keys are different. 
-             * 
-             * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's 
-             * September 2004 paper: 
-             * 
-             *      "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and 
-             *       Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC". 
-             *      (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf) 
-             * 
-             * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states 
-             * that: 
-             *      "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place 
-             *       BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process 
-             *       data with them." 
-             */ 
-            if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { 
-                EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); 
-                return 0; 
-            } 
- 
+            /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+            const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+
+            /*
+             * Verify that the two keys are different.
+             *
+             * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
+             * September 2004 paper:
+             *
+             *      "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
+             *       Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
+             *      (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
+             *
+             * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
+             * that:
+             *      "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
+             *       BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
+             *       data with them."
+             */
+            if (enc && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+                EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
 #ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
             xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
 #else
@@ -3515,9 +3515,9 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
         cctx->len_set = 0;
         cctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
         return 1;
-    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: 
-        *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L; 
-        return 1; 
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
+        *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L;
+        return 1;
     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
         /* Save the AAD for later use */
         if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
@@ -3727,11 +3727,11 @@ static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
         return len;
     }
- 
-    /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ 
-    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set) 
-        return -1; 
- 
+
+    /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */
+    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
+        return -1;
+
     /* If not set length yet do it */
     if (!cctx->len_set) {
         if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
@@ -3966,17 +3966,17 @@ static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
     case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
         octx->key_set = 0;
         octx->iv_set = 0;
-        octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher); 
+        octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c->cipher);
         octx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
         octx->taglen = 16;
         octx->data_buf_len = 0;
         octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
         return 1;
 
-    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: 
-        *(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen; 
-        return 1; 
- 
+    case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
+        *(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen;
+        return 1;
+
     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
         /* IV len must be 1 to 15 */
         if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15)