Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 1 of 2.

1 files changed, 61 insertions, 61 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/securebits.h b/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/securebits.h
index 69c11a49c5..f82b4aa920 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/securebits.h
@@ -1,61 +1,61 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-
-/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
-   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
-   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
-   changed from user-level. */
-#define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
-
-#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
-
-/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
-   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
-   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
-   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
-   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
-   executable file. */
-#define SECURE_NOROOT			0
-#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED		1  /* make bit-0 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_NOROOT		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
-#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
-
-/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
-   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
-   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
-   capabilities to be gained/lost. */
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP		2
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED	3  /* make bit-2 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
-#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
-			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
-
-/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
-   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
-   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
-   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
-   child can use this feature again. */
-#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS		4
-#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED		5  /* make bit-4 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS	(issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
-#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
-
-/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */
-#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE		6
-#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED	7  /* make bit-6 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
-#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
-			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
-
-#define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
-				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
-				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
-				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
-#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
-
-#endif /* _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ 
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 
+#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 
+ 
+/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies 
+   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the 
+   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be 
+   changed from user-level. */ 
+#define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X)) 
+ 
+#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 
+ 
+/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support 
+   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under 
+   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks 
+   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is 
+   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the 
+   executable file. */ 
+#define SECURE_NOROOT			0 
+#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED		1  /* make bit-0 immutable */ 
+ 
+#define SECBIT_NOROOT		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) 
+#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) 
+ 
+/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". 
+   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on 
+   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause 
+   capabilities to be gained/lost. */ 
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP		2 
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED	3  /* make bit-2 immutable */ 
+ 
+#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) 
+#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ 
+			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) 
+ 
+/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after 
+   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by 
+   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both 
+   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d 
+   child can use this feature again. */ 
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS		4 
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED		5  /* make bit-4 immutable */ 
+ 
+#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS	(issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) 
+#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) 
+ 
+/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */ 
+#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE		6 
+#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED	7  /* make bit-6 immutable */ 
+ 
+#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)) 
+#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \ 
+			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED)) 
+ 
+#define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ 
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ 
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \ 
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)) 
+#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) 
+ 
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */