Restoring authorship annotation for <orivej@yandex-team.ru>. Commit 2 of 2.

1 files changed, 127 insertions, 127 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/seccomp.h b/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/seccomp.h
index 6d9eb18abe5..02352de7196 100644
--- a/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/contrib/libs/linux-headers/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -1,127 +1,127 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ 
-#ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H 
-#define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H 
- 
- 
-#include <linux/types.h> 
- 
- 
-/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */ 
-#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED	0 /* seccomp is not in use. */ 
-#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT	1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */ 
-#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER	2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */ 
- 
-/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */ 
-#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT		0 
-#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER		1 
-#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL	2 
-#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES		3 
- 
-/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */ 
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC		(1UL << 0) 
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG			(1UL << 1) 
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW		(1UL << 2) 
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER	(1UL << 3) 
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH		(1UL << 4) 
- 
-/* 
- * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value. 
- * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data. 
- * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most, 
- * as a signed value (so 0x8000000 is negative). 
- * 
- * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always 
- * selects the least permissive choice. 
- */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U /* kill the process */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD	 0x00000000U /* kill the thread */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	 SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP	 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF	 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE	 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG		 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	 0x7fff0000U /* allow */ 
- 
-/* Masks for the return value sections. */ 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL	0xffff0000U 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION	0x7fff0000U 
-#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA	0x0000ffffU 
- 
-/** 
- * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over. 
- * @nr: the system call number 
- * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value 
- *        as defined in <linux/audit.h>. 
- * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call. 
- * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values 
- *        regardless of the architecture. 
- */ 
-struct seccomp_data { 
-	int nr; 
-	__u32 arch; 
-	__u64 instruction_pointer; 
-	__u64 args[6]; 
-}; 
- 
-struct seccomp_notif_sizes { 
-	__u16 seccomp_notif; 
-	__u16 seccomp_notif_resp; 
-	__u16 seccomp_data; 
-}; 
- 
-struct seccomp_notif { 
-	__u64 id; 
-	__u32 pid; 
-	__u32 flags; 
-	struct seccomp_data data; 
-}; 
- 
-/* 
- * Valid flags for struct seccomp_notif_resp 
- * 
- * Note, the SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE flag must be used with caution! 
- * If set by the process supervising the syscalls of another process the 
- * syscall will continue. This is problematic because of an inherent TOCTOU. 
- * An attacker can exploit the time while the supervised process is waiting on 
- * a response from the supervising process to rewrite syscall arguments which 
- * are passed as pointers of the intercepted syscall. 
- * It should be absolutely clear that this means that the seccomp notifier 
- * _cannot_ be used to implement a security policy! It should only ever be used 
- * in scenarios where a more privileged process supervises the syscalls of a 
- * lesser privileged process to get around kernel-enforced security 
- * restrictions when the privileged process deems this safe. In other words, 
- * in order to continue a syscall the supervising process should be sure that 
- * another security mechanism or the kernel itself will sufficiently block 
- * syscalls if arguments are rewritten to something unsafe. 
- * 
- * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 
- * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the 
- * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means 
- * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any 
- * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all 
- * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response 
- * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally 
- * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. 
- */ 
-#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE (1UL << 0) 
- 
-struct seccomp_notif_resp { 
-	__u64 id; 
-	__s64 val; 
-	__s32 error; 
-	__u32 flags; 
-}; 
- 
-#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC		'!' 
-#define SECCOMP_IO(nr)			_IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr) 
-#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type)		_IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) 
-#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type)		_IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) 
-#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type)		_IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) 
- 
-/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */ 
-#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV	SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif) 
-#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND	SECCOMP_IOWR(1,	\ 
-						struct seccomp_notif_resp) 
-#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID	SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64) 
-#endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ 
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+#define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+
+/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED	0 /* seccomp is not in use. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT	1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER	2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
+
+/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT		0
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER		1
+#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL	2
+#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES		3
+
+/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC		(1UL << 0)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG			(1UL << 1)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW		(1UL << 2)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER	(1UL << 3)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH		(1UL << 4)
+
+/*
+ * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
+ * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
+ * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most,
+ * as a signed value (so 0x8000000 is negative).
+ *
+ * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
+ * selects the least permissive choice.
+ */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U /* kill the process */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD	 0x00000000U /* kill the thread */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	 SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP	 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF	 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE	 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG		 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
+
+/* Masks for the return value sections. */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL	0xffff0000U
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION	0x7fff0000U
+#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA	0x0000ffffU
+
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over.
+ * @nr: the system call number
+ * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value
+ *        as defined in <linux/audit.h>.
+ * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call.
+ * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values
+ *        regardless of the architecture.
+ */
+struct seccomp_data {
+	int nr;
+	__u32 arch;
+	__u64 instruction_pointer;
+	__u64 args[6];
+};
+
+struct seccomp_notif_sizes {
+	__u16 seccomp_notif;
+	__u16 seccomp_notif_resp;
+	__u16 seccomp_data;
+};
+
+struct seccomp_notif {
+	__u64 id;
+	__u32 pid;
+	__u32 flags;
+	struct seccomp_data data;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Valid flags for struct seccomp_notif_resp
+ *
+ * Note, the SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE flag must be used with caution!
+ * If set by the process supervising the syscalls of another process the
+ * syscall will continue. This is problematic because of an inherent TOCTOU.
+ * An attacker can exploit the time while the supervised process is waiting on
+ * a response from the supervising process to rewrite syscall arguments which
+ * are passed as pointers of the intercepted syscall.
+ * It should be absolutely clear that this means that the seccomp notifier
+ * _cannot_ be used to implement a security policy! It should only ever be used
+ * in scenarios where a more privileged process supervises the syscalls of a
+ * lesser privileged process to get around kernel-enforced security
+ * restrictions when the privileged process deems this safe. In other words,
+ * in order to continue a syscall the supervising process should be sure that
+ * another security mechanism or the kernel itself will sufficiently block
+ * syscalls if arguments are rewritten to something unsafe.
+ *
+ * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
+ * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the
+ * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means
+ * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any
+ * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all
+ * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response
+ * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally
+ * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE.
+ */
+#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE (1UL << 0)
+
+struct seccomp_notif_resp {
+	__u64 id;
+	__s64 val;
+	__s32 error;
+	__u32 flags;
+};
+
+#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC		'!'
+#define SECCOMP_IO(nr)			_IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
+#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type)		_IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type)		_IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type)		_IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+
+/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV	SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND	SECCOMP_IOWR(1,	\
+						struct seccomp_notif_resp)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID	SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */